A Historical and Methodological Study of Ends and Means in Economic Theory. by Smith, Gerald Alonzo
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1979
A Historical and Methodological Study of Ends
and Means in Economic Theory.
Gerald Alonzo Smith
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Gerald Alonzo, "A Historical and Methodological Study of Ends and Means in Economic Theory." (1979). LSU Historical
Dissertations and Theses. 3416.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3416
INFORMATION TO USERS
This was produced from a copy o f a docum ent sent to  us for microfilming. While the 
m ost advanced technological means to  photograph and reproduce this docum ent 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality o f the material 
subm itted.
The following explanation o f techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or “ target" for pages apparently lacking from the docum ent 
photographed is “Missing Page(s>'\ If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced in to  the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating 
adjacent pages to assure you o f com plete continuity .
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an 
indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because o f 
m ovem ent during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we m eant to  delete 
copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a 
good image o f the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being pho to ­
graphed the photographer has followed a definite m ethod in “ sectioning" 
the m aterial. It is custom ary to  begin filming at the upper left hand com er 
o f a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with 
small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning 
below the first row and continuing on until com plete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by 
xerography, photographic prin ts can be purchased at additional cost and 
tipped in to  your xerographic copy. Requests can be m ade to our 
Dissertations Custom er Services D epartm ent.
5. Some pages in any docum ent may have indistinct print. In all cases we 




V  H  ? N  /\ \ H  H (  > A |  > A N N  A H H f  M l  \ > 1 < » >  
1 h i  ^ i f  '  ' M l  i  M -  !■■/ , -  1 i - N !  n  i * - l  ■ / ; <  U J. - U  i
7 '4 i 7 S o *
SMI TH,  b F r f * t r ' 7.
A H J S T ' W I L A L  ■ ' ■ ;  O r . i C i l  M ' M V  n F
A n  0  ■“ t  ^ 5 I r  C ■ . 1 r  ' f f  . R y ,
T H F  L r ' ‘ l M A  <■■ i -. ■ T VF «  I T v  A M '
A 0 p  1 C ■! 7 "  ' v .  ! 1 l - r  i r ; - L  P m . L , ,  i « 7 ' J
U ni\«rsity
M ic ro film s
In terrw ional t (H )  \  / i  I 14 ■ i • 11* i A N N  M  i 4^'i i I It
A HISTORICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL STUDY OF ENDS AND MEANS IN
ECONOMIC THEORY
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Economics
by
Gerald Alonzo Smith
B.A., St. Louis University, 1960 
M.S., University of Florida, 1971 
August 1979
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is happy to have this opportunity to thank Herman 
E. Daly. From the very beginning of my economic studies at the 
Louisiana State University to the last dot on this study he has 
provided valuable insights, much-needed encouragement» sound 
advice on how to proceed, and an understanding and kindness for 
which the author is most grateful.
To Professors Robert A. Flammang, William F. Campbell, Stephen
C. Farber, Frederic A. Youngs, Jr., for their guidance on this 
project, and on many others.
To the many faculty members at LSU, especially in the Depart­
ment of Economics, who have aided me in many ways beyond the call 
of duty.
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund aided in a financial manner much 
of this study, and its support is gratefully acknowledged.
To Regina, my parents and her parents, for their support and 
encouragement during both the difficult and pleasant times that I 
have spent working on this study.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....................
Page
•  *  11
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................ iii
ABSTRACT ..............................................  v
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION...................................  1
FOOTNOTES......................................... 16
II. CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1800-1962)..........  19
Nineteenth-Century Concern for the Environment . 19
Thomas Robert Maithus 
William Stanley Jevons 
George Perkins Jevons 
Nathaniel Southgate Shaler 
Charles Van Hise
Natural Resource Economic Theory of the
First Conservation Movement................ 30
Lewis C. Gray 
Richard T. Ely
John Ise and Frederick S o d d y ....................41
Subsequent Natural Resource Economics .......... 52
FOOTNOTES......................................... 57
III. THE TELEOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF ECONOMIC OUTPUT . . .  66
INTRODUCTION..................................... 66
J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi......................81
John R u s k i n ..................................... 98
John A. Hobson.................................. 116
Richard Henry Tawney ...........................  127
G. K. Chesterton and the Distributists........... 140
FOOTNOTES........................................ 155
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
CHAPTER
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF CAUSA MATERIAL IS
AND CAUSA FINAL I S ............................ .172
FOOTNOTES........................................ 210
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................. 216
V I T A ......................................................231
iv
ABSTRACT
In his recent book The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of 
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth Herman E. Daly develops 
the concept of an ends-means spectrum and suggests that economic 
theory with its emphasis on economic growth has been both too 
materialistic and not materialistic enough.1 In ignoring the 
ultimate means and the laws of thermodynamics it has been insuf­
ficiently materialistic. In ignoring the Ultimate End and ethics 
it has been too materialistic. There are, however, impressive 
intellectual traditions that criticize economic theory with its 
emphasis on growth in production from each of these two perspec­
tives. Modem statements of these critical traditions are evident 
in current policy debates concerning economic growth, energy, the 
environment, etc. But the underlying issues are not new, and we 
can learn much from past thinkers who were perceptive enough to 
foresee the problems of a growth economy before they emerged in 
full bloom.
The object of this dissertation is then twofold. First, it 
attempts an historical exposition of two traditions of economists.
1. Herman E. Daly, The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of 
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth (San Francisco: W. H. 
freeman 5 Co., 1977): lS-26.
v
The first tradition has been labeled neo-malthusian and includes 
those economists and other scholars who because of their belief that 
natural resources are a unique and essential factor of production 
in the economic process have explicitly incorporated the biophysical 
environment into their economic analysis. The second tradition in­
cludes those economists who would attempt to evaluate the worth of 
the output of the economic system by a more ultimate goal than that 
used by most economists (i.e., the satisfaction of '’given'* wants). 
This second tradition would hold that the existence of this ulti­
mate goal and a partial description of it can be derived from a 
study of man’s human nature.
Second, the concluding portion of this study will attempt to 
show the methodological importance of what an acceptance of these 
two traditions would be for conventional economic theory. Building 
upon an Aristotelian epistemological foundation, the conclusion will 
argue for an holistic methodology which explicitly incorporates 
into economic analysis a consideration of the biophysical environment 
and the Ultimate End of man’s nature. It should be emphasized that 




In his recent book The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of 
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth Herman E. Daly develops 
the concept of an ends-means spectrum and suggests that economic 
theory with its emphasis on economic growth has been both too 
materialistic and not materialistic enough.* In ignoring the 
ultimate means and the laws of thermodynamics it has been insuf­
ficiently materialistic. In ignoring the Ultimate End and ethics 
it has been too materialistic. There are, however, impressive 
intellectual traditions that criticize economic theory with its 
emphasis on growth in production from each of these two perspec­
tives. Modem statements of these critical traditions are evident 
in current policy debates concerning economic growth, energy, the 
environment, etc. But the underlying issues are not new, and we 
can learn much from past thinkers who were perceptive enough to 
foresee the problems of a growth economy before they emerged in 
full bloom.
The object of this study is then twofold. First, it attempts 
an historical exposition of two traditions of economists. The 
first tradition has been labeled conservationist and includes 
those economists and other scholars who because of their belief
1
that natural resources are a unique and essential factor of pro­
duction in the economic process have explicitly incorporated the 
biophysical environment into their economic analysis. The second 
tradition includes those economists who would attempt to evaluate 
the worth of the output of the economic system by a more ulti­
mate goal than that used by most economists (i.e., the satisfac­
tion of "given" wants). This second tradition would hold that 
the existence of this ultimate goal and a partial description of 
it can be derived from a study of man’s human nature. This tra­
dition has been labeled "humanistic" in a recent book by Mark A.
9Lutz and Kenneth Lux.“ It may be helpful to visualize the evolu­
tion of these two traditions by means of a simple chart which 
juxtaposes these two traditions in the context of mainstream and 
neo-Marxist economists. This chart is an expanded version of one 
found in Lutz and Lux.'5
Second, the concluding portion of this study will attempt to 
show the methodological importance of what an acceptance of these 
two traditions would be for conventional economic theory. Build­
ing upon an Aristotelian epistemological foundation, the conclusion 
will argue for an holistic methodology which explicitly incorporates 
into economic analysis a consideration of the biophysical environ­
ment and the Ultimate End of man’s nature. It should be emphasized 
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The classification into conservationist and humanistic tra­
ditions is in ternis of emphasis and starting point only. Many 
writers are to a considerable extent in both traditions. This is 
to be expected because the two traditions are not really so logi­
cally independent as may at first appear. For example, many 
questions of final goals such as distributive justice and inter- 
generational equity are muted if one believes that continual 
economic gTowth is biophysically possible.** Likewise if one’s 
arena of concern is limited to satisfying as many as possible 
immediate and autonomous effective wants, then many long-run 
biophysical constraints are no longer of much interest.
Economics has often been defined as that discipline which 
studies the allocation of scarce means or resources among competing 
wants or ends. This definition has been the source of as much 
confusion as understanding because of an ambiguity in the mean­
ings of the two underlined adjectives. To enlighten rather than 
to obfuscate, it is necessary to distinguish, in the first instance, 
between relative and absolute scarcity and, in the second instance, 
between competing autonomous ends, unrelated to any final or ulti­
mate end, and competing contingent or intermediate ends that are 
derived from a single Ultimate End. Is one resource scarce only 
relative to another, while the aggregate of all resources is not 
scarce, or is the aggregate also scarce in an absolute sense? Do 
ends compete only as purely autonomous wants, or do they also com-
5
pete in terms of their capacity to serve an objective Ultimate 
End, even if the latter is not well-defined.
In most modem economic analysis scarcity is defined to be of 
the relative nature, and the goal of economic efficiency is to 
satisfy as many as possible of the competing demands or ends of 
the economic agents, which demands are perceived to be autonomous 
or "given," i.e., beyond analysis. Such use of the relative mean­
ing of scarcity, although legitimate and necessary in treating 
with a certain type of economic problem, will almost certainly 
lead to misunderstandings when one discusses the issue of scarcity 
of resources with geologists, geographers and ecologists, whose 
disciplines by definition are concerned with determining the 
aggregate supply levels of low entropy primary matter-energy (both 
living and lifeless). Such a use will also lead to difficulties 
when discussing the issue with physicists and chemists whose 
second law of thermodynamics leads one to the inescapable conclusion 
that mankind's use of such matter-energy is limited in an absolute 
manner. As for the other term, in any discussion of the appropriate 
meaning of the phrase "competing ends," economists who use this 
phrase in the sense that such ends are totally autonomous with the 
individual will be talking at cross-purposes with philosophers, 
theologians and other humanists who perceive such competing ends as 
being determined by some more ultimate or final end of man.
It must be emphasized that in going back to the very defini-
6
tions of the most basic concepts in economics (scarce means, 
competing wants) we are definitely not playing mere "word games." 
Some will no doubt argue that it does not make any difference how 
one uses the terms of scarcity and competing, as long as one 
carefully defines his usage. Such an argument can be shown to be 
fallacious because, in the very act of defining words, one is 
building into one's framework of thought and analysis certain 
presumptions that will have drastic implications at a later stage 
in the analysis. Though it is important to precisely and carefully 
define one's terms, it is much more important to take care that 
such definitions are consistent with observations of reality as 
students of this particular area of reality perceive it. To state 
that it does not make any difference what the meanings of such 
phrases are, as long as such phrases are carefully defined, is to 
weave fantasies. Such fantasies may be carefully defined, they 
may be marvels of rigor, they may be consistent to the last detail, 
they may include "n" number of dimensions,they may be logical to 
second, and even more order conditions; but, nonetheless, they are 
basically fantasies since they are not consistent with the perceived 
reality of the acknowledged experts such as the physical chemists, 
on the one hand, and the humanists, on the other.
The nearest approach to discussing these issues in conventional 
economics theory has been in the consumer demand analysis first 
suggested by Carl Menger and later followed up by Kelvin Lancaster.
7
As Lancaster notes, "the view of some economists of an earlier 
generation (Menger, for example) that goods were desired in order 
to satisfy ’wants' was somewhat along the general line of our 
analysis: the various characteristics can be viewed, if you like, 
as each helping to satisfy some kind of 'want'."^
Actually Menger had made a somewhat different and more percep­
tive observation. Menger had noted that not only did goods have 
characteristics which satisfy "needs" (not "wants" as Lancaster 
had stated)^ but also that such "needs arise from our drives and 
the drives are imbedded in our nature. An imperfect satisfaction 
of needs leads to the stunting of our nature."^
However, neither Menger nor Lancaster explored man’s nature 
for clues to these "needs" or "wants." Instead, both turned their 
focus and analysis upon those characteristics in commodities which 
satisfied these "needs" or "wants."
As Menger noted, the question of needs leads directly to a 
discussion of man's nature. Is there a legitimate study of the 
nature of man called the philosophy of man, or is such a philosophy 
impossible, and thus a fraudulent endeavor? Such a philosophy 
would have to answer questions about the essence of man, and tell 
what is helpful in aiding one to be a completely full and essential 
person in the analogous manner that a good practitioner of the 
discipline of medicine can tell us what will lead to good health 
and what will not. And just as the doctor would have to know what
8
"good health" is and how to achieve it, so would the philosopher 
of man have to know what is the "essence of man" and how to 
achieve it. Is such a knowledge possible for man? This question 
of Socrates has been debated over the centuries. The very fact 
that there has been such a prolonged debate would seem to imply 
that, on the one hand, such a knowledge was at least partially 
possible and, on the other hand, that such a knowledge of man's 
own nature will never be complete. Or in other words, though some 
questions about the essence and destiny of man will be partially 
answered, there will be other questions that defy complete 
resolution.®
The possibility that there is only partial and less than cer­
tain knowledge about every facet of man's nature is not a very 
pleasing result to modern man with his desires to have certain, 
complete, precise, and hopefully, quantifiable knowledge. This 
may, however, be more of an indictment against the epistemological 
desires of the modem cult of quantification than against the philo 
sophic stuJ/ of man's nature. It is only a small and insecure 
mind which avoids this inherent tension and uncertainty in the 
study of man's nature by stating that since not everything can be 
learned for certain and precisely about the essence and destiny 
of man, then nothing can be known about the nature and Ultimate 
End of man. We seem to have forgotten Aquinas' dictum that it is 
better to know a little about that which is really important than
9
a lot about that which is unimportant.
Unfortunately, the view that value judgments about the nature
of man and the Ultimate End cannot be fruitfully discussed because
they are allegedly mere statements of subjective or autonomous
preferences has acquired widespread acceptance within the economic
profession. Some economists may be insisting upon the possibility
of a purely positive science because they have accepted the odd
9notion that "man can ultimately only fight" when their ultimate 
values about the nature of man conflict, and that the question is 
then reduced to one of "thy blood or mine."^ But it is sheer 
dogmatism to insist that such disagreements can never be resolved 
through discussion and research.1  ̂ The Achilles heel of this 
positivistic methodology is the implicit encouragement that it 
gives to ethical solipsism. All economists agree that value judg­
ments must be added to positive economics in order to obtain policy
12recommendations. But if such basic value judgments are arbitrary 
statements of subjective preference and also an indispensable part 
of any policy recommendation, then are not all policy recommendations 
finally arbitrary, mere matters of personal preference that cannot 
be tested even if esconced in a sophisticated and rigorous quanti­
tative methodology.
Such an epistemological approach has momentous implications.
Since such a methodology will not allow any knowledge about the 
nature of man and his Ultimate End which would heirarchically order
10
the demands of man, we are led to have an unbounded volition in 
man. Thus the will which is the desiring, wanting, demanding 
part of man's nature becomes autonomous when making the decisions 
which motivate man. This Hobbes can declare, "Reason is and 
always must be the servant of the passions.Though such a 
philosophy or lack of philosophy is called "rationalism," it would 
be better labeled "irrationalism," As R. G. Collingwood has re­
marked, "many behavioral scientists are engaged in the propaganda 
of irrationalism, which is defined as the attempt to provide a
14rational basis for the irrational flight from responsibility."
Such a methodology can progressively reduce the capacity of social 
scientists for moral outrage and will result in what Karl Mannheim 
has called a "crisis in valuation" which he defined as the loss of 
genuinely ethical judgmental capacity. Lacking this judgmental ca­
pacity to distinguish between the legitimacy and non-legitimacy 
of an economic commodity, modern economic theorists, when they 
have to deal with the question of what are the valid needs and 
demands of the individual consumer, have decided that since not 
everything can be known for certain and precisely (i.e., quanti­
tatively) about the nature of man and his legitimate needs, then 
nothing at all can be stated about the legitimacy of the individual's 
demand and that the only way to proceed in one's analysis of con­
sumer's demand is to treat each effective demand as equally good.
The nature of man is thus implicitly defined by the use of the term 
"economic agent." Man is viewed as an agent with insatiable wants
II
which are given, i.e., beyond analysis. Hence the economics 
profession's use of the term economic "goods'1 as if there were 
no economic "bads." This may, or may not be, a satisfactory 
methodology; it is, however, no less a normative stance than 
anything that will be put forward in this study. Not to pass 
judgment upon it is in fact to join up, that is, to render a 
positive judgment.
This study will then pass judgment on such a methodological 
stance derived from the conclusion that the nature of man cannot 
be studied fruitfully. Furthermore, since one's judgment in this 
issue ultimately will depend upon one's view of man's nature, it 
is necessary to outline my definition of man's nature. The defini­
tion of man assumed throughout this study is one that is derived 
from the Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition: Man is viewed as being 
composed of a material body and an inmaterial component that inter­
penetrate each other thoroughly. The inmaterial dimension is, 
moreover, ranked as more important not only because it can reflect 
upon its own nature and thus orientate the direction of the whole 
self, but because in a limited sense it shares in the existence of 
an absolute immaterial reality, whether one views this as Plato’s 
Logos or the Judaeo-Christian God. Man has, therefore, the material 
economic needs of any oxidising machine, while at the same time he 
has an interior spirit that will not be satisfied with only an 
ever-increasing accumulation of economic goods.
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In medicine, when one takes a certain amount of addictive 
stimulant for the sake of good health, the amount of the stimulant 
is finite and limited by the end of good health. When, however, 
one takes such a stimulant for its own sake, the desire for it 
becomes infinite since it is no longer limited by a final goal, but 
has become an end in itself. The same is true of the output of the 
economic process which, rather than being used for the sake of 
achieving the final goal of life, tends to become the final goal 
itself. Since output is then not limited by any final goal, the 
desire for it becomes infinite. We get hooked on economic growth.
To paraphrase Descartes, such a lifestyle would be based on the 
philosophical foundation: "I make and I buy, therefore I am."
In such a philosophical perspective man's reason becomes sub­
ject to the desires of the acquisitive side of his nature rather 
than the dominant partner in the orientation and direction of his 
activities. To act irrationally comes to mean only that, given 
one's desires, one commits some action which is inconsistent with 
such desires. It makes no difference what one's desires are, because 
they are seen to be beyond the reach of reason. As long as he used 
the most efficient tools, the completely mad Captain Ahab was 
entirely rational in his search for the white whale. No less an 
economist than Frank Knight has remarked on such a view: "Living
intelligently includes more than the intelligent use of means in 
realizing ends; it is fully as important to select the ends intel-
13
ligently, for intelligent action directed toward wrong ends only 
makes evil greater and more certain."^ More recently, Tibor 
Scitovsky has written about such activity: ’This may well be an
example of the higher irrationality of behavior governed by 
narrowly rational calculation."1^
Most economists, however, have refused to follow Knight and 
Scitovsky in a discussion of how man’s economic behavior affects 
the achievement of his final end, but instead have evaded this 
issue by placing it outside of the realm of the discipline of 
economics. Such an approach might appear to be well and good; 
after all, there has to be a division of academic labor just as 
much as physical labor. Yet the profession of economics cannot 
absolve itself in this instance by such a simple side-step because 
it is of the essence of economics that it deal with scarce resources 
and competing ends. How can a discipline efficiently allocate scarce 
resources among competing ends if it has the wrong definition of both 
scarce resources and competing ends? If the economics profession 
should somewhat arbitrarily accept an unrealistic definition of 
either of these two terms (say because of tractability to arith- 
momorphic analysis), to that extent all of its mental endeavors, no 
matter how arduous and sophisticated, will be abberations from 
reality. As such they may do more harm than good.
Such faulty analysis would not be too harmful, however, if it 
only left the economists in error. But economics provides society
14
with the image of economic society and this image, in turn, notably
affects the behavior of society.^ As Warren Samuels has written,
"Economists should and do participate in the social valuational
18process, despite disclaimers to the contrary." If the economics 
profession accepts as appropriate the image of relative scarcity 
and competing autonomous ends, then such views of these critical 
phrases will in a very subtle manner become the guiding vision of 
society, which will, in turn, reinforce the economists in their 
beliefs.
Yet there have been some economists during the Industrial 
Revolution who have incorporated the concept of absolute scarcity 
into their analysis. The name of Thomas Robert Maithus immediately 
comes to one's mind when one acknowledges the importance of absolute 
shortages. There have been economists who have eschewed the satis­
faction of autonomous given wants of consumers as the final criteria 
for determining the worth of the output of the economic system.
J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi in Nouveaux principes d* Economie 
politique, John Ruskin in Unto this Last, and R. H. Tawney in The 
Acquisitive Society have each in their own way raised questions 
about determining the worth of the output of the economic system. 
Each of these humanistic economists have refused to let go of the 
conclusions reached slowly and with great difficulty about the 
final end of man by the Greco-Judaeo-Christian civilization and to 
accept in their place the conclusions of an economic methodology
15
founded upon the principles of utilitarianism and the epistemology 
of positivism moderated by individualism.^® Each investigated 
whether the increases in production and consumption experienced 
during their lifetime benefitted man in achieving his final end 
which, following the Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition, they de­
fined as life in all its dimensions, especially in the higher 
inmaterial dimensions. It would seem worthwhile to back up and 
learn from our predecessors who have discussed these concepts.
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CHAPTER II
CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1800-1962)
Nineteenth-Century Concern for the Environment 
Although it was Rachel Carson who in 1962 aroused modern 
American public opinion to the dangers of the modem industrial 
economy upon the biotic environment, she was, by no means, the 
first to recognize the conflict between an expanding industrial 
economy and a delicate biotic and limited environment. And al­
though it was the Arab oil embargo in 1972-1973 that forced upon 
Americans the recognition of the total dependence of our economy 
upon a limited and exhaustible supply of certain natural resources, 
there were perceptive scholars who had sounded the tocsin over 
potential natural resource shortages long before the OPEC nations 
flexed their oil muscles. Analysis of the relationship between 
our modem economy and the biotic and physical resources of the 
earth has a long and widely-based, if somewhat checkered, intel­
lectual history.
This section will attempt to provide an historical outline 
of this intellectual concern for biophysical resources in industrial 
economic systems from the time of Thomas Robert Mai thus to the time 
that Rachel Carson published the Silent Spring. The intellectual
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history of a concern is an elusive subject which must be bounded 
if it is ever to be finished. Since the concern is over the social 
scarcity of biophysical resources, social scientists as well as 
biological and physical scientists have a legitimate interest in 
this concern. But to be more precise, it is that area of study 
wherein the biophysical sciences and the social sciences overlap 
that will most likely generate the knowledge which is necessary for 
the wise utilization and allocation of our biophysical natural 
resources. Accordingly, in this study we have limited our search 
of authors either to biological and physical scientists who took an 
active intellectual interest in problems of social scarcity, or to 
social scientists who acknowledged explicitly that our economy is 
totally dependent for its very existence upon the physical re­
sources of this globe as well as upon the proper functioning of 
many delicate and intricate biotic, physical and chemical reactions 
within the environment.
The significance of Maithus was not in the resolution that he
gave to the problem of natural resource scarcity, but in the manner
2that he framed the problem. Once Mai thus discussed the dynamics 
of population growth and the limitations of the earth's fixed 
resources, social scientists were forced to acknowledge that the 
problem of how mankind with its growing population and expanding 
industry could survive on a fixed, limited and delicate environ­
mental base was a critical and real threat.
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Mai thus developed his position in the following manner in his
first essay on the subject:
I think I may fairly make two postulata.
First, that food is necessary to the existence 
of man. Secondly, that the passion between 
the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly 
in its present state . . . Population, when 
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio.
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical 
ratio.*3
There were thus two basic assumptions which Maithus used to 
justify his pessimistic conclusion that "the superior power of 
population cannot be checked without producing misery or vice."^ 
First, he assumed a rapid increase in population whenever the amount 
of food rose above the subsistence level. Second, he assumed a 
slower increase in the food output from the relatively fixed natural 
resource of land. Both of these assumptions have been explored and 
discussed from many angles. In this chapter I shall focus upon 
the latter of these two assumptions by discussing those scholars 
who have attempted to show the importance of natural resources in 
their economic analysis. It should be pointed out that the inti­
mately related assumption of population dynamics will not be
discussed in this paper even though the population question has 
probably generated more research than the resource question. As 
indicated in the title to his later editions, An Essay on the 
Principles of Population, or, A View of Its Past and Present Ef­
fects on Human Happiness; with an Inquiry into Our Prospects
Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils Which It
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Occasions Maithus himself devoted almost all of his attention to 
studying the dynamics of population growth rather than to the 
resources which supported the population. He seemed to take it 
for granted that one could safely assume that food was 1) the basis 
of all life, and 2) its supply could not be increased very rapidly.^ 
Most of Maithus's immediate followers also turned their attention to 
the problem of restraining population growth rather than to that of 
analyzing the natural resource base that supported a population.^
It was not until 1865 that a thorough analysis of the resources
Qsupporting a modem economic system would be undertaken. In that 
year the economist William Stanley Jevons brought Malthusian thought 
up to date with the industrialization of England and the repeal of 
the C o m  Laws.
This is what Mai thus argued. He said that, though 
our numbers tend to increase in uniform ratio, we can­
not expect the same to take place with the supply of food.
We cannot double the produce of the soil, time after time, 
ad inf ini turn. When we want to double the produce of a 
■Field we cannot get it by simply doubling the labourers.
Any quantity of capital, and labour, and skill may fail 
to do it, though discoveries from time to time do allow 
of a considerable increase. Yet the powers and capabilities 
of organic and inorganic nature always present this re­
markable contrast. The former are always relative to 
the number of existing beings, and tend unceasingly to 
increase. But exterior nature presents a certain ab­
solute and inexorable limit, uncertain and indefinable 
though that limit may be.
of the C o m  Laws throws us from c o m  upon coal.3
Jevons wrote The Coal Question in order to probe into the source
The whole question turns upon the application of these 
views to the consumption of coal. dXir subsistence no longer 
depends upon our produce of com. The momentous repeal
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of the British industrial supremacy of his times. He prefaced the
second edition of The Coal Question with a summary statement of
his principal hypothesis.
Renewed reflection has convinced me that my main 
position is only too strong and true. It is 
simply that we cannot long progress as we are now 
doing. I give the usual scientific reasons for 
supposing that coal must confer mighty influence 
and advantages upon its rich possessor, and I 
show that we now use much more of this invaluable 
aid than all other countries put together. But 
it is impossible that we should long maintain so 
singular a position.10
Jevons* position was quite straightforward. It was that the 
British industrial economy had taken advantage of the energy of 
coal more than the industry of any other country. Thus British 
industrial supremacy depended upon the use of vast amounts of 
easily accessible coal. However, this supremacy could not last 
because 1) the coal was becoming more difficult to obtain, and 2) 
other countries such as the United States and Germany had larger 
reserves of coal and were beginning to utilize their resources.
This meant that in time that Great Britain's industrial might 
would be surpassed by these countries. Also, and more importantly, 
it meant that in time the economy of Great Britain would begin 
to slow down. One of Jevons* main concerns was how the Britith 
nation of the mid-nineteenth century should use its unparalleled 
and never-to-be-repeated industrial greatness which was based upon 
coal. As he concluded The Coal Question:
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If we lavishly and boldly push forward in the 
creation of our riches, both material and intel­
lectual, it is hard to over-estimate the pitch of 
beneficial influence to which we may attain in 
the present. But the maintenance of such a posi­
tion is physically impossible. We have to make 
the momentous choice between brief but true 
greatness and longer continued mediocrity.^
At the same time as the Englishman Jevons was treating of the
importance of coal to the British economy, an American, George
Perkins Marsh, was undertaking a much more comprehensive project,
a study of the inpact of mankind throughout history upon nature.
According to Marsh, through wanton destruction and profligate
waste the earth was:
fast becoming an unfit home for its noblest 
inhabitant, and another era of equal human 
crime and human improvidence,. . . would re­
duce it to such a condition of impoverished 
productiveness, of shattered surface, of 
climactic excess, as to threaten the depri­
vation, barbarism, and perhaps even extinction 
of the species.1^
In many ways the studies of Jevons and Marsh complement each 
other. Jevons investigated the dependence by one particular 
country at one particular time upon one particular resource. March 
investigated the impact of civilized man throughout his history 
on his environment. Jevons' work was a scientific and detailed
case study; Marsh's work was that of a generalist, as he himself
recognized. Jevons was concerned with one source of industrial 
energy. Marsh was concerned with the total biotic and land en­
vironment that supported civiliation, but not with the metals and
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fossil fuels that constructed and powered an industrial economy.
Marsh introduced his topic with a brief discussion that 
linked the fall of the ancient Roman Empire to a decrease in its 
natural resource base. Next, in a wide-ranging investigation,
Marsh generalizes from the example of the Roman Empire to the 
whole of western civilization. It is in this section that some of 
his most memorable indictments and expressions of concern are found 
over the way that western man has destroyed his environment. After 
this general introduction, Marsh discusses man’s role in plant and 
animal domestication, and the effects of such domestication upon 
the organic and land environment. Next, in the largest chapter of 
the book entitled "The Woods" he explores the consequences of 
deforestation which was one of his chief concerns, because he had 
been personally involved in the deforestation that had occurred 
on the Green Mountain slopes of his native Vermont, and he had 
observed the scrub and desert regions of the Mediterranean.
The remainder of the book surveys man's impact upon two other 
aspects of nature, that of water and dunes. He concludes by show­
ing that man's actions, though individually negligible, may in the 
aggregate alter the structure, composition and destiny of the earth 
and its inhabitants.
Marsh's analysis of mankind's impact upon the earth attracted 
wide attention at the time. It directly inspired an 1873 state­
ment by concerned scientists which, in turn, led Congress to
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establish a national forestry commission and to set aside certain 
lands as forest preserves. From this forest commission would come 
the leaders of the Conservation movement that would spread over 
the United States from 1890 to 1910,
The foresters were concerned with the indiscriminate deforesta 
tion that was taking place in the United States, By 1890 the 
American frontier was coming to an end, Americans in their search 
for their manifest destiny could no longer face west and see un­
limited expanses of forest resources beckoning to them. It was 
the end of am era, and it is no surprise at this critical time in 
its history, the United States stopped momentarily to take a rough 
inventory of its natural resources and to consider just how they 
should utilize such resources. The forests were the first of the 
great natural resources in the United States which were depleted so 
rapidly and wantonly as to attract attention and cause concern. As 
mentioned just above, as a result of a concerned statement by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Division 
of Forestry was created in 1882. In 1886 Dr. B. E. Femow, a 
leading conservationist, took charge of the work of forestry in 
the United States Department of Agriculture. Since the history of 
the role of the foresters in the First Conservation Movement of 
the United States would take us too far afield, it will be omitted 
in this study with the exception of some work by B. E. Femow. ̂  
Early geologists also concerned themselves about the supply
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of crude petroleum. The Geological Survey of Pennsylvania showed 
a concern over oil supplies as early as 1874, In 1883 the Pennsyl­
vania State Geologist, Peter Lesley, sounded a distinctly warning 
note: "The next generation will gather from our oil history, with
angry astonishment, a lesson of warning in political economy, only 
useless because coming too late."^
Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, professor of geology at Harvard, 
expressed a conservationist philosophy similar to Marsh, but he 
emphasized more than Marsh the importance of minerals and the 
fertility of the soil. In 'The Economic Aspects of Soil Erosion," 
Shaler warned his readers in vigorous language of the dangers 
that their fertile soil resource would wash away if American farmers 
continued to abuse the land.^ This warning would ring true to the 
many American fanners who saw their top soil either wash away or 
blow away during the Dust Bowl era. In his best-known book, Man 
and the Earth, Shaler endeavored to set forth certain reasons why 
there should be a change in the point of view that Americans com­
monly regarded the resources of the earth. Shaler noted in the 
preface; "As a teacher of Geology, I have seen that there is a 
complete lack of understanding in our communities as to the duty 
we owe to our successors in their use of these limited resources.
It is important to note that Shaler, as Marsh had before him, 
recognized that the careful conservation of America's resources 
would not only require more information derived from careful research,
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but also, and even more essential, a change in attitude by Ameri­
cans. There was a need for more than the optimistic utilitarian 
approach that progress would be able to resolve all the problems
of resource scarcity. There was a need for a change in heart, for
a love of the earth and a respect for posterity. Shaler concluded 
Man and the Earth with this exhortation:
the great gain we are to have from the modem know­
ledge of the world is in the change of attitude it
is to bring about: in the sense of kinship with the
anciently alien realm and of duty by the gTeat 
inheritance of life. To the making of this new 
spirit no great body of learning needs go; it will 
depend for its development far more on the way of 
approach than on the mass of the knowledge that 
is gained. So soon as men come to feel themselves 
as really the children of the world, the tides 
of affection that instinctively tend toward it, 
but have been sorely hindered by ancient misunder­
standings, will help in the good work, and give 
us souls reconciled to their great house and eager 
to help its order.
Charles Van Hise, professor of geology at the University of 
Wisconsin, also played a vital role in the Conservation movement.
His book The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States, 
first published in 1910, became the textbook most often used in all 
conservation courses in the universities. One can easily perceive 
why it would become a successful text. It was illustrated, factual, 
and to the point in its message to Americans to stop wasting their 
fossil fuels, water, forests, and land.
Before advancing on to the economists' involvement with the 
First Conservation Movement in the United States, it seems worth-
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while to summarise the conclusions of Mai thus, Jevons and Marsh and 
his followers. Maithus*s contribution is well known. He showed 
that it was necessary for a nation*s economic prosperity that its 
population not outrun its supply of food energy. Jevons brought 
Maithus's thoughts up to date with the industrialization that had 
taken place in the first half of the nineteenth century by attempting 
to show that England's economic prosperity depended upon an easily 
accessible and plentiful source of energy for its industry, and 
that, since the supplies of coal were threatened with exhaustion, 
so was the prosperity that depended upon than. Jevons argued for 
a heightened awareness of the importance of coal and a public dis­
cussion of how England should use her declining coal fields. Should 
England's industrial system go out in a blaze of glory or should 
England opt for a period of "slow restrained growth?"-^ The Ameri­
can George Perkins Marsh took a wider view and attempted to show 
the dependence of western civilization upon a fertile biotic en­
vironment. His historical studies showed how man’s economic system 
could slowly and unconsciously destroy the fertility of an environ­
ment. He called therefore for more investigation into the impact 
of man's economic system upon the environment. Later, foresters 
and geologists added warnings from their respective disciplines 
about the potential destruction of forests and exhaustibility of 
fossil fuels, and exhorted society to develop some ways to keep 
from wasting such resources.
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Natural Resource Economic Theory of the 
First Conservation Movement
In a major address before the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science in 1895 Bernhard E. Femow, the noted 
forester and conservationist, concluded his presentation with this 
challenge to the economists of his day: "I close with the hope
that the students of political economy will see that this branch 
of their science, the economy of natural resources, so important 
and yet so neglected, requires on their part a fuller and more 
careful consideration."^ Evidently not one to wait around for 
others, in the next year Femow taught a course on the economic 
aspects of forestry under the auspices of the Department of Politi­
cal Economy at the University of Wisconsin which Richard Ely has 
claimed were the first such lectures given within a department of 
political economy.20
Femow's main contribution to natural resource economic theory 
was his fourfold classification of natural resources: 1) Inex­
haustible resources; 2) Exhaustible and non-renewable resources;
3) Renewable resources, but liable to deterioration under increased
activity; and 4) Renewable resources whose yield could be much
21increased if managed scientifically. It should be noted that 
when Femow and those who follow him speak of an exhaustible and 
non-renewable resource, they are referring to the aggregate supply 
of the resource and not to the supply of one particular mine or
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oil well. Neglect of this distinction has caused some confusion 
in the literature on the subject.
It would not be, however, until around 1912 at the height of 
the Conservation Movement that some economists took up Femow's 
challenge to incorporate natural resources within the scope of 
their analysis and to explore explicitly the question of the
22appropriate rate of utilization of natural resources by the economy. 
Were such natural resources to be treated by economists in the same 
way as all other factors of production excluding labor (i.e., as 
a portion of either society's homogeneous capital or land) or were 
natural resources in some way unique as a group and uniquely dif­
ferent in the manner that Femow had classified them, therefore 
requiring special consideration as to their optimal rate of utili­
zation. Until that time economists generally had dealt with natural 
resources under the two headings of rent and royalty. Adam Smith
had noted that mines could yield a rent but only if the mineral
23was relatively easy to obtain or favorably located. David Ricardo
24is somewhat ambiguous in his treatment of mines. In his brief 
chapter entitled "On the Rent of Mines" in the Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation Ricardo accepts Adam Smith's conclu­
sion that relatively fertile and/or favorably located mines could
25yield a differential rent. However, in the previous chapter he 
implies that the concept of rent should be reserved for "that 
compensation which is paid to the owners of land for the use of
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its original and indestructible powers" and that the "compensation 
given for the mine or quarry is paid for the value of the coal or 
stone which can be removed from them, and has no connection with 
the original and indestructible powers of the land," (i.e., 
royalty). Alfred Marshall attempted to harmonize these views by 
stating that the net income from a mine includes the '*payment of 
a rent as well as a royalty."^7
The conservationist did not think that this discussion of 
rents vs. royalty was adequate in dealing with the issue of optimal 
utilization of natural resources because it did not deal explicitly 
with the question of the potential exhaustion of certain resources 
and the inpact of that exhaustion as Jevons had done, for example, 
in The Coal Question. The conservation theorist would claim, not 
only that natural resources as a group were a unique input into 
the economic system, but that some particular resources were 1) 
essential to modem industrial society, 2) liable to exhaustion, 
and 3) unable to be replaced satisfactorily by any other resource. 
Consequently, the conservationist would state that mankind had a 
moral duty to preserve the vital resources for future generations 
as nearly unimpaired as the nature of the resource admits.
Lewis Cecil Gray was the first economist to attempt to explore 
the connection between the conservationist ethic and economic theory. 
His pioneer study "Economic Possibilities of Conservation" appeared 
in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1913. In this seminal work
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Gray showed a clearer understanding of the all-important difference 
in outlook between that economic theory which accepts the present 
value maximization criterion for determining the appropriate utiliza­
tion of a mine and the conservationist theory with its ethic of 
preservation of vital natural resources than has been shown in many 
more recent studies.
Though Gray states in his first sentence that "It is not safe, 
without some preliminary definition, to attempt a scientific con­
sideration of a concept which is chiefly a product of popular 
28discussion," nowhere does he give a precise definition of the 
conservation ideal. However, from his introductory discussion it 
is clear that conservation has to do with natural resources: "It
is desirable to confine the idea of conservation to its original 
application to natural resources." And that for Gray the conserva­
tionist ideal has to do with conserving natural resources for the 
future. 'The real heart of the conservation problem presents an 
issue which taxes the resources of economic theory to the utmost.
This issue is the problem of adjusting the conflict between the 
interest of present and future. It is the purpose of this paper to
estimate the extent of this conflict of interest and to point out
29the economic possibilities of conservation."
In his discussion of that category of resources which he de­
fines as being "necessarily exhsuted through use, and non-restorable 
after exhaustion," ^  Gray states that "Minerals afford a tolerably 
clear-cut type of resources which are absolutely limited in supply
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and non-restorable. It is necessary to make a definite choice 
between present and future. Normally, when once used, the supply 
is exhausted practically for all time. . . Yet the most serious 
phases of the conservation problem grow out of the fact that some 
of the most important elements, such as coal, petroleum, and iron, 
are being rapidly and completely used up without hope of replace­
ment."^ He concludes this first section with the preliminary 
observation that "In short, it is not necessarily true that the 
method of utilization which results in conservation is the method 
which results in maximum profits.
In the second section Gray asks what rate of extraction the 
individual owner of a mine will pursue in his quest for maximum 
profits. Gray's overall object is "to inquire what are the con­
ditions which, in the case of the individual, determine the 
profitableness of a conservation p o l i c y . H i s  conclusion is that 
"whether or not the individual will pursue a policy of exploitation 
or one of conservation, depends on a number of conditions, the most 
important of which are the rate of interest, the law of diminishing
productivity, and the value of the natural resources under the
34individual's control." It is in this section that Gray first 
develops the present value maximization criterion,^ which is the 
criterion that most economists had implicitly accepted in the past 
and would continue to use more explicitly and correctly in the 
future to "determine" the optimal rate of utilization of nonrenew-
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able resources.^ Using the present value maximization criterion 
as his guide Gray next discusses the role of the interest rate on 
the extraction rate of a natural resource. He concludes that "the 
general effect of a high interest rate, other things being equal, 
is rapid exploitation; whereas a lower interest rate makes a policy 
of conservation more profitable to the o w n e r . H e  concludes 
this section with a discussion on the impact of prices on the 
extraction rate of natural resources. Though he is aware that 
higher prices have both a favorable and unfavorable impact on 
conservation, he believes that the overall impact is favorable.
"There are several reasons, however, which justify the view that 
utilization will tend to be exploitative when land is cheap, and 
conservative when it is dear."^
In the third and final section of his paper, Gray attempts to 
show what could be done to make the present value maximization 
criterion promote the conservationist goal. He notes first that 
"much, however, depends upon the character of wants. If men desire 
chiefly commodities which require a large amount of natural resources 
for their satisfaction, the social demand for the objects of nature 
will be correspondingly great." And "Since an increase in social 
demand results in a great increase in the aggregate utilization 
of natural resources, it follows that conservation may be affected 
by measures whose result is a decrease in social demand. Such a 
decrease may be effected by the restriction of population or by
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changes in the character of wants."39 Gray admits that "alterations
of these kinds, however, are exceedingly difficult to bring about
by positive social action."40
Next he shows that if the supply of natural resources had been
artifically limited by restraining the frontier this would have
aided the conservation of natural resources. "Hie frontier has
been the line of minimum social demand for natural resources in
proportion to the supply and, therefore, the line where the most
wasteful methods of utilization have been followed . . . Had our
fathers made the frontier a dead-line which might not be extended
until sufficient social demand existed to create high land values
at once, a maximum economy of utilization might have resulted."4^
Gray next discusses the implications of policy actions that
would directly force the resource owner to be more conserving of
his resources even though it might be economically inefficient.
For instance, "If mine owners are required to substitute wooden
supports for the columns of ore which are now employed to support
the roofs of their mines, coal that would otherwise be lost may be
saved for the future; but coal for present use will likely be more 
42expensive." He concludes this discussion with the following 
observation:
Conservation if generally a policy which in­
creases the burden of the present . . . Society is 
confronted by. . . a choice between present satis­
faction and future satisfaction. Moreover, conser­
vation requires that individuals lessen their con­
sumption today in order that other individuals may 
enjoy the results of thei abstinence. Hence, in so
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far as it involves the saving for the enjoyment of 
other generations what we might use for ourselves, 
it constitutes a type of ethical requirement which 
is upon a higher level than any that has heretofore 
existed, --an ethical requirement entirely novel 
in its scope. The ethical field is to be widened to 
include unborn generations; not only those which 
will appear in the inmediate future but also those 
which are yet enshrouded in a future limited only 
by the uncertain period of human life upon the 
earth. Few individuals have achieved an ethical level 
sufficiently exalted to induce them to curtail present 
enjoyment foT the sake of shadowy generations yet to 
come.43
Next Gray discusses the limitations of using an extreme
version of the conservation ethic: "Conservation as a single
principle of action involves the equal importance of future wants
and present wants. It requires that the want of the infinitely
distant future shall be as important as the want of the immediate
present. Conservation as a single principle of action is reduced
44to an absurdity." This awareness that an extreme conservation
ethic cannot be the sole guiding model for society prompts Gray to
ask the question "Where is the proper balance between utilization
<1 ̂and conservation," Gray recognizes that this is a basic philosophi 
cal question, the complete answer to which would require a complete 
knowledge of the nature of man. "Philosophically considered, the 
question cannot be answered with finality without such a definite 
comprehension of the purpose of human existence as has not yet 
been vouchsafed the race. In the absence of more infallible founda­
tions we shall doubtless lean on the 'crutch of comnon sense.
Though not a very precise answer, such an answer follows logically 
from Gray's premises about the worth of conventional economic 
theory, the conservation goal and his philosophy of man.
Next Gray asks if conservation policies necessarily hinder 
progress in the future. He answers:
Exploitation results in maximum production under 
certain conditions, but maximum production does not 
necessarily mean progress . . . Maximum production 
may be accompanied by a manner of life which is not 
consistent with the highest social development. . .
A vast amount of consumption is neither based on 
welfare, nor an enjoyment; it is solely dictated 
by convention. The enormous waste of coal required 
for the electrical advertising in our great cities 
is illustrative of this exploitative consumption.
As Professor H. J. Davenport has expressed it, "Every 
great white way in every American city is nightly 
one more chemical orgy of waste, a crime of com­
petitive advertising for which some day thousands 
of individuals must shiver for months." The neces­
sities of conservation may compel the economist to 
enlarge his field so as to apply the test of economy 
as one of the criteria for the justification of 
wants.47
In concluding his paper Gray wonders what policy measures can be
undertaken to create the "proper social conditions which will
48provide the motives for conservation." Gray immediately recom­
mends a low interest rate. "A most important social condition 
is the interest rate. In all cases the interest rate must be 
rendered as low as possible. To this end adequate credit agencies 
should be provided for those who own and operate natural resources." 
Also he suggests that the prices of natural resources be kept rela­
tively high by the government. "Conservation requires the creation
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of high values; . . .  In this manner values may be kept sufficiently 
high to cause the individual to accomplish the maximum result with 
the minimum of waste."^
However, even with these policies Gray ultimately concludes 
that it is mostly a question of demand. "If social demand is allowed 
to increase by leaps and bounds, the most careful utilisation may 
coincide with an enormous increase in the aggregate destruction 
of natural resources. At this point are encountered questions of 
population and of luxurious consumption. The wisdom of the nations 
will be none too great to deal with these phases of the problem."^ 
Richard T. Ely was Lewis Gray's professor at the University 
of Wisconsin so it is difficult to determine whose ideas should 
take precedence in time. However that might be, Ely takes a dif­
ferent approach to the problem of conservation than that of Gray 
even though he cites Gray's work. Dr. Ely assumes as a basic 
premise that since certain natural resources are both indispensable 
and exhaustible, they should be preserved "in a condition so nearly 
unimpaired as the nature of the case, or wise exhaustion, admits.
In his analysis of the optimal rate of utilization of natural re­
sources Ely rejects the deductive and abstract methodology which had 
produced the present value maximization criterion and opts for an 
inductive methodology which allows more direct input from the 
foresters, geologists, hydrologists, etc. It is in this section 
that he takes pride in bringing the forester B. E. Femow into the 
Department of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin.
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Ely favors such a methodology because of his academic back­
ground which was with the German historical school or inductive 
method of political economy. As Ely acknowledges in this essay,^ 
his methodology owes much to the German economist Friedrich List. 
Though List's National System of Political Economy dealt primarily 
with the development of future productive capacity through ap­
propriate tariff policies, Ely shows that List's inductive analysis 
of productive powers is easily and naturally extended so as to find 
application to the conservation of vital resources. Since one of 
the main premises of the conservation ethic is that society should 
have a careful regard for the productive power for the future, Ely 
was able to show the necessity of conservation policies if one 
accepts the methodology of List.
Ely goes on to argue that since laissez faire economic poli­
cies based upon private present value maximization criteria would 
not ensure appropriate conservation of vital resources, some public 
ownership and/or regulation would be necessary if such resources 
were to be preserved. This latter argument is mostly done by use 
of examples though it is at this point that Ely cites Gray's work 
in his defense.^
Though there were a few other economists interested in the 
study of economic theory as it applied to the conservation of natural 
resources, their work was somewhat tangential to the main issue.
Such was the work of Thomas N. Carver, an economist at Harvard who
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was mainly interested in human resources, and Ralph Hess, another 
economist at the University of Wisconsin,^
As the conservation movement lost much of its popular support 
during and after World War I, the few economists who had attempted 
to analyze the goals and principles of conservation apparently lost 
their interest in continuing this line of research. It is interest­
ing to note that they seemed to shift their interest to the newly- 
developing subdiscipline of agricultural economics. For instance, 
Richard T. Ely became editor of Land Economics and collaborated on 
a much-used textbook of the same name while doing his research on 
the taxation of land resources. Lewis Gray became president of the 
fledgling American Farm Economic Association, author of a classic 
two-volume history of southern agriculture, and later an active 
administrator in the Land Resettlement Division of the Department 
of Agriculture during the New Deal era.^
John Ise and Frederick Soddy
A. The Economic Thought of John Ise
The intellectual void left when Ely, Gray and others turned 
their attention away from the analysis of conserving natural re­
sources to other issues would be filled in the United States by 
one indomitable academic. John Ise was b o m  in 1885 very close to 
the geographical center of the Unites States. After graduate 
studies at Harvard, he returned to the University of Kansas where
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during his lifetime he wrote three major books--The U.S. Forest 
Policy in 1920, The U.S. Oil Policy in 1927, and the U.S. National 
Parks in 1961-- as well as a remarkable monograph in 1925 in the 
American Economic Review "Theory of Value as Applied to Natural 
Resources," plus a quite unique textbook on Economics, besides 
many other papers, addresses and essays on the subject of natural 
resources and their utilization.
Though John Ise understood and appreciated the frontier ethic 
as regards natural resources, he also perceived that it was destruc­
tive to the American way of life in the long run. He sounded a 
theme in the first paragraph of his first book that would be his 
life-long concern:
The history of the United States is fundamentally 
a history of rapid exploitation of iranensely valuable natural 
resources. . . Whatever preeminence the United States may 
have among the nations of the world, in industrial activity, 
efficiency and enterprise, in standards of living, in wealth,
. . . must be sttributed to the possession of these great 
natural resources; and the maintenance of our preeminence 
is dependent upon a wise and economical use of remaining 
resources. Thus the question of conservation is one of the 
most important questions before the American people.57
Ise's The U. S. Oil Policy stands as a socio-economic classic,
much ahead of its time. His discussion of the social costs and
benefits of the automobile in particular and technology in general,
though fairly conrnon today, broke new ground for the economists.
His premonition that on the international scene "there are many
reasons for believing that oil will never be left entirely to
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COunfettered economic sale and purchase,” has turned out to be 
only too true in our time.
In addition, John Ise expanded the subdiscipline of natural 
resource economic theory by investigating the alleged benefits 
that society receives from a rapid exploitation of natural re­
sources. Unlike most economists, he was willing to ask critical 
questions of much of the consumption of his age, or as Lewis Gray 
had expressed it, he was willing "to enlarge his field so as to 
apply the test of economy as one of the criteria for the justifica­
tion of wants."
Can we say categorically, that the pleasure of riding 
from nowhere to nowhere at 80 miles an hour is inferior in 
quality to the pleasure of listening to the Eroica symphony?
As economists, we have always evaded such questions. We 
have assumed that whatever the people want has economic 
utility whether bootleg gin or Beethoven, and from the 
predominance of demand for the former have assumed that 
American happiness was increasing day by day in every way
Perhaps much of our traditional economics is pointless 
and of little avail, a foundation with no superstructure, 
a prologue without the opera. The production of goods, 
more goods, mor things, mountains of things--to what purpose? 59
In the study, "The Theory of Value as Applied to Natural 
Resources,"^® Ise probed into the question of what is the appropriate 
pricing policy for exhaustible natural resources. He began his 
analysis by distinguishing between those resources which have 
renewable substitutes and those resources which do not have such 
substitutes. For these latter resources which do not have substi­
tutes either for themselves or for their products, the issue boils 
down to the question of "how much difference are we justified in
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making between present wants and future wants?" Ise concluded, 
as indeed he must and as Lewis Gray had previously concluded,^ 
that it is impossible to answer this question in a definite and 
precise manner. "Doubtless future wants should be discounted 
somewhat, because of various contingencies and uncertainties, but 
it is doubtful if the wants of the next generation, for instance, 
should be rated less than half as important as our own. This 
would mean a discount of about two percent a year."^
Ise's main contribution to the price theory of natural resources 
was however in the next category, resources for which renewable 
substitutes are available either for the resources themselves or 
for their products. This would certainly be the largest and most 
important category, and it is in the price theory for this category 
that Ise makes his unique contribution.
On the theory of forthcoming substitutes, where 
should prices be fixed? The answer here is clear. Prices 
of the resources or of the products derived from these 
resources, should be fixed at a point approximating the 
cost of producing adequate and satisfactory substitutes.
For example, the price of a barrel of oil should be priced approxi­
mately the same as the cost of producing an equivalent barrel from 
an agricultural crop such as sugar cane. Pricing nonrenewable 
resources at the same level as the cost of producing adequate and 
satisfactory renewable substitutes would have two desirable conse­
quences according to Ise. First, it would conserve our exhaustible 
resources. Second, it would stimulate efforts to find a variety
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of adequate substitutes from renewable resources.
Ise would incorporate many of these conservation principles 
into his textbook on Economics, published toward the end of his 
long career. In an opening chapter on Land he included a long 
section on the waste of our resources and discussed the state of 
the nation's lumber, fossil fuel, and metal reserves. He concluded 
that "the significance of all this may be seen if we consider that 
our high standard of living has been possible largely because of 
our rich natural resources of many kinds.
Ise goes against the drift of current economic thinking, as 
he himself recognized,^ by adding chapters discussing the American 
consumer and his utilization of the products derived from exhaustible 
natural resources. In a chapter entitled "Human Wants and Utility," 
he critically investigated the usefulness of many of the consumer's 
purchases. In what other economics text could one read the follow­
ing about the American consumer?
He has to work like a slave every day to get the things 
that convention and fashion and social emulation and 
advertising demand of him; but he winds 141 as poverty- 
stricken in wants, in the capacity to enjoy and appre­
ciate, as he is rich in goods and in opportunities 
for ostentation. What he needs is not the satisfaction 
of the wants he has, he needs a better set of wants.
Was Ise prophetic when he concluded this chapter with the observa­
tion that "the American people may soon have to learn to adjust 
themselves to a stationary income and to find the joy of life in 
something other than a growing flood of goods--for example, . . .
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in the development of a more genuine appreciation of some of the 
simpler and less expensive but really higher and finer kinds of 
satisfactions.”^
His two chapters on the machine age explore the problem of 
technology and human life. As he notes, "We have a lot of things 
in these hectic days, a lot of movement, but little time for 
living.” "Modem transportation, communication, advertising, 
and salesmanship— all of them important features of the machine 
age--have intensified the struggle to keep up with the Jones by 
making everyone more conscious of the pace that the Jones are 
setting. There is little if any general gain in this social 
m a r a t h o n . H e  next shows the impact of the machine age upon 
exhaustible resources by pointing out that "the machine has used 
up moTe oil in the past ten or twelve years, and more minerals in 
the last thirty-five years, than were used in all history."^
In conclusion to this section, I would contend that John Ise’s 
writings entitle him to be called America’s first natural resource 
economist. I would also submit that his incorporation of the physical 
coordinates of value into his economic analysis as well as his criti­
cal questioning of modem man's consumption of the products derived 
from our exhaustible resources are still valid and deserve to be 
studied by modem economists who now in increasing numbers grapple 
with the problems that he alone in his time dealt with extensively.
It was unfortunate that John Ise was unaware of the work of
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Frederick Soddy, an English chemist and heretical economist who 
was shocked by the economic profession's lack of attention to the 
physical coordinates of value, and who urged economists to pay 
attention to the principles of thermodynamics. Soddy's analysis 
would have provided a firm biophysical, if not metaphysical, basis 
for many of the exhortations of Ise.
B. The Economic Thought of Frederick Soddy
1. Introduction:- Frederick Soddy (1877-1956) is best known 
as a Nobel Prize-winning chemist who collaborated with Rutherford 
in studying radioactive disintegration, introduced the concept 
of "isotopes," and was a major contributor to the modem theory 
of atomic structure. Although an enthusiastic believer in scien­
tific progress and in the possibility of a society in which the 
fruits of scientific knowledge would be shared by all, Soddy was 
acutely aware that history supported the view that science is at 
least as likely to amplify evil as good. He could not accept the 
confortable view that scientists have no responsibility for the uses 
to which their work is put, and although others (bankers and econo­
mists) were in his view more guilty, scientists could not plead 
innocent. But the real problem was faulty economics, not faulty 
chemistry, and in his latter years economics replaced chemistry as 
the center of his intellectual life.
Soddy realized earlier than most the theoretical possibility
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of atonic energy. Since his own work had contributed to the dis­
covery that such a vast energy potential existed, it was natural 
for him to ask, "what sort of a world it would be if atomic energy 
ever became available?"^* His answer (written in 1926) was clear: 
”If the discovery were made tomorrow, there is not a nation that 
would not throw itself heart and soul into the task of applying it 
to war, just as they are now doing in the case of the newly de­
veloped chemical weapons of poison-gas warfare . . . If it (atomic 
energy) were to come under existing economic conditions, it would
mean the reductio ad absurdum of scientific civilization, a swift
7 2annihilation instead of a none too lingering collapse." For 
Soddy, the problem was to change economic conditions in order 
eventually to make thw world safe for atomic energy and other 
fruits of science. There must be something radically wrong with 
economic thought and institutions in order for the gift of scientific 
knowledge to become such a threat. Soddy was thus led to a radical 
critique of economics.
Soddy's background as a physical chemist prepared him to 
introduce a new level of sophistication into the neo-malthusian 
critique of economic theory. Just as Jevons had pointed out that 
coal, not corn, was the driving force of a modem industrial economy, 
so Soddy carried the argument a step further by showing that it was 
inanimate sources of energy, whether coal, oil, falling water, or 
potentially atomic that was necessary for any modem industrial 
economy. "If we have available energy, we may maintain life and
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produce every material requisite necessary. That is why the flow 
of energy should be the primary concern of economics."
Soddy*s discussion of the first and second laws of thermo­
dynamics were pathbreaking^ and anticipated the brilliant work of 
Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen in this field. His investigations into 
the original source of energy (the sun in almost all cases) led him 
to distinguish between the permanently available flow of energy 
and limited stocks of energy stored in the fossil fuels, a distinc­
tion which is at the basis of much conservationist's thought. Such 
considerations led him to the conclusion that the ultimate basis of 
economic wealth is physical. "The wealth of the community is its
revenue, which, in the last analysis, is a revenue of energy
75available for the purposes of life." Nature has stored such energy
in fossil fuels, but Soddy notes that such supplies are limited
and that "what we do is to unstore it (energy in fossil fuels), an
easier matter (than storing it), and to convert it into a flow before
76it is of the least possible use to us." Soddy's investigation
into energy, its sources, conservation, and usefulness led him to
declare that "Economics deals not with energy, but entirely with
the flow of useful and available energy.
Soddy's basic philosophical approach to economics might be
called "materialism without reductionism." He argued that we must
recognize the fundamental dualism of the material and the spiritual
78and resist "monistic obsessions."
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Consequently Soddy rejects the monism of "Ultra-Materialism:"
I cannot conceive of inanimate mechanism, obeying 
the laws of probability, by any continued series of 
successive steps developing the powers of choice and 
reproduction any more than I can envisage any increase 
in the complexity of an engine resulting in the pro­
duction of the "engine-driver" and the power of its 
reproducing itself. I shall be told that this is a 
pontifical expression of personal opinion. Unfor­
tunately, however, for this argument, inanimate 
mechanism happens to be my special study rather than 
that of the biologist. It is the invariable charac­
teristic of all shallow and pretentious philosophy 
to seek the explanation of insoluble problems in some 
other field than that of which the philosopher has 
first hand acquaintance.7^
Yet a proper materialism must be one of the foundation stones 
of economics. In fact, "without phosphorus no thought" is a maxim 
that all philosophers and ethicists should be required to memo­
rize. What mechanical science teaches economics is that,
life derives the whole of its physical energy or power, 
not from anything self-contained in living matter, and 
still less from an external deity, but solely from the 
inanimate world. It is dependent for all the neces­
sities of its physical continuance primarily upon the 
principles of the steam-engine. The principles and 
ethics of human law and convention must not run counter 
to those of thermodynamics.81
The last sentence is very significant because it provides the 
basis for many of Soddy's criticisms of the economy as a presumed 
perpetual motion machine. For men, like other heat engines, the 
physical problems of life are energy problems. Pre-nineteenth 
century man lived on energy revenue (sunlight captured by plants, 
the "original capitalists"). Present day man augments this revenue 
by consuming energy capital (coal, the "stored sunlight of palaeozoic
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sunmers"). While man can use fuel-fed machinery to lighten labor, 
he can feed his internal fires only with new sunshine, or rather 
the energy of new sunshine as transformed through the good offices 
of the plant. Life thus depends on a continuous flow of energy, 
and hence the enabling requisites of life must partake of the nature 
of a flow rather than only a stock. There are limits to the degree 
that this flow can be stored for future use. A significant part 
of the requisites of life must come to us as a current flow or 
"revenue" that cannot in any phsyical sense be converted to a stock 
and indefinitely stored for later use. Stocks of assets, to the 
extent that we can maintain them against the ravages of entropy, 
are aids and accessories in improving our ability to tap the 
energy revenue, but the revenue itself cannot be significantly 
increased, and it cannot be saved except to a limited degree. In­
deed, the very maintenance of our accumulated stock of physical 
wealth against the destructive force of entropy requires the 
renewing power of the low-entropy "revenue" flow. True, nature 
has stored energy in coal, but it took geologic epochs of time, and 
we are only able to unstore it. Furthermore, the "flamboyant 
period" of using up the capital stock of coal was perceived by 
Soddy as a "very passing phase," after which the constraints 
inposed by living on energy revenue would be more clearly seen and 
unmistakably felt.
For Soddy the basic economic question was, "How does man live?"
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and the answer was, "By sunshine." The rules that man must obey 
in living on sunshine, whether current or palaeozoic, are the first 
and second laws of thermodynamics. This in a nutshell is "the 
bearing of physical science upon state stewardship."
The importance of Soddy in this tradition that was concerned 
about the matter/energy input into the economic system was the 
scientific support that he provided the tradition. His analysis 
of the basic sources of energy and the importance of the laws of 
thermodynamics added a scientific dimension to the conservationist 
tradition and brought it 14) to date with twentieth-century physics 
and chemistry.
Subsequent Natural Resource Economics
John Ise and Frederick Soddy were lone voices in the field of 
economics. There would be no immediate follow-up on their pene­
trating and seminal ideas. Instead most economic theorists would 
follow the lead of Harold Hotelling who in a 1931 article entitled 
"The Economics of Exhaustible Resources" attempted to discover
what maximizes the present value of the stream of consumer's
82benefits from the stock of natural resources. Since the market 
encourages firms to maximize the present value of their profit 
stream even with exhaustible resources, Hotelling wondered whether 
market forces would maximize the present value of consumer's bene­
fits. He found that under competitive conditions there is a 
tendency for the market to lead toward present value maximization
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of consumer's benefits. It is important to note that Hotelling 
was working under the assumption that new resources can always be 
found and/or that technology will come up with suitable substi­
tutes for the vital natural resources. In other words, there is 
no such thing as absolute or Malthusian shortage, or even the 
possibility of such a shortage, in his world-view. Only particular 
mines or wells are exhaustible for Hotelling, but not resources.
This is quite a different use of the word "exhaustible" than that 
of Gray, Ise and Soddy. For the most part, the economics profes­
sion has followed Hotelling's methodology and assumptions, and, 
explicitly or implicitly, has assumed that, for any rate of 
utilization of natural resources, what is optimal for the consump­
tion of the present generation will also be optimal for the 
consumption of future generations. As a result, most economists 
have felt that no unique effort ought to be made in the conservation 
of our natural resources. However, Talbot Page and James Doilney 
have recently shown that present value maximization, if used as 
society's only criterion for determining the optimal rate of extrac­
tion of natural resrouces, can lead to disastrously low future 
83welfare levels. Accordingly, in this section we shall not attempt 
to outline that body of literature that had derived its inspiration 
from Hotelling's methodology. Such a technique may be useful in 
resolving certain problems dealing with relative or Ricardian 
scarcity, but with its assumption of unlimited natural resources
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and/or that technology will provide such resources, it does not 
belong in a history of the conservation tradition. I have mentioned 
it merely to show where conservation principles were ambushed in 
the history of economic thought.^
During the 1930's intellectual concern for the conservation 
of natural resources dimmed somewhat. There appears to have been 
four causes of this decline. First, the socio-economic problems 
of the Depression took precedence over all other problems. Second, 
American education had become more specialized and departmentalized. 
Scientists were coming to know more and more about less and less.
But the problem of wisely allocating natural resources requires 
not only a comprehensive interdisciplinary knowledge of many sciences 
from geology and physics to economics, ethics and philosophy but
Q Calso an appreciation for the holistic integrity of the universe.
tThird, the social sciences were becoming more positivistic in their 
methodology. Since the issues involved in the conservation of 
resources quickly lead to normative judgmemts, the social scientists 
became more reluctant to deal with such issues.®^ Fourth, there 
was a rising faith that technology would resolve the problems of 
natural resource scarcity, and that conservation of such resources 
was not really needed.
What concern there was over natural resources focused upon a 
problem that was only too apparent during the Dust Bowl era, the 
depletion of fertile top soil, through both water and wind erosion.
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As the geographer Carl 0, Sauer expressed it in the 1930's, "Soil 
destruction is the most widespread and most serious debit to be
O?entered against colonial commercial exploitation.
After a description of such soil destruction, Professor Sauer 
rejected the view that technology would resolve the food problems 
of the world: "The easy denial of our dilemma by referring it to
the technologist is in large measure wishful thinking." According
to Sauer, society still has to resolve the question of how to 
conserve natural resources; a problem that Americans have not faced 
squarely.
The doctrine of a passing frontier of nature replaced 
by a permanently and sufficiently expanding frontier of 
technology is a contemporary and characteristics expression 
of occidental culture,itself a historical-geographic 
product. This frontier attitude has the recklessness
of an optimism that has become habitual, but which is
residual from the brave days when north-European free­
booters overran the world and put it under tribute. We 
have not yet learned the difference between yield and 
loot. We do not like to be economic realists.88
This brings us to the time of World War II. During World War 
II enormous quantities of resources were used up, and shortly 
after the war there were some misgivings about the adequacy of 
the U. S. resource base to meet the greatly increased and steadily 
increasing demands for raw materials. This concern over the adequacy 
of the resources base led to the establishment of the President's 
Materials Policy Commission in 1951 and to its successor, the Re­
sources for the Future organization. This commission, now usually 
called the Paley Commission, concluded that the period of unlimited
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resource availability, for the United States, was over, but, 
nevertheless, scarce resources could be obtained by increased 
foreign trade and the resource base could be expanded by new 
technology.
Not all Americans accepted this guardedly optimistic con­
clusion of the Paley Commission that natural resources were plenti­
ful, although maybe not in the United States. . In a response to 
the Paley Commission Samuel Ordway stated, "It does not seem likely 
that imports or 'technology1 will be the means of keeping us from 
ultimately reaching the limit of growth."®^
However, in the hubris of the post-World War II years the 
belief that the depletion of resources was the most serious problem 
facing the United States was held by only a small minority of 
scholars. During this Cold War era, urged on by competition with 
the Soviet Union, most social scientists saw the problem to be the 
opposite: How can we move our economy to grow ever more rapidly
and use even more resources? Because of their faith in technology 
such scientists disregarded any warnings of absolute shortages or 
environmental disruption. It would not be until Rachel Carson 
wrote the Silent Spring in 1962 that once again a large number of 
Americans would gradually start to concern themselves with the de­
pletion of resources and corresponding abuse of the environment
90upon which their very life and society depend.
CHAPTER II 
FOOTNOTES
1. The historical exposition of concern for environmental 
resources has, as far as I can ascertain, never been attempted 
in any systematic manner by other scholars. This chapter is 
therefore a pathbreaking study. I recognize that the inclu­
sion of certain authors and the exclusion of others is a 
matter of judgment. I look upon this study as a first step 
rather than the definitive history of concern for natural 
resources.
Because of the author’s limitations, this chapter will be 
limited to Anglo-American scholars. This will unfortunately 
omit the efforts of the Europeans Wilhelm Gstwald and Ernest 
Solvay to develop an "energy" form of value.
2. Though there were studies before Maithus which were con­
cerned with man’s dependence upon the environment, such 
studies were of a sporadic and tangential nature. See Clarence 
Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in 
Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth 
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19?6).
3. Thomas Robert Maithus, An Essay on the Principles of Population,
as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society. With Remarks
on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other 
Writers. (1798) Ed. by Gertrude Hiumelfarb (New York: Random
House, 1960): 8-9. All quotations will be from this edition.
4. Ibid.: 17.
5. For a survey of this question of population dynamics see 
Joseph J. Spengler, Population Economics: Selected Essays of 
Joseph J. Spengler, (Durham, W.C.: Duke University Press,
1972).
6 . "Let us now take any spot on earth, this Island for instance,
and see in what ratio the subsistence it affords can be sup­
posed to increase. We will begin with it under its present 
state of cultivation.
If I allow that by the best possible policy, by breaking up 
more land and by great encouragement to agriculture, the produce 
of this Island may be doubled in the first twenty-five years, I 




In the next twenty-five years, it is impossible to suppose 
that the produce could be quadrupled. It would be contrary 
to all our knowledge of the qualities of land. The very 
utmost that we can conveive, is, that the increase in the 
second twenty-five years might equal the present produce.
Let us take this for our rule, though certainly far beyond 
the truth, and allow that by great exertion, the whole produce 
of the Island might be increased every twenty-five years, by 
a quantity of subsistence equal to what it at present pro­
duces. The most enthusiastic speculator cannot suppose a 
greater increase than this. In a few centuries it would 
make every acre of land in the Island like a garden.
Yet this ratio of increase is evidently arithmetical.
It may fairly be said, therefore, that "the means of sub­
sistence increase in an arithmetical ratio." T.R. Mai thus 
(1st edition): 12. Later editions carried essentially the 
same message. See pp. 131-132.
7. For example, see Francis Palce’s Illustrations and Proofs of 
the Principle of Population (London, 1622). John S. Mill was 
also concerned with population control throughout much of 
his life. In his youth he was once arrested for passing out 
birth control literature and he would later argue that the 
state had the right to control births. See his On Liberty 
(1859) (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947): llO. See 
also Norman Hines, The Place of John Stuart Mill and of Robert 
Owen in the History of English Neo-Malthusianism," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 42 (1928): 627-640.
8. Though there were earlieT works on the question of the 
exhaustibility of the coal fields of Great Britain, most of 
these works were rather brief chapters by geologists. Their 
methodology consisted in making an estimate of the amount of 
accessible coal left in England and the duration of coal sup­
ply, Jevons commented about such studies that "the annual 
consumption is a rapidly growing quantity, and it is a most 
shortsighted proceeding to argue as if it were constant."
The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the 
Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal-Mines ed A. W. 
Flux (New York: Augustus M. Kelley reprint, 1965): lb. For a 
review of these earlier sutdies, see chapter 2, "The Opinions 
of Previous Writers" in Jevons1 The Coal Question.
It perhaps should be noted that the economist John R. M'Cul- 
loch had previously characterized the notions of the exhausti­
bility of England's coal mines as utterly futile, both in the 
article on Coal in his Dictionary of Comnerce and Commercial
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Navigation (Philadelphia: Thomas Wardle, 1840) "Calling her 
coal mines the coal cellars of the great city, there is in 
them a supply which, at the present rate of expenditure, 
will last for 2,000 years; and . . . may be regarded as in­
exhaustible." Volume 1, p. 354, and in his A Statistical 
Account of the British Empire: Exhibiting its Extent, Physical 
Capacities, Population, Industry, and Civil and Religious 
Institutions (London: Charles Knight 5 Co.. 1839) Volume 1.
p. 600.
9. William Stanley Jevons, The Coal Question: An Inquiry Con­
cerning the Progress of the Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion 
of our Coal Mines, ed. by A. W. Flux (New York: A. M. Kelley 
reprint, 1965): 195. Underlined sentence was italicized in
original.
10. Ibid., xxx.
11. Jevons, The Coal Question: 460.
12. George Perkins Marsh, Man and Nature, David Lowenthal (ed.) 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965): 43.
13. For the role of foresters in the First Conservation Movement, 
see Samuel Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); John Ise, 
The United States Forest Policy (New Haven: Yale University 
tbress, 1920); M. Nelson McCreaiy, Gifford Pinchot, Forester/ 
Politician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960);
or Henry Clepper, Professional Forestry in the United States 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971).
14. John Ise, The United States Oil Policy (New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1926): 275.
15. Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, "The Economics Aspects of Soil 
Erosion," National Geographic Magazine, VII (1896): 328-377.
16. Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, Man and the Earth (New York: Fox, 
Duffield and Co., 19Q5): i.
17. Ibid., 232-33.
18. Jevons, The Coal Question: 457.
19. B. E. Femow, 'The Providential Functions of Government with 
Special Reference to Natural Resources," American Association
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for the Advancement of the Sciences, Proceedings 44 (1895): 
344.
20. Richard T. Ely, "Conservation and Economic Theory,: in "The 
Foundations of National Prosperity: Studies in the Conserva­
tion of Permanent National Resources ed. by Richard T. fely 
et. al. (New York: Macmillan, 1917): 17. Femow subsequently 
published these lectures under the title of Economics of 
Forestry.
21. Bernhard E. Femow, Economics of Forestry (New York: Thomas 
Y. Crowell and Co., 19^2): 15-16.
22. The only earlier study that discussed natural resources did 
so in a peripheral manner. See H. J. Davenport, "The Extent 
and the Significance of the Unearned Increment," Papers and 
Proceedings of the American Economic Association 1 (19lt): 
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CHAPTER III
THE TELEOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF ECONCMIC OUTPUT
Progress to what and from where? , . .
The European talks of progress, because by an 
ingenious application of some scientific ac­
quirements he has established a society which 
has mistaken comfort for civilization.1
Introduction
In the preceding section of this study an attempt was made to 
explore the thought of some scholars who, since the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution, were intent on exploring the signifi­
cance of the matter/energy input into the economic system. Such 
scientists attempted not only to analyze the vital dependence upon 
the ultimate means (the natural resources of the globe) by any socio­
economic system, but also what a society could do to minimize waste 
and destruction of such resources.
In this section I shall focus upon the aggregate output of the 
economic system. More specifically, I shall attempt a historical 
review of scientists who have assessed the value of the aggregate 
output of the economic system by measuring its worth against some 
more Ultimate End of mankind. Herman Daly has discussed the concept 
of the Ultimate End and its importance in the following manner:
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Is the nature of the Ultimate End such that, 
beyond some point, further accumulation of physical 
artifacts is useless or even harmful? Are some of 
the intermediate ends now being served, and those newly 
proposed, really undesirable, or less than worthwhile, 
in the light of the Ultimate End? Could it be that one 
of our wants is to be free of the tyranny of infinite 
wants?
The ultimate benefit or Ultimate End is less 
definable than the ultimate means. Perhaps, as a 
minimum (emphasis is in the original) definition, it 
could be considered as the survival and continuation of 
the evolving life process through which God has bestowed 
upon us the gift of conscious life. I hasten to add 
that this minimum definition begs some important 
questions . . .
Even though it is difficult to give a satisfactory 
definition of the Ultimate End, we are forced to choose 
among competing intermediate ends. The ranking of 
intermediate ends into a list of priorities logically 
implies seme ordering principle, some concept, however 
vague, of the Ultimate End, with reference to which 
intermediate ends are ordered. Some of these ends 
cannot be served by aggregate growth. In fact,^produc­
tion and consumption often just get in the way.**
In his analysis Daly shows that the economic profession, in 
performing its rightful task of efficiently allocating scarce inter­
mediate means among an array of competing intermediate wants, has 
erroneously assumed that these intermediate means and legitimate 
intermediate wants were infinite in quantity and number. It should 
be made clear that it is not suggested that economics cover as its 
formal object the whole spectrum of reality from ultimate means to 
the Ultimate End. Such a suggestion would indicate that there was 
only one all-encompassing science. What it does suggest, however, 
is that the science of economics has to be aware of the findings and
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conclusions of its neighboring sciences which impinge and over­
lap upon its subject matter if it wants to be consistent with other 
branches of knowledge. Though economics is an autonomous science, 
this autonomy does not give it the right to determine the content 
of the concepts which it necessarily receives from other disciplines. 
Such an arrogant procedure would cause a break in the continuum of 
knowledge which would not only be the source of much confusion, but 
also be a sure way to introduce erroneous concepts into the very 
fundamental definitions of one's science. What seems to have hap­
pened historically is that economics has legitimately borrowed the 
definition of these border concepts--intermediate means and ends-- 
from its neighboring disciplines, but has not kept 14) with the more 
recent investigations of these neighboring disciplines.
As the Industrial Revolution has progressed, society has 
changed from an age of real penury and absolute scarcity in inter­
mediate ends— food, lodging, clothing--but one of an absolute abun­
dance in natural resources--forests, clean air, land, space— to an 
age of abundance and surplus in intermediate ends but one of scarcity 
and shortages in natural resources; consequently, the content of 
these border concepts of economics has changed drastically in the 
real order of events. Yet the economics profession continues to act 
and think as if nothing had changed in the last 250 years. The 
reason for this obstinacy of the economic profession in maintaining 
its original perception of these border concepts in the face of all
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evidence to the contrary is not precisely known but several reasons 
have been advanced. First, the resistance to change itself. Second, 
the traditional concepts with their infinite substitutability of both 
intermediate means one for another and infinite wants one for 
another, the mathematical calculus can be used to full advantage. 
Third, if one allows an Ultimate End (summum bonum) to determine 
the priority of intermediate wants, one is drawn into the vagueness 
of philosophy. If the economics profession allows this, much of 
its precision and rigor will be lost, and precision and rigor are 
highly valued in the modem "scientific” world. Such a change in 
the content of its most fundamental building-block concepts would 
force the economics profession to admit that it is not similar to 
the physical sciences with their unchanging demonstrable laws and, 
in our culture, this means giving up the appearance of being truly 
scientific. As R. G. Hawtrey describes the issue: ''Economists are
proud to claim that theirs in the most exact branch of social science. 
The intrusion into it of the vexed question of ethics, with the vast 
amorphous phantoms of metaphysics looming in the background, would 
soon make an end to that claim."^ For, as it stands now, with all 
effective desires being given equal weight, one can avoid further 
normative judgments. It should, however, be pointed out that giving 
all effective desires equal weight is a stupendous normative judgment 
in itself. Ignoring this problem will not make it go away. In this 
case, economists have apparently decided to just follow the line of
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least resistance. This can be shown by asking an economist what 
is it that determines the economic preferences or goals of an 
individual. The orthodox economist answers that such preferences 
and goals are given, that is, subject only to and determined by the 
will of the individual. This positivistic and utilitarian response 
of the economists has had serious consequences, not only for eco­
nomic theory, but also for society in general.^
One obvious result of such a response for economic theory has 
been that economists have constrained their range of analysis by 
vigorously excluding all questions of value concerning the prefer­
ences of the consumers. John Whippen and Stephen Renas have remarked, 
"As positivism became entrenched as a leading methodological position, 
it led to the closure of much of economic thought . . .  By taking as 
given the values and goals of Western society from the time of Adam 
Smith onward, positive economists assumed them to be non-problematic. 
As non-problematic, these values were not subject to examination."^ 
Ben B. Seligman is even more telling in his indictment of 
positivistic economics:
Overconcem with economy of thought has too often 
led to the use of mental bulldozers, leaving the intel­
lectual landscape quite barren. To remove a few trees 
that obscured their view, positivists frequently leveled 
entire forests.^
The latter (/the positivistic economist) eschews any 
identification with goals, asserting that analysis can 
only elucidate the implications of his model and that he 
must pursue these implications wherever they may go. He 
is not concerned with teleology or norms . . . Yet, he
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may be charged with the patent fact that there are 
specific norms hidden in his positivist economics for 
when he speaks of the relationships between ends and means 
he is establishing perforce certain boundaries of be­
havior patterns.7
Positivism has abolished the desire to engage in 
open and free speculation about the nature of man and 
the universe.®
John Kenneth Galbraith has parodied this closure of economic thought 
in his usual delightful manner:
The first step (in making economics "scientific") 
was to divorce economics from any judgment on the goods 
with which it was concerned. Any notion of necessary 
versus unnecessary or important as against unimportant 
goods was rigorously excluded from the subject . . .
Nothing is so thoroughly drilled into the minds of the 
young as the need for this restraint. Nothing in 
economics so quickly marks an individual as incom­
petently trained as a disposition to remark on the 
legitimacy of the desire for more food and the 
frivolity of the desire for a more elaborate auto­
mobile.
After making this indictment against the conventional wisdom 
of economic theory, Galbraith follows his mentor Veblen who made 
the very same point with his phrase "conspicuous consumption 
and argues that, since the consumers cannot achieve what is best 
for society in their own private spending binges, the affluent 
society should allow some other organized body to make the choices 
of what should be produced, allocated and consumed in our society. 
Veblen seemed to prefer an organization of engineers to make these 
crucial decisions, somewhat akin to the technocratic solution; while 
Galbraith favored more public sector goods and services as could
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only be obtained by increased government intervention.
There is, however, another more ancient and more radical 
tradition besides that of Veblen and Galbraith which questions the 
economist's uncritical conmitment to maximizing the individual's 
subjective consumption preferences as the final goal or end of an 
economy. This is the very ancient tradition which traces its origin 
back to Greek philosophers and to the beginnings of the Judaeo- 
Christian civilization. It is more radical than the Veblen-Galbraith 
critique because it questions the very desirability of any increase 
in gross national product. Veblen and Galbraith question more the 
composition and the manner in which the gross national product is 
consumed rather than the amount of gross national product. This 
Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition emphasizes that a critical evalua­
tion of the consumption of economic products is just as important 
as increased productivity and efficient allocation of scarce means. 
This tradition holds that the value of economic goods and services 
are determined by the extent that they contribute to the achievement 
of some final goal (the summum bonum) of man, and which final goal 
is conceived as something beyond just the satisfaction of increasing 
one's economic productivity and consumption. In such a tradition, 
it is not only possible but, indeed, quite likely that the increased 
satisfaction of consumer's subjective preferences could do more harm 
than good. G. K. Chesterton has remarked,
And as long as Mr. Mark Starr and others continue 
to tell the people that all the various gadgets foisted
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upon us by capitalists to make profits are gifts of the 
Almighty for enabling us to lead fuller, larger, nobler, 
higher, wider, deeper, etc., lives so long will the people 
remain in utter darkness.^
In such a teleological vision, the value of economic "goods" 
is determined by a final goal, and the final goal is determined by 
a study of man's nature. This brings us once again to the Socratic 
question of "What is man?." Along with other Greek philosophers, 
Aristotle probed deeply into the question of what use of material 
possessions makes for harmony and happiness in man's life.
Perhaps the Latin ideal of "contemplatio in actione" which 
using a certain amount of poetic license I have translated as "in 
the wise use of possessions man reflects the harmony of divine 
reality" best describes Aristotle's goal. The possession of certain 
economic goods and services were necessary but not sufficient ele­
ments in the search for the good life. Aristotle noted that "a 
good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the 
other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under the 
opposite conditions. . . This makes men fancy that external goods 
are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that brilliant
performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument
12and not to the skill of the performer."
It was the wisdom shown in the use of a moderate and har­
monious amount of material possessions, rather than the maximum 
accumulation of such possessions that constituted the essence of 
the good life. In this sense Aristotle differs from modem econo-
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mists who view the accumulation of material possessions as the end 
of both the individual and nation. Barry Gordon has described 
Aristotle's thought about material possessions in the following 
manner:
In Aristotle's view, economics is not the competing 
technology it has tended to become in the hands of many of 
its twentieth century practitioners. Much of the engi­
neering- style literature which pervades modem professional 
journals and monographs in the field would seem pointless 
to him. This pointlessness stems, given his perspective, 
from the dissociation of that literature from explicit 
consideration of what he takes to be the central question 
of human thought and action, the nature of the happy life
It is pointless then to investigate means of increasing 
the conmunity's command over the use of resources while 
dissociating the investigator from analytical involvement 
in the question of how that enhanced command might result 
in a genuine improvement of quality of life for thecomnunity.1*
Aristotle taught that the art of economy consisted in using 
economic possessions moderately and wisely in improving one's self 
toward a higher order of wisdom and virtue. There are two other 
basic attitudes one might take concerning economic possessions.
One can take an ascetic position and view such output as a neces­
sary evil to be renounced as far as possible in one's pursuit of 
inmaterial ideals. On the other hand, one can take a more modern 
position and have as one's primary goal the constrained maximisa­
tion of such economic goods and services. These three approaches 
to economic possessions might be labeled and categorized as follows:
1) "Ascetism" in which worldly or material possessions are viewed 
as necessary evils and thus renounced as far as possible.
75
2) "Materialism" in which the object of society is to produce and 
consume as large a quantity of economic goods and services as is 
economically efficient. The materialism referred to here is not 
intellectual and philosophical but practical (concern for comfort, 
living standards, per capita GNP). 3) "Contingentism" in which
economic goods and services are used to the extent that some more 
final goal based upon man*s nature would dictate.
It is with hesitation that one coins such an awkward label as 
"contingentism" for this third way of evaluating economic posses­
sions. I have thought of such names as "Moderation," "Neutrality," 
or "Functionalism," but have rejected them all for one reason or 
another; "moderation" and "neutrality" because although they dis­
tinctly imply that an inordinate amount of economic possessions is 
not to be pursued above all else, such names do not make it clear 
that use of such goods is to be determined by another more final 
goal. The word "Functionalism" is suggested by R. H. Tawney in 
The Acquisitive Society, but he uses it with a somewhat different 
though related meaning. It is indicative of our age that there does 
not exist an apt word or phrase which would label clearly that 
philosophy of life that would look upon economic possessions as 
neutral objects whose total value is completely contingent upon 
their relationship to some more final or higher goal. This same 
indictment of modem society can be made when one reflects that 
Ruskin's name for material possessions which harm an individual or
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society, "illth" in opposition to wealth, has never caught on.
The Greek philosophers were quite aware of this distinction be­
tween the accumulation of wealth for its own sake and the production 
and consumption of wealth, the proper use of which would be de­
termined by some Ultimate End of man. Aristotle used the term 
"chrematistics" for that study which sought to maximize wealth for 
its own sake, while economy was that science which explored the 
harmonious and natural use of economic possessions. Needless to 
say, he thought that chrematistics was inferior in its substance 
to that of economics.
However, it seems that our more modem age cannot even imagine 
material possessions being anything except good, hence our word 
for the product of our economic system, economic "goods." Our 
usage of the word "goods" is a materialistic narrowing of a dis­
tinctively ethical word, still surviving in its usage as a "good 
life." Such usage is an excellent example of how one's terminology 
can affect one's analysis. Since we somewhat arbitrarily label 
the result of production "goods," how can one argue against such 
production?
Despite this inherent bias in the very terminology and the very 
marrow of our society, there have been some social scientists in 
the last two hundred years to critically question the value of 
ever-increasing economic possessions for individuals and society.
It will be the object of this chapter to discuss some of the mani-
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festations of this third way of contingentism which are found 
in the history of modem economic thought.
There were two criteria used in the selection of scholars for 
inclusion into this chapter. First, such scholars either had to 
be acknowledged economists (Sismondi, Hobson and Tawney) or, if 
non-economists, they had to attempt to discuss the value of economic 
output in a theoretical and reasonably complete analytic manner 
(Ruskin and Chesterton). Second, they had to subject economic 
output to an humane assessment. And, as noted and discussed above 
in the introduction, the definition of humanism is one that is de­
rived from the Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition.*^
But before we jump from the ancient Greek civilization of 
Aristotle to the modem conmercial and industrial age, a few 
conments seem in order on the intervening centuries. 15 Though one 
can find particular statements which could be used to justify all 
three of the above mentioned approaches to material possessions, 
it is safe to say that the third approach of contingentism was 
perceived to be the ideal by the leading Judaeo-Christian philiso- 
phers in these intervening centuries. R. H. Tawney writes:
The most fundamental difference between medieval 
and modem economic thought consists in the fact that, 
whereas the latter normally refers to economic expediency, 
however it may be interpreted, for the justification of 
any particular action, policy or system of organization, 
the former starts from the position that there is a moral 
authority to which considerations of economic expediency 
must be referred.16
What has, however, been modified is the final goal itself.
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For Aristotle the final goal was to improve man's mind and will 
or, in other words, wisdom and virtue. This was a goal that man­
kind would have to pursue unaided and alone. In the Judaeo-Christian 
civilization, this pursuit of the final goal is given a definite 
direction. Using the writings of the Old and New Testament of the 
Bible as their foundation, the medieval philosophers and theologians 
were able to construct a philosophy of life that was more detailed 
and definitive than was that of Aristotle in pointing out what was 
the final goal of mankind and how the production and consumption 
of economic possessions should be used in the pursuit of that goal. 
This teleological view of economic possessions is made quite 
clear in the thought of Thomas Aquinas^  and in a very precise 
statement on the subject in the basic writings of Ignatius of 
Loyola, the Spanish founder of the Jesuits, written toward the end 
of the medieval ages.
Man was created to praise, reverence, and serve 
God Our Lord, and by this means to save his soul.
And the other things on the face of the earth were 
created for man's sake, and in order to aid him in the 
prosecution of the end for which he was created.
Whence it follows that man ought to make use of 
them just so far as they help him to attain his end, and 
that he ought to withdraw himself from them just so far 
as they'hinder him.18
Anyone investigating the history of that idea which I have 
labeled contingentism, that is, viewing economic production in a 
neutral light and asking for what, in economic writings from the
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time of Adam Smith onward is likely to experience much frustration.
The source of such frustration is easily found and is the following.
It should be as obvious as it can possibly be that before a reasonably 
intelligent being or society begins an endeavor, such a society 
would determine the overall usefulness or worth of the project 
and, only after such an evaluation has been finished, would he at­
tempt to efficiently perform the task. And, if by some chance, the 
performance of the task came to be substantially more difficult 
than it had initially been thought would be the case, then the 
intelligent society would once again review the whole project e ls  
to its overall worth to human happiness. It is the essence of in­
sanity to pursue a task without ever looking at the overall picture. 
Yet such an insanity seems to be the lot of modem commercial 
civilisation. R. H. Tawney has characterized our society in the 
following manner: f,It is a commonplace that the characteristic
virtue of Englishmen is their power of sustained practical activity,
and their characteristic vice a reluctance to test the quality of
19that activity by reference to principles.” Tawney then goes on 
to compare our society to a squirrel energetically and efficiently 
but futilely running in place in a revolving cage. Some of the 
same ideas must have been going through the mind of J. R. Hicks 
when he wrote that "one cannot repress the thought that perhaps 
the whole Industrial Revolution of the last 200 years has been 
nothing else but a vast secular boom, largely induced by the
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unparalleled rise in population. If this is so, it would help to 
explain why, as the wisest hold, it has been such a disappointing 
episode in human history."^0
Since it is easy to prove that in times of real penury, increased 
material production is a real source of benefit to society, modem 
conventional economic theorists have then extrapolated and assumed 
that ever more is better. This supposition is the same as saying 
that although a would-be violinist cannot make music without a 
violin, all that is necessary for ever better music is an ever 
larger violin.
Thus the critical social scientist seeking to explore recent 
history of economic thought that he might be aided in evaluating 
the overall usefulness of increased economic productivity, will 
soon experience a sense of frustration because of the lack of 
writings on this subject. When one thinks of all the essays, studies 
and books written by economists on rather arcane and trivial re­
finements of economic theory, and how little is written on the worth 
of all this economic productivity in achieving the final goal of 
mankind, a sense of defeat can easily set in. "Unhappy man that 
I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"21
Yet there were some economists who did attempt to maintain 
a critical stance in the face of the dominant economic theory. The 
first of these was the Swiss economist, J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi. 
It is necessary to remember that Sismondi was writing in a time of
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transition from the craft system to the factory system, and that 
his criticism will be directed against the excesses that ordi­
narily occur in such a transition period, Sismondi was well 
equipped for his role as a critic of the excesses of industrialism 
as he was one of the few economists of his generation who had the 
historical ability and acumen to observe the transitory nature of 
his era.
We are, and this point cannot be sufficiently 
stressed, in an altogether new state of society, of 
which we have absolutely no experience. We tend to 
divorce completely all sorts of ownership from all 
sorts of work, to break down all relationships between 
man and master, to deprive the former of all associa­
tions in the profits of the latter.
In a very early age of industrialism Sismondi was attenpting to 
orientate the economics profession from the abstractions of eco­
nomic man that would ultimately be its hallmark. He wanted economics 
to describe and analyze a changing economic scene and to hold fast 
to the ancient hard-earned truths about man. Instead economists 
would eventually come to declare that their concepts and abstrac­
tions were what were permanent, and that the nature of man was what 
was unknowable and fleeting.
J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi 
More than one historian of economic theory has pointed out 
that the contributions of J. C. L. Simondi de Sismondi have been 
unjustly ignored by the economics profession. Thomas Sowell has
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shown that Sismondi made five major discoveries in economic theory 
which the economics profession overlooked and then had to redis­
cover.^ diaries Gide and Charles Rist have suggested that Sismondi 
should be considered the real founder of the school which has since 
become known as economie sociale in France and Sozialpolitik in 
Germany, and, if not the founder, at least a precursor of the 
Historical School.^ Elie Halevy has pointed out that Sismondi 
was the first writer to give expression to the belief that industrial 
society tends to separate into two absolutely distinct classes-- 
those who work and those who possess--which distinction was to play 
such an important role in the Marxian system. ̂
In this study I want to investigate another contribution of 
Sismondi that has been overlooked and which consequently had to 
be rediscovered. This is Sismondi's role as a moral and humane 
critic of the classical economic theory.^ This role was unknown, 
or at least unacknowledged, by such English critics as Carlyle, 
Ruskin, Hobson and Tawney. William Grampp also overlooks his role
in the otherwise quite perceptive study, "Classical Economics and
27Its Moral Critics." James Sherburne is more knowledgeable when 
he writes:
Ruskin*s ethical and Romantic bias places him closer 
to Simonde de Sismondi (1773-1842) than to any other eco­
nomist critical of the abstraction of the classical school. 
Sismondi is best known today for his vast histories of Italy 
and France. Nonetheless, his Nouveaux principes d *economie 
politique (1910) is a landmark in radical economic criticism.
. . . Sismondi rejects the assumption of economic man and
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urges the study of real producers and consumers. He 
differs from other advocates of an empirical approach 
in the extent of his ethical concern. For him as for 
Rnskin, the attack on method is a way of injecting 
ethics into economic analysis. Unlike Ruskin, Sismondi 
retains a strong interest in making economics more 
accurate as a science. Ruskin’s debt to the Swiss 
scholar is unknown. Although he was familiar with 
Sismondi's history of the Italian republics, it is 
difficult to determine whether he had read Nbuveaux 
principes.28
How Sismondi came to this role of moral critic is an inter­
esting story and well worth a digression at this point. J. C. L. 
Simonde de Sismondi was b o m  into a somewhat impoverished but 
aristocratic family in Geneva in 1773. In 1793 his family was 
forced to flee to England where Sismondi thoroughly examined the 
English industrial system and socio-politico-econimic institutions. 
The young Sismondi learned to love England as a kind of second 
country and to adopt the principles of political and economic 
liberalism. After eighteen months in England, his family returned 
to Geneva and then on to northern Italy where Sismondi published his 
first work on the agriculture of Tuscany (Tableau de 1’agriculture 
en Toscane). In 1803 he published a two-volume treatise, De la 
richesse comnerciale, ou principes d'economie politique appliques, 
a la legislation du commerce which was chiefly, but not entirely, 
an attempt to expound and popularize the ideas of Adam Smith through­
out the French-speaking world.^ This book was much noticed at 
the time for Jean Baptiste Say's study had not yet been published, 
and it met a need in French-speaking countries. Sismondi was offered
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the chair of political economy at the University of Wilna in 
Poland, but he refused the offer that he might pursue his other 
academic profession, that of an historian. For the next twelve 
years of his life he concentrated on writing the monumental 
sixteen-volume history of the Italian republic which established 
for him a solid and lasting reputation as a historian. During 
the same time he also published a two-volume work on the literature 
of southern Europe. After 18Q3, the year when he published his 
work on economic theory popularizing Adam Smith, he had read very 
little in economics. In 1815, however, he was asked to write the 
article on policical economy for the Edinburgh Encyclopedia, and 
his study of economics was resumed. Upon a re-examination of the 
economic theory, Sismondi discovered that his judgment of classical 
economy theory had changed, and he was now led to condemn what 
formerly he had praised. Beneath the appearance of England's 
prosperity and political freedom he discerned an economic system, 
the true name of which was not liberty but servitude.
As a consequence of his revision in thought Sismondi published 
a two-volume treatise, Nouveau principes d1Economie politique ou 
de la Richesse dans ses rapports avec la Population, in 1819, which 
he re-edited in 1827 with important additions. Though this study 
does not seem to have been widely read, it was immediately attacked 
in the press by the classical economic school. McCulloch inserted 
a six-page digression condemning Sismondi's thought in an article
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for the Edinburgh Review. ^  In a private correspondence to David 
Ricardo, McCulloch mentioned that "Sismondi is too much of a 
sentimentalist to make a good political economist."^
Undoubtedly one of the themes in the Nouveaux principes which 
made McCulloch view Sismondi as being "sentimental" was his teleo- 
logical definition of wealth. For Sismondi explicitly rejected 
that definition of wealth as it was defined in the following pas­
sage by a leading orthodox economist:
To what extent and under what circumstances the 
possession of wealth is, on the whole, beneficial or 
injurious to its possessor, or to the society of which 
he is a member; what distribution of wealth is most 
desirable in each different state of society; and what 
are the means by which any given country can facilitate 
such a distribution?--all these are questions of great 
interest and difficulty, but no longer form part of 
the science of political economy . . . The subject 
treated by political economy is not happiness but 
wealth.*^2
What was Sismondi's view of wealth? Why did his view provoke 
the wrath of the leading economists of his day? In beginning his 
study Sismondi reviewed the definitions of the ancient Greek 
philosophers.
But at least they (the Greeks) never lost sight 
of the fact that wealth had no other worth than what it 
contributed to the national happiness; and precisely 
because their treatment was less abstract, their point 
of view was oftentimes more just than ours.33
In both his Nouveaux principes and his later Etudes sur l'Economie
politique Sismondi is insistent throughout on the distinction which
he obtained from Aristotle between the science of "chrematistics"
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which treats with the accumulation of monetary wealth or items of 
exchange value for their own sake, and political economy which 
treats of the role that economic production and consumption should 
play in achieving the final goal of society. He states his posi­
tion in the following two quotations:
When one takes the increase of economic goods as the 
end of society, one necessarily sacrifices the end for 
the means. One obtains more of production, but such pro­
duction is paid for dearly by the misery of the masses.34
. . . the chrematistic science, or the study of the 
means of increasing wealth, in setting aside the purpose 
of this wealth, is a false s c i e n c e .35
Since Sismondi disagreed with the conventional economic theo­
rists of his day in his perception of the ultimate end of the 
economy, it is not surprising that he came to different policy 
conclusions. During the era that Sismondi was writing the main 
debate raging within the economics profession was what came to be 
known as the general glut controversy.^ This controversy over 
Say's law and the possibility of general causing periodical
economic crises reached a peak of intensity and volume of output 
in the 1820's, involving every major economist of the period, and 
which was unrivaled until the Keynesian controversy of the mid­
twentieth century. With the exception of Malthus, according to 
the classical writers, the general growth of production presented 
no inconvenience, thanks to the fortunate spontaneous mechanism of 
the market which inmediately corrected the errors of the entre­
preneur if he in any way over-estimated the quantity demanded.
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Sismondi’s teleological approach to the production and consumption 
of economic wealth led him to reject this optimistic conclusion. 
Among those opposed to this optimistic faith in the automatic 
equilibriating mechanism of the market, Sismondi alone thought 
that the cause of such crises might be over-production as well as 
underconsumption. Although Sismondi is frequently cited as being 
one of the founders of the theory that underconsumption was the 
main cause of the recurring economic crises,^ it would be much 
more precise to say that he viewed overproduction as the cause of 
the economic crises. This distinction between underconsumption 
and overproduction is important to the analysis of Sismondi.
If one views economic productivity to be the Ultimate End as, 
according to Sismondi, did the dominant "chrematistic" economic 
theorists of his day then, of course, the cause of all economic 
depressions is lack of consumption. It would be a contradiction 
in terms to say that there was too much production and, therefore, 
underconsumption must be the cause of such economic depressions.
Such a view implies that the solution to such crises is found in 
increasing the quantity of consumption or, in other words, increasing 
the effective demand. In all cases it is better to modify consump­
tion upward than to reduce production downward. And to compound 
this attitude, the classical economist added that the way to increase 
consumption was to increase production. "It is not a consequence
T Oof production being too much increased. Increase it more."
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Implicit in such a reconroendation is the normative position that 
more is always better and that the solution to such economic depres­
sions is not to thoroughly investigate the society that suffers
from the crisis, but to resolve all such macro-economic recessions
39and depressions by somehow increasing effective demand. Sismondi, 
however, was not content with such an analysis. If one acknow­
ledges a more final goal than production and consumption, then 
the cause of economic crises could be either overproduction, under­
consumption or, as more likely in those early days of the Industrial 
Revolution, some combination of both, and it is the task of the 
political economist to investigate the matter more thoroughly by 
exploring the effect of economic production and consumption upon 
the welfare of mankind. This was a task that Sismondi attempted 
in his later economic writings.
Such an investigation will not use the same type of analysis 
as the classical economists which Sismondi criticized for being 
too abstract. For instance, the abstract economic theory of 
Ricardo was attacked by Sismondi, not because it reasons from the 
general to the particular, but because the generalizations are not 
based on the actual observations of particular men and also because 
such generalizations do not take into account that manls consumption 
is designed to fulfill a higher goal. Sismondi comments that:
. . . it is a natural habit of the human mind to seek 
to reduce all its operations to the simplest formula, to 
generalize all its rules, and to accomplish this uniform 
procedure whenever it can to avoid more complicated pro-
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cedures. That habit, which tends to simplify every­
thing, to classify everything, to generalize everything, 
is no doubt the most essential cause of the progress of 
various sciences. It is not necessary, however, to abandon 
one's self to it in an unreflecting manner.40
The science in their hands is so speculative, that 
it seems to be detached from all practice. It was be­
lieved at first that in extricating the theory from all 
the accessory circumstances, one ought to render it 
clearer and easier to seize, but the opposite is attained.
The new English economists are quite obscure and can be 
understood only with gTeat effort because our mind is 
opposed to admitting the abstractions demanded of us.
This repugnance is in itself a warning that we are turning 
away from the truth, when in moral science, where everything 
is connected, we endeavor to isolate a principle and to see 
nothing but that principle.^1
Sismondi begins his analysis by comparing the economic society 
in which the majority worked for themselves as craftsmen and trades­
men with the industrial society in which most laborers worked for 
others, (It was Sismondi who coined the word proletariat). Since 
the craftsman's reward was the fruits of his own labor, and the 
amount of this reward was determined by the natural order of things, 
he would stop producing when he had reached the point that he would 
prefer to enjoy the leisure and the fruits of his labor, Sismondi 
remarked:
For the laborer who works for himself there is a 
point reached in the accumulation of wealth beyond which 
it would appear as folly to accumulate still more, since 
such a laborer would not be able to increase his consump­
tion in a proportional amount. But the needs of the 
laborer who works in an industrial society appears to be 
infinite. No matter how many riches he has massed, there 
is no point at which he will say: "This is enough."
. . . Moreover this is a serious error into which
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have fallen most of the modem economists that they 
think that the act of consumption is unlimited and 
always ready to devour an infinite quantity of pro­
duction. They do not cease from encouraging the 
nations to produce, to invent new machines, to im­
prove their work so that the quantity of production 
achieved in the year will always surpass that of 
the preceding year: they are very distressed when they 
see the number of unproductive workers to multiply, 
they would point out the idle for the indignant 
public, and in a nation where the power of the worker 
has been increased by a hundredfold, they want that 
everyone should work in order to l i v e .42
How does it happen that the industrial laborer works beyond 
that point which he would in a more natural system? Sismondi notes 
that the workers were getting a relatively small share of the 
output due to the institutional economic system of that early 
industrial era. Because of these low wages, the worker and his 
family had to work long hours in order to obtain the necessities 
of life. Sismondi questions whether the marginally increased out­
put is worth the marginal extra hours of work.
If all'les pompons de la richesse1 were offered to 
the manual worker as a recompense for his assiduous tra­
vail of twelve and fourteen hours a day, as many do today, 
there is not one of these workers who would not choose 
less luxury and more of leisure, less of frivolous orna­
ments and more of liberty. Such would be the choice of 
the entire society, if only there was more equality in 
our society. Every craftsman who profits the total amount 
of his own industry, when he compares the almost inperceptible 
pleasure that he would receive from a slightly finer suit of 
clothes with the additional work that such a suit of 
clothes entails, would not wish to pay this price. The 
luxury is not possible except when it is paid for by the 
work of others. Assiduous and constant labor is able to 
be procured, not for the sake of frivoloties, but only to 
gain the necessities of life.4?3
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For Sismondi, overproduction is when workers strain to pro­
duce more than they would in a system in which they received a 
larger share of the fruits of the productive process. Because 
the owners reaped where the laborers worked, the decision to expand 
production was made by those who profited from such production 
rather than by those who bore the real cost of labor that such 
expanded production necessarily entails. Sismondi wrote about the 
England of the early days of the Industrial Revolution with its 
nascent factory system. New technology and organization of large 
scale production increasingly polarized society into a minority 
of possessing capitalists and a majority of dispossessed workers.^ 
It is important to note that in this critical period of transition 
Sismondi was unwilling to glorify economic production for its own 
sake as other economists were able to do because of their absolute 
faith in the salvific efficacy of Say's Law which declared that 
since supply created its own demand, an increase in production was 
a sign of increased demand for such production. Sismondi instead 
asked a more fundamental question:
What, then, is the object of human society? Is it 
to dazzle the eye with an iiimense production of useful 
and elegant things; to daunt the senses with the control 
which man exercises over nature, and with the precision 
or the speed with which a human work is executed by 
lifeless beings? Is it to cover the sea with vessels 
and the earth with railways which distribute in all 
directions the products of an ever increasing industry?
. . .  If such is the case, we have undoubtedly made 
immense progress as compared with our ancestors; we are 
rich in inventions, rich in activities, rich in scien­
tific powers, rich in merchandise everywhere; for every
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nation has produced not only for itself but also for 
its neighbors. But, if the aim which society ought 
to accept, in encouraging labor and protecting 
the fruits of the labor of man, fruits which we call 
wealth,--if these fruits, which consist of moral and 
intellectual goods as well as material goods, should 
be the means of improvement as well as of enjoyment, 
are we sure that we are approaching our goal?4^
Sismondi's observation of the industrial system reminded him
of the story of Gandalin.
In the time of enchantment, Gandalin, who lodged 
a sorcerer in his home, noticed that every morning the 
sorcerer would take a broom-handle and, saying a few 
magic words on it, he made out of it a water-carrier, 
who at once would get for him as many pails of water 
as he desired. One morning Gandalin hid himself behind 
a door and listened with all his might to overhear the 
magic words which the sorcerer pronounced for his en­
chantment. He, however, did not hear what the sorcerer 
said next to undo it. As soon as the sorcerer went 
away, Gandalin repeated the experiment; he took the 
broom handle, pronounced the mysterious words and the 
broom water carrier went forward to the river and 
returned with water, and then again went forward and 
came back with it, thus again and again; Gandalin's 
reservoir was already full and the water flooded the 
room, "It's enough!" cried he, "Stop!" But the machine- 
man neither saw nor heard; insensible and indefatigable, 
he would have brought all the water from the river.
Gandalin, in his despair, took an axe and hit his carrier 
with repeated blows. Then he saw the fragments of the 
broom, upon falling on the ground, immediately get up 
and reassume the magic form and run to the river.
Instead of the carrier, he had now four, eight, sixteen; 
the more that he struck down the machine-men, the more 
machine-men got up to do his work in spite of him. The 
entire river would have passed into his home, if the 
sorcerer had not fortunately come back and destroyedhis enchantment
Sismondi comments then that
. . . the water, however, is a good thing. Water, 
just as much as the work, just as much as the capital, is 
necessary for life. But one is able to have too much, even
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of the best things of life . . . Each new application 
of science and the useful arts, similar to the axe of 
Gandalin knocking down the machine-man which the magic 
words had created, only to find soon two, four, eight, 
sixteen in its place; so the productivity continues 
to increase with a rapidity without measure. Has not 
the moment come, or at least is not the moment able to 
come, when one should say: This is too much?
According to the theory which is professed today 
in all the schools of political economy, this moment 
has not yet come, and it is never going to c o m e .46
The story of Gandalin epitomizes Sismondi's view of his so­
ciety. It was increasing economic production with a rapidity 
without measure but for what? His historical studies had taught 
Sismondi that there was more to a superior civilization than just 
increased material production. Such increased productivity could 
well do more harm than good. As Sismondi grew older, he grew more 
pessimistic about his society that would not reduce its frenetic 
activity and orientate its economic production and consumption 
by some final goal. On September 19, 1834, he wrote in his private 
j ournal:
I read in the Westminster Review a striking article 
on civilization, in which the author points out many of 
the bad effects of the present system, which hitherto I 
have been almost the only one to remark. There is much 
ability in this article, but it inspires one with a 
melancholy feeling, because the evils are so serious and 
one does not see the remedies; the too much of everything 
is the evil of the d a y . 4 7  (Underlining is in the original).
Before we conclude with Sismondi, it is interesting to point 
out that he could be considered a precursor for another socio­
economic ideal which has recently gained some attention. Although
94
E. F. Schumacher never mentioned Sismondi in his Small Is Beautiful: 
Economics as if People Mattered, it would be possible to gather 
together a selection of some of Sismondi's writings and label them 
with that same title. In twin articles--"On Landed Property" and 
"On the Condition of the Work People in Manufactories"--published 
by the Revue mensuelle d'Economie politique in 1834 Sismondi criti­
cized the stress on large-scale fanning and concentration of eco­
nomic power which was being advocated by both the theoretic commu­
nists of his day, the Saint Simonians, and the classical economists. 
In the agricultural sector Sismondi observed the following:
The Saint Simonians, and all those who wish to 
regenerate society by the co-operation system, fall 
into a great absurdity, when they wish to give by turns 
to the same men the enjoyment of luxury, and the often 
rude, sometimes disgusting labours of poverty. He who 
has been required in the morning to spread manure on 
the common field, will care little for a ride in a 
carriage at noon, or for an evening ball in velvet and 
lace. But the chrematistics fall into an absurdity of 
much the same kind, when they say, 'The more you produce, 
the more enjoyment will there be for all." . . . Where 
is the use of offering to the nation more sources of 
enjoyment, if you are to destroy those who are to bene­
fit by them?48
The chrematistic school has represented us as an 
eminent progress in agriculture, the power acquired of 
doing the same work with a continually decreasing number 
of hands; this progress has been pushed very far in 
England, where they have succeeded in driving more than 
half the nation out of the fields into the towns. The 
economist of men, not of wealth, cannot behold such 
progress without extreme sorrow.49
And in his study of the urban industrial scene Sismondi commented:
It is in the midst of these trades, exercised by the 
freeman of towns, which formerly did all the industrial work
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in all nations, that manufactories have arisen. The 
masters of manufactories in towns hold the same place 
in the industry of towns that great landowners do in 
the country. Like them, to make their own great 
fortunes, they must cause the disappearance of one 
or two hundred small independent properties: like
them they afterwards, by agreeing together, reduce all 
the men who work under them to a state approaching to 
servitude; . . . Industrialism, or the substitution 
of one great workshop for many small ones in the common 
arts, has been considered to be one of the benefits of 
civilization, in consequence of many illusions.SO
Is it not evident, that instead of making a virtue 
of industrialism, that is, of the effort which all are 
making to glut the markets still more, society and 
government should endeavor to give another direction 
to hisnan activity, so that, as machines will henceforth 
do the work of men, men should no longer do the work of 
machines.
In general, this extolling of the societal advantages of 
small proprietorships and what today would be known as "inter­
mediate technology" fell on deaf ears. Conventional orthodox 
economical theory was not preapred to give a hearing to, much less 
to investigate, the effects of concentration of economic power on 
society. The classical economics with its praise of free competi­
tion and its fundamental goal of an ever-increasing production had 
no place for a theory which questioned its very premises. Sismondi's 
questioning of economic concentration out of humane considerations 
was not even worthy of a reply by the orthodox economic profession.
It is interesting to note that the only formal reply to this position 
favoring decentralization of economic power through intermediate 
technology was by Lenin in 1893 in a treatise entitled "A Characteri­
zation of Economic Romanticism: Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists.
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Lenin thought that "Sismondi occupies a special place in the history 
of political economy, in that he stands off the track of the main 
trends, that he is an ardent advocate of small production and 
opposes the advocates and ideologists of large scale enterprise.
For Lenin as for Marx,^ however, Sismondi was only worthy of scorn 
because he did not realize that the facts of history in their 
inevitable march toward the centralized accumulation of monopoly 
capitalism and thence to Communism were showing up his errors.
Hence it was that the ideas of Sismondi, characterized as 
"sentimental" by the orthodox economists and scorned as hopelessly 
romantic by the Marxists, were, for the most part, totally neglected.^
Even today modem economists find it difficult to appreciate 
his analysis, just as he found it difficult to understand the 
position of the political economists of his day. "The new English 
economists are quire obscure and can be understood only with great 
effort because our mind is opposed to admitting the abstractions 
demanded of us. This repugnance is in itself a warning that we 
are turning away from the truth, when in the social sciences, where 
everything is connected, we endeavor to isolate a principle and 
to see nothing but that p r i n c i p l e , Modem economists simply 
do not agree with Sismondi that l’economie politique n'est elle 
pas une science de calcul, mais une science moral. Elle egare 
quand on croit se guider par des nombres; elle ne meme au but que 
quand on apprecie les sentiments, les besoins et les passions des
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honmes."56
It is easy to find the reason for this difference in outlook.
As both Grampp and Sherburne have noted in their discussion of 
the moral critics of orthodox economic theories, it is a difference 
in basic philosophies of life.^? The classical economists derived 
their inspiration from the philosophic liberalism and utilitarianism 
of their day. Sismondi, and later Ruskin and Tawney, rejected this 
world view. Using the ancient Greek philosophers as their mentors, 
just as had the medieval scholastics, Sismondi and Ruskin thought 
that the theory of political economy was one which investigated 
the utilization and consequence of economic production on the 
ultimate end of mankind rather than just an unbounded maximization 
of production.
As we leave this perceptive observer of the transition age to 
modem industrialism and turn to a later age of greater production 
and abundance, we should not forget that it was Sismondi who first 
criticized the economic theorists who made the increase of produc­
tion a national goal. In that early industrial age of long working 
hours for not only for the laboring men and women but also the 
children, he was concerned not so much about the effect of consump­
tion on achieving the final goal of man's nature, but whether the 
cost in human suffering was too great for the frivolous items being 
produced. We now turn to an author who will continue this line of 




As the Industrial Revolution advanced through the nineteenth 
century, the worst excesses of its exploitative labor practices 
were gradually decreased. Most of these reforms, such as the Coal 
Mines Act in 1842 and the Factory Act of 1844 with 6-1/2-hour 
maximum working day for children under 13 and a maximum of 12 
hours for women, were the result of government intervention to 
effect a policy which Sismondi had advocated for some twenty years.
Though John Stuart Mill could argue as late as 1848 that it 
was doubtful whether any of the inventions yet produced had 
"lightened the day's toil of any human being," he nevertheless noted 
that "they have increased the comforts of the middle class," even 
if "they have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human
r qdestiny, which it is in their nature and futurity to accomplish."
At the same period in time when John Stuart Mill was writing these 
sentiments in his Principles of Political Economy, another writer 
was beginning to investigate what effect these great changes in 
physical inventions as well as social machinery with their result­
ing increase in the comfort of the middle classes were having on 
human destiny. John Ruskin was b o m  in 1819 into a moderately 
wealthy London merchant family. Though he knew firsthand the power 
and pleasures that conmercial success brought in its train, his 
puritanic and artistic parents made sure that he never judged the
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accumulation of wealth to be the main goal of his life. Trained 
as an artist and art critic, John Ruskin’s reputation grew im­
mensely with his successive publication of the four volumes in 
his series Modem Painters. It was always, however, Ruskin's 
ambition to bring the beauties and inspiration of art to the repre­
sentative British worker. When the average British laborer failed 
to respond to the beauty and inspiration of the intellectual and 
artistic world, Ruskin set himself to the task of finding the 
cause of such blindness. His observations into the life and society 
of the British laboring class rather quickly led him to believe 
that something was wrong with an economy that produced so much 
quantity of things of so little quality, yet brutalized so many 
people in doing so. Similar to other English critics of the in­
dustrial society such as Coleridge, Cobbett, Carlyle, Dickens,
59Arnold, Morris and many others, Ruskin soon denounced the com­
mercial society of his time for its worship of Mammon, its "gospel 
of g r e e d , a n d  the conventional political economy which he saw 
as intellectually supporting such a system.^ As the historian Asa 
Briggs has mentioned, "indeed, they (the poets) had probed far 
more deeply than the political economists into the inner meanings 
of the processes of change, had taken the world of nature as well
fi2as the world of men into the reckoning." Yet of all these English 
critics, only Ruskin attempted to challenge the economic theorists 
on their own ground by undertaking the task of thoroughly analyzing
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precisely what were the errors of conventional political economy.
In Unto This Last and Munera Pulveris, Ruskin attempted to demon­
strate what were the basic errors of the political economists of 
his day. Rather than attempt to summarize Ruskin's criticism of 
orthodox political economy and the positive content of his economic 
theory,^ I shall focus upon his analysis of how the worth of 
final economic output should be evaluated. Or, as Ruskin phrases 
it, what determines what is real wealth and what is the opposite 
of wealth or "illth."
By the mid-nineteenth century there was evidence that the 
world was shifting from an era of scarcity of intermediate goods 
such as shelter and food to one of, at least potential abundance 
in such goods in the industrialized world. If so, then the 
question of wealth or "illth" becomes not only a theoretical ques­
tion but one of real life. James Sherburne has noted that "the 
history of the discovery of abundance is yet to be written."^
The only scholarly study to face the problem of the discovery of 
abundance is Daniel M. Fox's intellectual biography of the Ameri­
can economist, Simon N. Patten, who first discussed the implications 
of abundance The Discovery of Abundance: Simon N. Patten and the 
Transformation of Social Theory. Sherburne claims that Ruskin 
"stands as the most important nineteenth-century precursor of Simon 
N. Patten and twentieth-century abundance thinking."^
Ruskin begins his analysis of real wealth by contrasting his
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definition of wealth to the approach of John Stuart Mill. Mill 
had commented that "everyone has a notion, sufficiently correct 
for common purposes, of what is meant by wealth"^ or, in other 
and more illuminating words, whatever commodities individuals 
value to be wealth, that evaluation, in itself, makes such com­
modities wealth to be valuable and a source of wealth. This basic 
definition of wealth is critical and Ruskin vigorously rejects 
this first step of Mill's. Mill's definition of wealth is grounded 
in that branch of positivistic and utilitarian philosophy which 
not only sought the "greatest happiness for the greatest number"
(as, in some vague but real sense, do all philosophies), but also 
made the crucial assumption that there is no objective criterion 
other than the individual consumer's subjective preferences for 
determining what is conducive to happiness. In other words, as 
Sherburne has noted, it is utilitarianism strongly modified by a 
strong attachment to individual liberty.^ In such an ideology 
the logical goal of the economic system has to be to maximize the 
satisfactions that the individual consumers receive from fulfilling 
their own self-perceived desires. As Jeremy Bentham has noted: 
if other things are equal, and if pushpin is preferred to poetry, 
then pushpin is more valuable.
Ruskin, however, viewed wealth in a different light. He thought 
that the economist's view of wealth as determined by freely per­
ceived desires of autonomous individuals was erroneous. He pointed
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out that the economist’s ideal of liberty was entirely deficient 
in scope, eventually self-defeating, a phantom in other words.6** 
Since the definition of wealth revolves around one's concept of 
liberty, it is necessary to pursue the meaning of liberty further 
in the writings of Ruskin. Ruskin held that true liberty, like 
happiness, can only be achieved when it is recognized that there 
is a Law to which all must be obedient. Ruskin notes "how frantic 
the pursuit of that treacherous phantom which men call Liberty. . . 
How could it be otherwise: since if there be any one principle 
more widely than another confessed by every utterance, or more 
sternly than another imprinted on every atom, of the visible crea­
tion, that principle is not Liberty, but Law."6^ Ruskin claims 
that this principle was acknowledged in ancient Greek thought and 
in the medieval society. If one somewhat arbitrarily decides that 
such societies were undesirable because they did not seek directly 
and immediately to maximize individual freedom, then one is forced 
to forego an appreciation of most of the leading thinkers of the
past ages in their quest for those politico-economic laws which make
for a satisfactory comnunity. Ruskin, like Sismondi, had a great 
deal of respect for the ancient writers.
The study which lately in England has been called 
Political Economy is in reality nothing more than the 
investigation of some accidental phenomena of modem 
conmercial operations, nor has it been true in its 
investigation even of these. It has no connection 
whatever with political economy, as understood and
treated of by the great thinkers of past ages.
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In order to understand Ruskin's rejection of the political
economist1s definition of wealth which was based on the philosophy
of utilitarianism modified by a strong attachment to individual
liberty, it is necessary to pursue the implications of such an
ideological position. Ruskin notes that in such a society
. . .the persons who become rich are, generally speak­
ing, industrious, resolute* proud, covetous, prompt, 
methodical, sensible, unimaginative, insensitive, and 
ignorant.
The persons who remain poor are the entirely fool­
ish, the entirely wise, the idle, the reckless, the 
Jumble, the thoughtful, the dull, the imaginative, the 
sensitive, the well-informed, the improvident, the 
irregularily and impulsively wicked, the clumsy 
knave, the open theif, the entirely merciful, just 
and goodly person.71
In such a society the more industrious, resolute, proud, 
covetous, etc. pursue wJiat they perceive as ever more liberty but 
which should be called license, according to Ruskin.^ In their 
pursuit of "liberty" they attempt to both manipulate and satisfy 
the perceived final goals of the less forceful with vendible com­
modities. This achievement of market power allows them to make 
decisions that affect their own lives and others. This decision­
making ability is then looked upon as "liberty."
Whereas in former times it was the task of ethics, moral 
philosophy, or moral theology to aid mankind in the moderate and 
harmonious use of intermediate goods, which goods are the end 
products of any productive economy, in his time Ruskin perceived 
that these end products of the economist system had become the
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perceived final goals of mankind. Accordingly, the science of 
political economy had become the ethics and moral philosophy of 
the age because it is the task of political economy to aid man­
kind in making the correct decisions on how efficiently to produce 
and allocate scarce means to achieve as many satisfactions as 
possible. More simply, since what were formerly intermediate 
goods, whose usefulness was determined by a more ultimate goal as 
determined by the ethical sciences, are now perceived as final 
goals, that science, political economy, which deals with the effi­
cient production and allocation of those formerly intermediate, but
73now viewed as final, goals becomes the moral philosophy of an age. 
And regardless of what political economy was supposed by its sup­
porters to be, Ruskin asserts that it abets mamonism. James E. 
Caimes, an economist of Ruskin*s time, said that political economy 
abets nothing; it stands neutral among systems and gives no advice.
Political economy stands apart from all particular 
systems, and is, moreover, absolutely neutral as 
between all . . . For there are few practical prob­
lems which do not present other aspects than the 
purely economical--political, moral, educational, 
artistic aspects--and these may involve conse­
quences so weighty as to turn the scale against 
purely economic solutions. On the relative importance 
of such conflicting considerations, Political Economy 
offers no opinion, pronounces no judgments.?4
Ruskin ignores the fact that political economy gives no advice,
being only too aware that its advice is taken by practical men.
John Fain has noted about this issue the following:
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Ruskin's position here is very strong. To the scientists 
who formulated the natural laws of political economy those 
laws were statements of human tendencies which never 
operate in isolation, or as they always said, which are 
subject to the qualification ceteris paribus. To practical 
men those laws assumed the aspect either of justice or of 
inevitability. And we cannot say that the scientists 
were entirely justified and the practical men entirely 
benighted. It is difficult to exclude normative im­
plications from descriptive statements.
If the statesmen of Ruskin's day had been wise enough to apply 
economic policies as suggested by the best political economists, 
all might have been well. But they were not, and their half­
wisdom dictated unmodified applications of economic theory. The 
record is filled with illustrations of this tragic state of mis­
understandings. One will suffice:
All this time, the attitude of English statesmen was one 
of indifference. In 1845, the Devon commission laid bare 
the fatal defects of the Irish land system and suggested 
sensible remedies. But no proposals for reform could 
make headway in face of the prevalent doctrine of laissez- 
faire. Private property was regarded as sacred, and the 
principles of the classical political economy were invoked 
in support of a policy of inaction. It was in vain that 
the economists themselves pointed out the uselessness of 
maintaining the forms of free contract when the reality 
was absent.
As late as 1868 Robert Lowe, a Conservative and economist,
opposed Irish land reform with the principles of political economy,
for only such principles stood as an "oasis in the desert of
77politics upon which we may safely rest."
Ruskin*s criticism of political economy began by rejecting 
the fundamental premise that liberty, the power to make decisions,
was the final end of a society. In a nutshell, the ability to make
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good decisions was his ideal. He, therefore, rejected also the 
attendant economic conclusion that individuals were the best 
determinants of what was valuable. Ruskin is adamant in his stand 
that there is an objective source of wealth. "The value of things, 
therefore, is independent of opinion, and of quantity. Think what 
you will of it, gain how much you may of it, the value of a thing
itself is neither greater nor less. For ever it avails, or
* " 78 avails not.
It is the task of political economy to analyze this true source 
of wealth, that is, how the production and consumption of economic 
commodities will lead to an increase in the ideal life. Similar to 
Sismondi, Ruskin distinguishes between the true science of political 
economy which subordinates the quest for wealth to an Ultimate 
End of man and that tTbastard science" which merely attempts to 
maximize wealth.
The real science of political economy, which has yet 
to be distinguished from the bastard science, as medicine 
from withcraft, and astronomy from astrology, is that 
which teaches nations to desire and labor for the things 
that lead to life; and which teaches them to scorn and
destroy the things that lead to destruction.™
And for Ruskin, "the ideal of human life is a union of Spartan
simplicity of manners with Athenian sensibility and imagination."®®
Thus for his definition of wealth it was natural for Ruskin to turn
to the Greek writer, Xenophon for his answer. Ruskin claimed that
the Economist of Xenophon "contains a flawless definition of wealth,
and an explanation of its dependence for efficiency on the merits
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and faculties of its possessors;--a definition which cannot be 
bettered; and which must be the foundation of all true Political
Economy among nations, as Euclid is to all time the basis of
81Geometry." x Ruskin is referring to the first chapter of Xenophon's 
Economist, "The Management of Property, that is Whatever is of Use 
to a man, But is of No Value to Such as Are Slaves to Their Pas­
sions" where Xenophon is intent on showing that some economic 
possessions aid man in living and thus are true wealth or property, 
and some possessions, on the contrary, contribute to the destruc­
tion of man's nature. These latter possessions cannot be considered 
as true wealth, but must be considered as the opposite of wealth 
or property--illth was Ruskin's label for such possessions.
Then the very same things are property to a man 
who knows how to use them, and not property to one who 
does not. For instance, a flute is property to a man 
who can play on it fairly; but to one who is wholly un­
skilled in its use it is no more property than mere 
useless stones would be,--unless indeed he sold it.
So it is clear to us that a flute in the hands 
of a man who does now know how to use it, is not property 
to him, unless he sells it. So long as he keeps it, it 
is not property. And indeed, Socrates, we shall thus 
have reasoned consistently, since we before decided that 
a man's property must be something that benefits him.
If the man does not sell the flute, it is not property, 
for it is of no use; but if he sell it, it becomes 
property.
To this Socrates answered, Yes, if he know how to 
sell it. But if he, again, were to sell it to a man 
who does not know how to use it, it would not be property 
even when sold, according to what you say.
Your words, Socrates, seem to imply that not even money
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would be property unless a man knew how to use it.
Well, you seem to agree with me that a man's 
property is only what benefits him. Suppose a man were 
to make this use of his money, to buy, say, a mistress, 
by whose influence his body would be worse, his soul 
worse, his household worse; how could we then say 
that his money was any benefit to him?
We could not,--unless, indeed, we are to count 
as property henbane, the herb that drives mad those who 
eat it.82
This is an important passage for Ruskin and one that he 
would return to more often than to any other for his inspiration 
when pursuing problems in political economy. One can see a 
glimpse of it in the following often-quoted declaration of Ruskin: 
"And possession is in use only, which for each man is sternly 
limited; so that such things, and so much of them as he can use, 
are, indeed, well for him, or wealth; and more of them, or any 
other things are ill for him, or Illth.
Thus the concept of wealth includes more than just the measure­
ment of one's actual possessions, it includes, secondly, the 
capability of utilizing them in an appropriate and vital manner. 
"'Having' is not an absolute, but a graduated, power; and consists 
not only in the quantity or nature of the thing possessed, but also 
(and in a greater degree) in its suitableness to the person pos­
sessing it and in his vital power to use it. . . Wealth, therefore,
84is the 'posession of the valuable by the valiant.'" There is also 
a third aspect to wealth; a commodity cannot constitute wealth unless 
it has been produced in an appropriate manner. "The whole question,
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therefore, respecting not only the advantage, but even the quan­
tity, of national wealth, resolves itself finally into one of 
abstract justice. . . Any given accumulation of conmercial wealth 
may be indicative, on the one hand, of faithful industries, pro­
gressive energies, and productive ingenuities; or, on the other, 
it may be indicative of mortal luxury, merciless tyranny, ruinous
chicane."8S
This third aspect of Ruskin's thought on wealth leads into a 
discussion of the concept of cost. Conventional economics sepa­
rates the production and consumption processes and considers 
separately the men functioning in each process. For Ruskin, as 
for Sismondi, this separation is unwarranted, because the produc­
tion process itself has an impact upon the consumer. If the 
production process is heavy with human cost, this will have a ruinous 
effect on the worker's ability to make wise decisions concerning 
consumption. As Sismondi had remarked, "Those who spread manure 
in the morning will not t/ant to dance in silk clothes in the after­
noon." Ruskin attempted to carry this discussion a step forward 
by distinguishing between intrinsic costs, "that of getting the
thing in the right way," and effectual cost "that of getting the
86thing in the way we set about it."
Another concept of great importance in Ruskin's analysis is 
'value." As Ruskin characteristically phrases it, 1 Valor, from 
valere, to be well or strong ( );--strong, in life (if a man),
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or valiant; strong for life Cif a thing), or valuable. To be
Valuable,1 therefore, is to 'avail towards life.' A truly
valuable or available thing is that which leads to life with its
whole strength. In proportion as it does not lead to life, or as
its strength is broken, it is less valuable; in proportion as it
leads away from life, it is invaluable or malignant."^ To be
valuable , therefore, is to ’’avail towards life." To give this
concept concreteness Ruskin distinguishes between intrinsic value
and effectual value. Intrinsic value is "the absolute power of
anything to support life. A sheaf of wheat of given quality and
weight has in it a measurable power of sustaining the substance of
the body; a cubic foot or pure air, a fixed power of sustaining its
warmth; and a cluster of flowers of given beauty a fixed power of
enlivening or animating the senses and the h e a r t . H o w e v e r ,
useful criteria of intrinsic value as life-giving power would have
to be derived chiefly from the physical and biological sciences,
fields in which Ruskin was not adept and thus he did not pursue
this line of thought.
It may be worth a digression here to note that an early biographer
of Ruskin was a biologist and fixed upon the quotation as the first
instance of an expression of an "objective" value wherein
. . . physical and physiological properties, or ’values,' 
can indeed indefinitely be assigned: the one so much fuel, 
its heat-giving power measurable in calorimeter, or in 
actual units of work, the other a definite sensory stimulus 
. . .  It is interesting then to note that the shout of
I l l
’sentiment versus science,1 with which Mr. Ruskin has been 
for so many years turned out of court, did after all 
accurately enough describe the controversy; . . . the 
inductive logic and statistics, the physics and the 
chemistry, the biology and medicine, the psychology 
and education were all essentially on the side of Mr.
Ruskin; while on the other were too often sheer blind­
ness to the actual facts of human and social life--organism, 
function and environment alike— concealed by illusory ab­
stractions, baseless assimiptions, and feeble metaphors 
stuck together with scholastic logic and frozen into 
dismal and repellent form by a theory of moral senti­
ments which assumed moral temperature at its absoluteQO ~zero,8y
In this respect Ruskin may be considered a forerunner to much 
of that work which has attempted to assign a more prominent index
of value to an item's absolute or entropic usefulness, rather than
rely totally upon a comnodity's monetary value as the only cri­
terion of a comnodity's worth to society. A noted twentieth- 
century physical chemist and economist, Frederick Soddy, has analyzed 
this idea of absolute wealth much more fully than either Ruskin or 
Patrick Geddes. Soddy recognized Ruskin as his predecessor and 
often paid tribute to his thought. In the following passage from 
Soddy*s Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt, we are able to see once 
again the need of the humanistic scientist for the basic physical 
scientist and vice-versa and, we should add, the need of the economic 
scientist for both in his attempt to fulfill human needs from the 
world's physical resources:
Ruskin, in solitary and picturesque protest 
against the hallucinations of his age, pleaded in vain 
for an economics founded upon life. Hostile . . .  to the 
chrematistic pursuit of science which desecrates the
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countryside and doomed the workers to bestial conditions 
of existence, and a great champion of the cause of the 
higher spiritual and aesthetic values against the onrush 
of a sordid materialism, yet it is to materialistic science 
we must turn if we require the theory and justification
of his philosophy.30
Thus it is worthwhile to note that Ruskin1s concept of in­
trinsic value brings into the realm of political economy the 
physical and biological sciences. Though, as just mentioned, 
Ruskin did not pursue this line of thought, he seems to have been 
dlert to the essential role of such sciences.
Such and such a piece of land, with its asso­
ciated lakes and seas, rightly treated in surface and 
substance, can produce precisely so much food and power, 
and no more, its surface treatment (agriculture) and 
substance treatment (practical geology and chemistry) 
are the first roots of economical science.31
In addition to intrinsic value with its emphasis on the ab­
solute or entropic value, Ruskin used the concept of effectual 
value. Intrinsic value is present in goods used or unused; ef­
fectual value results whenever these conmodities with intrinsic 
value are used by an appropriate "acceptant capacity." "The pro­
duction of effectual value, therefore, always involves two needs: 
first, the production of a thing essentially useful; then the 
production of the capacity to use it." This latter ability to 
use properly a conmodity is clearly inspired by Xenophon^ 
Economist which we have already discussed. Thus if a good thing 
avails toward life in the consumptive process, it is valuable.
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In distinguishing between Ruskin's definitions of wealth 
and value, it is enough to note that, for Ruskin, a commodity 
might be valuable without constituting wealth. Wealth has three 
aspects whereas value has only two; wealth requires that a thing 
be good, that it be honestly got, that it be effectively used, 
whereas value requires only that a thing be good and effectively 
used. Consequently, before we may designate a valuable comnodity 
to be a part of a nation's wealth, we must ascertain the intrinsic 
cost, which may under certain conditions negate the resultant value. 
In concluding this section on wealth, intrinsic and effec­
tual, and on intrinsic and extrinsic cost, we see that for Ruskin 
the true political economist had to be aware of his border dis­
ciplines. Ruskin's stress on effectual value and intrinsic cost 
brought ethics, morals and social philosophy into the realm of the 
political economist, while his elaboration upon intrinsic values 
made some knowledge of the results of the physical and biological 
sciences imperative.
It is clear from this discussion of Ruskin's notions of wealth 
and value that he could not consider the mere accumulation of 
wealth and possessions to be the final goal of either the individual 
or the nation. He contrasts the erroneous from the correct per­
ception of wealth in the following passage:
There will be always a number of men who would 
fain set themselves to the accumulation of wealth as 
the sole object of their life. Necessarily, that class
114
of men is an uneducated class, inferior in intellect, and 
more or less cowardly. It is physically impossible for 
a well-educated, intellectual, or brave man to make 
money the chief object of his thoughts; just as it is 
for him to make his dinner the principal object of them.
All healthy people like their dinners, but their dinner 
is not the main object of their lives. So all healthily- 
minded people like making money--ought to like it, and 
to enjoy the sensation of winning it: but the main 
object of their life is not money; it is something 
better than money.^
Generally speaking, Ruskin taught that moderate wealth should 
be the goal. "A nation which desires true wealth, desires it 
moderately, and can therefore distribute it with kindness, and 
possess it with pleasure; but one which desires false wealth, de­
sires it inmoderately, and can neither dispense it with justice, nor
94enjoy it in peace. Ruskin urges the individual to recognize 
that
. . . the law of life is that a man should fix the sum 
he desires to make annually, as the food he desires to 
eat daily; and stay when he has reached the limit, re­
fusing increase of business, and leaving it to others, 
so obtaining due freedom of time for better t h o u g h t s .95
Hence his prescriptions for the running of a state: "I strongly
suspect that in a well-organized state, the possession of wealth
ought to incapacitate for public o f f i c e , a n d  "one of the most
important conditions of a healthy system of social economy, would
be the restraint of the properties and incomes of the upper classes
within certain fixed limits."^
This call for moderation and restraint did not fall on fertile
ground in Victorian England. Sherburne points out that "Ruskin's
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final call for restraint was, perhaps, the most incomprehensible 
to his Victorian contemporaries. It lies in the sensitive area of 
social advancement or 'getting-on.* Ruskin denies the 'gospel 
of whatever we've got, to get more' as vehemently as he does that 
of ’wherever we are, to go somewhere else.'"®®
The customary reaction was that expressed in a leading article 
by the Manchester Examiner and Times on October 2, 1860: "He 
(Ruskin) is not worth our powder and shot, yet, if we do not crush 
him, his wild words will touch the springs of action in some 
hearts, and ere we are aware a moral floodgate may fly open and 
drown us all."®® For better or worse, the Manchester Examiner and 
Times and, one might add, the conventional political economists 
were able to keep shut the moral floodgate that Ruskin*s thought 
represented and thus to keep the Victorian economic theory on the 
dry road of amorality. Though one economist predicted in 1888 that 
future economic theory would be built with Ruskinian bricks rather 
than with Ricardian s t r a w , t h i s  prediction has simply not come 
true.
Yet Ruskin's wild words have touched deeply sane minds and 
hearts. Such diverse individuals as the heretical English economist
John A. Hobson,^®1 the artist and craftsman Eric Gill,*^ the
103 i fMbiologist Patrick Geddes, the physical chemist Frederick Soddy, *
the economic historian R. H. Tawney,*0  ̂a founder of the American
Economic Association Richard T. Ely,*®® the English novelist and
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distributist G. K. Chesterton, the French novelist Marcel 
l nftProust, uo and Indian pacifist and political leader Mohandas 
G a n d h i , w o u l d  all pay homage to Ruskin and his ideas.
John A. Hobson
Although John A. Hobson often claimed that he was Ruskin1s 
disciple, and in many of his works indicated that he was merely at­
tempting to fill in some of the gaps in Ruskin1 s ’’magnificent plunge" 
into economic theory which brought "whole civilizations to a grand 
assise,"HO nonetheless true that John Hobson added to and modi­
fied as much as he kept intact from Ruskin's thought. Ewald Grether 
has described the relationship of Ruskin and Hobson in the following 
manner: "It is clear that it was neither a faith nor a creed that 
descended from Ruskin to Hobson, but primarily an attitude."HI 
This inherited attitude was that of subjecting standard or conventional 
economic theory to the test of human assessment. Though Hobson, even 
more than Ruskin, admitted that there was a place for that orthodox 
economic theory which took the narrow and more quantitive vision that
simply attempted to allocate efficiently scarce resources among the per-
112ceived needs of individuals, nonetheless, Hobson's plea for 
a "wider human assessment" of the output of the economic system 
than was undertaken by such orthodox economic theorists, marks him 
clearly as a Ruskinian. For both Ruskin and Hobson the discipline 
of economics had to be moderated by a social ethics and brought under 
the umbrella of a broader science; the art or science of human welfare.
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However, whereas for the idealist and Tory Ruskin, the ethical 
order was imminent in social behavior and thus socio-economic 
behavior was ultimately reducible to ethical behavior, the prag­
matic and democratic Hobson took a more "organic" view of social 
welfare which derived as much of its inspiration from the physical 
sciences, especially biology, as it did from absolute ethical 
standards.Michael Freeden has remarked about the foundations 
of Hobson's economic theory: "In terms of the intellectual origins
of his thought, this means that his idealism was tempered by an 
emphasis on biological processes, especially by the 'organism' 
model and by evolutionary theory,”114
Ruskin and Hobson were men of different generations and no­
where is this fact made more clear than by their attitude towards 
the biological sciences, Ruskin had resigned his chair at Oxford 
chiefly as a protest against the establishing of a physiological 
laboratory within its classical precincts, while Hobson had enthu­
siastically accepted the findings of such laboratories. Ruskin's 
thought apparently had matured too far before the evolutionary 
concepts of biological science became thoroughly impressed upon the 
thought of his age. Hobson, on the other hand, was the product of 
an age in which the science of biology in general and the evolu­
tionary process in particular were the guiding tenets to much of 
social thought. This is not to indicate that Hobson took an amoral 
and a-ethical stance, quite the contrary. It does indicate, however,
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that Hobson’s ethical base was formed somewhat differently (more 
adequately?) than was Ruskin's. Hobson was quite aware of this 
difference in his economic theory and that of Ruskin, and often 
lamented Ruskin’s lack of appreciation for the science of biology: 
"Had Mr. Ruskin been less scornful or suspicious of the rising 
science of Biology, he might have greatly strengthened the ethical 
supports on which he r e l i e d . H o b s o n  would support Ruskin's 
ethics by showing that Ruskin's ethical conclusions were similar 
to the conclusions inspired by an organic worldview. For example,
The law of just distribution of wealth, to Mr.
Ruskin primarily a moral problem, is seen to rest upon 
a necessary physical basis, so soon as we learn to trace 
through all the changing processes of vegetable and 
animal life the natural interdependence and interaction 
between nutrition and function, the intake of food and 
the output of energy in work. Once let us grasp com­
prehensively the truth that society is rightly classed 
as an organism, and the great principle of apportion­
ment of work and its products contained in the formula,
"From each according to his powers, to each according 
to his needs," no longer rests only on a sentimental or 
a purely moral basis; it becomes the necessary applica­
tion of a natural law of progress in every department of 
organic life.*16
Before plunging into Hobson's thought on the nature of eco­
nomic wealth, it is worth noting that although Hobson's name is 
most often linked with Ruskin's in the history of economic theory, 
in some significant respects Hobson’s thought was aligned more 
closely to Sismondi's than to Ruskin. Both Hobson and Sismondi 
can be considered as professional, though somewhat heretical, 
economists in addition to their role of humane critic of the eco­
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nomic profession. Both made significant contributions to economic 
theory.^ Hobson and Sismondi made their major contribution to 
economic theory in their research into the causes of the periodic 
economic crises, and both rejected Say's Law in their belief that 
over-production was the cause of such crises. John M. Keynes has 
acknowledged his debt to H o b s o n , b u t  not to Sismondi. Keynes 
attributed the origin of the idea of the possibility of a general 
underconsumption/overproduction and the consequent rejection of 
Say's Law to Thomas Maithus, and, in so doing, was apparently 
unaware that Maithus had mostly borrowed this analysis from Sismondi. 
Marx is closer to the truth when he cynically described Maithus' 
Principles as merely the "English translation" of Sismondi.^
And finally, although Sismondi considered himself a "republican" 
and Hobson thought of himself as a "democrat," they were both 
politically far removed from the quite conservative Toryism of 
Ruskin.
With that introduction, we can now sally forth into Hobson's 
evaluation of economic wealth. Hobson begins his discussion of 
consumption by pointing out an inconsistency in orthodox economic 
thought: "Though everybody agreed that consumption was the final
goal, this goal, as such, was nobody's concern. When goods passed 
through the hands of farmers, manufacturers, and traders, into the 
hands of consumers, they seemed to pass out of the economic system 
into a destructive process that took place in privacy and obscurity."
12Q
And though "consumption remained the formal end of economic 
processes, production was the real end."*^
Such an ostrich attitude towards the problems of evaluating 
the worth of final consumption could only lead to further error, 
implied Hobson.
Only so far as current tastes and appetites are 
reliable indices of human utility, only so far as we 
can identify the desired with the desirable, is the 
evolution of customary standards of life a sound human 
art. But it is needless to cite the ample evidence 
of the errors and wastes that are represented in 
every human standard of consumption.'^
In order to obviate such errors Hobson attempted to dispel some of 
the "privacy and obscurity" that surrounded the consumption of eco­
nomic products, or as he peceived the task, "some further adjust-
123ment is needed to assess the desired in terms of the desirable."
Hobson first rejected the approach taken by standard economic 
textbooks when dealing with the section on consumer behavior. Hobson 
saw behind the facade of measuring the fulfillment of the effective 
desires of consumers or utilizing sane elasticity of demand index, 
and then using this measurement as an indicator of how well the 
economic system was performing its essential task of achieving the 
final goal of all economic system.
But a study primarily directed to the ascertain­
ment and measurement of elasticity of demand, does not 
yet accord the disinterested valuations of consumptive 
processes required by a theory in which consumption is 
the "sole end." For consumption here only enters the 
economic field as a factor in markets and the determina­
tion of prices, not as the means of realizing the pur­
pose of which the whole economic system is directed.124
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In order to realize the purpose by which the whole economic 
system is directed Hobson had to determine what it was that was 
desirable, or, in other words, what was the Ultimate End by which 
the economic system could be oriented and measured. Hobson's 
favorite phrase for such an ideal was "organic welfare" about 
which he once added, "Though in form a mere synonym for good life, 
it is by usage both more restricted and more precise,"-^ In 
another study he was concerned to show that "organic welfare" had 
both a materialistic component and a non-material or artistic, 
spiritual component.
The organic conception of mens sano in corpore
sano still stands as the first principle of human
welfare. . . It finds its justification in the truth 
so strongly enforced by Aristotle that we must first 
have a livelihood and then practice virtue.126
What contributes to a mens sano in corpore sano? More 
specifically, what contribution does the economic process make to 
a mens sano in corpore sano? As Hobson notes, we are immediately 
"Confronted by the question how far the actual economic conduct, 
with its accompanying desires and gratifications, can be taken 
as a safe index of the desirable or organic welfare in its true 
sense." His response is that "we cannot assume a full identity 
of the income of an individual or a conwnunity, expressed in terms
of current satisfactions, with that income expressed in terms of
human welfare." This is so because "the total process of consump­
tion- production may contain large elements of human waste or error, 
in that the tastes, desires, and satisfactions which actively
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stimulate this wealth creation may not conform to the desirable."127 
Later Hobson is more explicit in his condemnation of using the satis­
faction of current consumer's effective demand as the Ultimate End 
of economics.
We cannot admit as the objective of economic activi­
ties either the yield of material goods which these 
activities produce, or the "psychic income" which they 
yield as assessed in terms of current deservedness or 
satisfaction, without reference to their intrinsic de­
sirability.
Hobson then echoes Ruskin by immediately adding "A material or a 
psychic income may contain 'illth' as an alloy to its wealth."12^
The notion of excess production appears next in Hobson’s 
analysis. His declaration that "Mechanical production can easily 
outrun organic consumption," reminds one of both Ruskin's concept 
of "acceptant capacity" and Sismondi's strictures of the politi­
cal economists "que de se representer la consomnation comme une 
puissance sans bomes, toujours prete a devorer une production 
infinie,"12^
After surveying the results of actual consumption patterns and 
the economist's analysis of such consumer behavior Hobson concludes 
that "it cannot be said that any adequate study either of the 
evolution of actual standards of consumption, or of 'desirable 
standards,' has yet been made." Hobson also indicated the reason 
for such failure:
Though much attention has been given to the economy 
of expenditure in equalizing "marginal utilities," it has
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not been clearly recognized that the several margins 
are themselves determined by processes of utilitarian 
calculations based on balances of organic requirements.
This failure to recognize that the determination of the "several 
margins" is due, at least partly, in Hobson's mind to the fact 
that economists fail "to realize adequately that the organic 
nature of man necessarily stamps itself on his standard of con­
sumption, and that, therefore, the various items of consumption 
must be studied as contributions toward the organic whole."130 
John Hobson would expend a considerable portion of his ana­
lytical energies in studying not only the various items of consump­
tion, but also the process of production in an industrial system, 
and how both consumption and production contributed to or inhibited 
the organic welfare ideal. Hobson's analysis of the process of 
production is best sunmarized in Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation 
(1914), while the best compendium of Hobson's thought on the items 
of consumption is found in chapter five "Standards of Consumption" 
in Part IV, "Organic Reform of the Economic System" in his Wealth 
and Life: A Study in Values (1929). Hobson begins his analysis 
in the former study by formulating the general problem provisionally 
in terms of three questions: "(1) What are the concrete goods and
services which constitute the real national income? (2) How are
131these goods produced? (3) How are they consumed?" Hobson, 
however, rejects these questions as inappropriate for an organic 
welfare political economist. Goods, production and consumption
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have to be measured in human terms. As he expresses it:
In order to express business "costs” in terms of 
human costs, we require to know three things:
1. The quality and kind of the various human ef­
forts involved in the business "cost."
2. The capacitites of the human beings who give 
out these efforts.
3. The distribution of the effort among those who 
give it out.
Correspondingly strictly to this analysis of "costs" 
of Production will be the analysis of "utility" of 
Cons imp tion. There we shall want to know:
1. The quality and kind of the satisfaction or 
utility yielded by the "economic utility" that is sold 
to consumers.
2. The capacities of the consumers who get this 
"economic utility."
3. The distribution of the economic utility among 
the consuming public.
The humanist criticism of the Industry is condensed
into this a n a l y s i s . 132
Hobson devoted the next several chapters of his Work and 
Wealth to investigating the human costs of the process of produc­
tion in an industrial society. Though he is quite aware of the 
great value of machines to lighten human labor, he is also aware 
of their human costs. The "loss of liberty" of being tied to the 
inexorable pace of a machine is the first cost that he discusses. 
Second, he explores the indictment "that the worker in one of 
these routine subdivided processes has no appreciation of the 
utility or social meaning of his l a b o u r . "1^3 Hobson recognizes
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that machinery can lead to men who are not interested in their work, 
and who do not recognize in it either beauty or utility. Hobson 
comments that such a "man is degraded by that work, whether he knows 
it or not. When he cones to a clear consciousness of that degrada­
tion, the spiritual cost is greatly enhanced.
As concerning the process of consumption, though Hobson never 
fully resolves in his own mind the absolute value of the items of 
consumption, he was unwilling to agree with the "popular thinking 
that is apt to brush aside the questions with the remark that 
values are matters of individual tastes, and quot homines tot 
sententiae." Hobson considered such a position to be false because 
"we know that there exists a substantial body of agreement as to 
the main constituents of welfare, and even as to the order of their 
evaluation."135
From his observations on consumption behavior around him Hobson 
noted that an industrial economy has a built-in bias towards ex­
cessive production and consumption of material goods. "This 
charge of materialism made against the more advanced industrial 
conmunities,. , . is based on an over-stimulation of certain 
instincts for physical satisfactions, due to the innovating ten­
dencies of modem capitalism with its elaborated apparatus of 
selling pressures." This leads to an excess which is due to "a 
hasty exploitation of newly roused tastes that absorb too much of 
human nature in economic processes. 'Getting and spending, we
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lay waste our powers.”'-^
"Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers" is the poet's 
lament over the philosophy of materialism that seems to be the 
inevitable consequence of an industrial economy in which narrow­
minded and tunnel-visioned economists only describe a minute 
portion of the social canvas. Such economists never take off their 
blinders, and though they may peak from time to time to the left, 
they never look above to the Ultimate End, nor below to the 
primary and absolute foundations of all economies, the environ­
mental resources.
Hobson’s final solution to this inherent bias toward exces- 
sice production is the following:
Human energy, therefore, increasingly demands 
that half the power of mechanical production shall be 
applied, not to producing more goods, but more leisure, 
that is to say, to so liberating the producer from the 
strain and burden of specialised production that he may 
become a skilled consumer, with leisure and energy enough 
at his free disposal to assimilate the slower gains of 
scientific production, instead of being overwhelmed by 
them, while at the same time bringing his harmonised 
economic standard of living into proper relations with 
the non-economic activities and satisfactions of his life.
This seems impracticable so long as profiteering rules 
the economic system. For the profit-maker can only 
gain his end either by working his machines and his 
workers to their full capacity, and turning out goods 
so rapidly that his skilled marketeers must induce the 
general body of workers to take their share in increased 
goods, not in increased leisure and other non-economic 
satisfactions, or by restrictions of output that give a 
wasteful or excessive leisure.137
As a fitting summation of J. A. Hobson's contribution to the 
analysis of wealth and the economic system which produces such
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wealth, and, at the same time, an introduction to the thought of 
Richard Henry' Tawney, the noted economic historian and student of 
the current economic scene who will be the subject of our next 
section, we can quote a passage from Tawney's quite favorable 
review of Hobson's Wealth and Life.
The essence of humanism, perhaps, is the attitude 
which judges the externals of life by their effect in 
assisting or hindering the life of the spirit. It is 
the conviction that the machinery of existence--property 
and material wealth, and industrial organisation, and 
the whole fabric and mechanism of social institutions-- 
is to be regarded as means to an end, and that this end 
is the growth towards perfection of individual human 
beings. In this sense, Mr. Hobson is the greatest of 
economic humanists. Undisturbed by the roar of the wheels, 
he approaches the engine with questions most of us are 
too clever, or too superficial, to condescend to ask.
What is the thing for? In what way do its impressive 
gyrations minister to the dignity and happiness ofmankind?138
Richard Henry Tawney 
On the death of Richard Henry Tawney in 1962, Talcott Parsons, 
the noted Harvard sociologist, wrote that "it would, I think, be 
fair to say that Tawney regarded both his historical scholarship 
and his knowledge of modem economics as primarily instrumental.
He was above all a moralist, deeply concerned with understanding, 
in full historical depth, what he felt to be the moral problems 
of his times."139 This instrumental role of historical and eco­
nomic knowledge is clearly observed when one reviews the chronology 
of Tawney's early life. After graduation from Balliol College in 
Oxford in 1903 with a standard classical education he decided that
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he would attempt some kind of social work. After looking around 
at the possibilities Tawney finally settled down to work for the 
charitable organization called the Childrenfs Country Holiday Fund 
while he lived at Toynbee Hall, a university settlement house in 
the East End of London. For a very important three years of his 
life Tawney actively attempted to directly ameliorate the standard 
of living for the impoverished by philanthropic and educational 
means. Gradually, however, Tawney became disillusioned in the 
effectiveness of such direct steps. Perceiving such philanthropic 
efforts to be somewhat superficial, Tawney turned to research and 
analysis of the current economic scene. By 1906 he was ready to 
leave the active life of the social worker and turn to teaching 
and research into the entire social system which spawned such evils 
as he had encountered in his work in the East End of London. Six 
years later Tawney would describe the stages that his thought went 
through as he searched for the cure to society's evils.
The stages of thought about social affairs through 
which I, and I suppose other people, have passed are some­
thing as follows. One begins by regarding poverty etc. 
as a matter of individual misfortune. One does not connect 
it with the main institutions of society; nor does one 
think of those institutions as the work of the state and 
dependent upon its support. One therefore does not look 
to the state for improvement. In the second stage one 
realizes that then there is a unity underlying the indi­
vidual cases of poverty; that they are connected with 
social institutions, specimens of a type, pieces of a 
system, and that this system is, in the first instance, 
the work of the state and can be altered by an alteration 
of the law. One therefore now looks to the state for 
reform. . . In the third stage one realizes that the 
attitude of the state is just the attitude of countless 
individuals, that to rage against it for not removing
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economic evils (Which state action can remove) is as 
futile as it is to rage against the Pope for not being 
a reformer, and that society cannot lift itself up by 
the soles of its boots. The attitude of governments 
. . .  is wrong because the attitude of individuals to 
each other is wrong, because we in our present society 
are living on certain false and universal assumptions; 
and that even when statesmen honestly mean to do good 
they will often do harm . . . merely because all their 
actions, good and bad, proceed from a character based 
on those assumptions. What we have got to do first of 
all is to change those assumptions or principles.
As Tawney searched in the pre-World War I era for the false
and universal assumptions that were the ultimate cause of society's
evils, he first turned to the study of conventional economic theory
for guidance and enlightenment. From 1906 to 1908 Tawney was an
assistant in economics at Glasgow University. Tawney very quickly,
however, came to the conclusion that conventional economic theory
was more a part of the problem rather than any help in understanding
the ultimate cause of social evils. At Glasgow University Tawney
acquired his lifelong disesteem for orthodox theoretical economics.
Looking back on his time there, "as a kind of sub-assistant on
economic theory," he recalled having "exchanged apples for nuts in
the best manner of Marshall." He quoted the words of the governess
to her pupil in The Importance of Being Earnest: "Do not read Mill's
chapter on the fall of the rupee, my dear; it is too exciting for
a young girl;" then observed: "I found that my attitude to economics
was much the same, and that these austere heights were not my
spiritual home."-^ Tawney was more forthright in his assessment of
economic theory when he confided to his diary (December 11, 1913) an
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attitude which he continued to hold but did not later express so 
boldly: ’There is no such things as a science of economics, nor
ever will be. It is cant and iMarshall's talk as to the need for 
social problems to be studied by ’the same order of mind which 
tests the stability of a battleship in bad weather1 is twaddle.''^2
Failing to find what he wanted in the study of conventional
economic theory, Tawney turned to the study of economic history 
for guidance and enlightenment. If he could only find out what
had been the historical development of his economic society, such
knowledge should be useful in finding resolutions to society’s 
evils. Though he used history as an instrument in his private 
and personal search for solutions to current social problems,
Tawney realized, as few do who seek for answers to problems with 
which one is emotionally involved, that one cannot dictate to his­
tory. Instead one must commit oneself to the era that one studies 
with an attentive ear, an inquisitive nose, a patient and thorough 
mind, and a sympathetic heart as one searches for the clues to the 
history of an era. History can indeed serve as a useful instrument 
in aiding one to understand current social evils, but it is a deli­
cate instrument to be used only by the adept (not always the pro­
fessionals) and is a tool which must be treated with respect if it 
is to be used rightfully. Tawney*s Religion and the Rise of Capi­
talism (1926) and his earlier The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth 
Century (1912) have been models for many who have published after
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him.
But before he could use history as a tool or instrument to 
aid him in the understanding of current social maladies, Tawney had 
to clarify in his own mind the broad general nature of the social 
sickness of his era. During this period of introspection and 
reflection, Tawney wrote a long entry into his diary for July 12, 
1913:
As long as individuals think the attainment of 
moderate material comfort the chief end of life, so 
long will governments plead as an excuse for not doing 
this or that they cannot afford it. If modem England 
and America are right in believing that the principal aim 
of man, what should be taught to children, what should 
serve as a rough standard of merit, what merits appro­
bation and respect, is the attainment of a moderate-- 
or even immoderate--standard of comfort, and that moral 
questions arise only after this has been attained; then 
they must be content to go without religion, literature, 
art, and learning. These are not hard to find for those 
who really seek them, or who seek them first. But if 
they are sought second they are never found at all . . .
What I mean is that the failure of society to make 
the changes which are obviously important when regarded 
in bulk is due to the fact that individually we all have 
a false philosophy of life. We assume that the greatest 
misfortune which can befall a man is poverty--and that 
conduct which leads to the sacrifice of income is unwise, 
impractical, etc.; in short that a man's life should be 
judged by its yield of income, and a nation's life by 
its production of wealth. Hence we have one group of 
economists who have attacked certain reforms on the 
grouping that they diminished wealth, and another school 
who answered them not by saying 'let wealth be diminished, 
fiat justicia,' but by arguing that they really would not 
diminish wealth after all. The answer is I believe correct. 
But it is, nevertheless, devilish; for it suggests that 
hunan life, justice, etc, should be measured as items on 
a balance sheet. . .
But supposing unearned incomes, rents, etc. are pooled,
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will not the world, with its present philosophy, do 
anything but gobble them up mid look up with an impatient 
grunt for more? That is the real question. It will not 
be faced in my lifetime because as long as the working 
classes believe, and believe rightly, that their mentors 
rob than, so long will they look on the restoration of 
the booty as the great reform, and will impatiently waive 
aside more fundamental issues, as a traveller robbed by 
a highwayman declines to be comforted by being told that 
money, after all, does not buy happiness. But when their 
masters are off their backs they will still have to face 
the fact that you must choose between less and more wealth 
and less and more civilization. . .
Again may not it be that the real way to overcome 
the power of the wealthy is to despise wealth?
When three or four hundred years hence mankind 
looks back on the absurd preoccupation of our age with 
economic issues with the same wonder as, and juster con­
tempt than, we look back on the theological discussions 
of the middle ages, the names which they will reverence 
will be those of men who stood out against the prevalent 
fallacy that the most important problems were economic 
problems, and who 
despising riches.*
Six years later, after being interrupted by World War I and
its aftermath, Tawney returned to this question of what was the
basic problem facing the economic society of his era, and wrote
first "The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society" for the Hibbert
Journal which he soon expanded into the book, The Acquisitive
Society which quickly became one of the most controversial books
of the 1920's as he called on the British society to reform its
fundamental philosophy of life.
These are times which are not ordinary, and in
such times it is not enough to follow the road. It
is necessary to know where it leads and, if it leads 
nowhere, to follow another. The search for another
taught men to conquer poverty by
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involves reflection, which is uncongenial to the 
bustling people who describe themselves as prac­
tical . . . But the practical thing for a 
traveler who is uncertain of his path is not to 
proceed with the utmost rapidity in the wrong 
direction: it is to consider how to find the 
right one.145
Tawney next pointed out that the path upon which England’s 
industrial and economic leaders would guide her, the philosophical 
path that viewed economic productivity as its own end, had been 
tried in the past and had been found wanting.
When they desire to place their economic life on a 
better foundation, they repeat, like parrots, the word 
’’Productivity," because it is the word that rises first 
in their minds; regardless of the fact that productivity 
is the foundation on which it is based already, that in­
creased productivity is the one characteristic achieve­
ment of the age before the war, as religion was of the 
Middle Ages or art of classical Athens, and that it is 
precisely in the century which has seen the greatest 
increase in productivity since the fall of the Roman 
Empire that economic discontent has been most acute.146
Increased productivity alone will not cause societal ills to dis­
appear. Such a response is based upon an illusion.
Hence the idea, which is popular with rich men, that 
industrial disputes would disappear if only the output of 
wealth were doubled, and everyone were twice as well off, 
not only is refuted by all practical experience, but is 
in its very nature founded upon an illusion. For the 
question is one not of amounts but of proportions; and 
men will fight to be paid $120 a week, instead of $80, as 
readily as they will fight to be paid $20 instead of $16.14?
Such leaders whose faith is that "riches are not a means but
an end," and who imply "that all economic activity is equally
14fiestimable, whether it is subordinated to a social purpose or not,"A °
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are "like a man who, when he finds that his shoddy boots wear 
badly, orders a pair two sizes larger instead of a pair of good 
leather, or who makes 14) for putting a bad sixpence in the plate 
on Sunday by putting in a bad shilling the next."149
Tawney would point out the direction that the correct path 
would lead by harkening back to a central theme of Ruskin
The purpose of industry is obvious. It is to supply 
man with things which are necessary, useful or beautiful, 
and thus to bring life to body or spirit. In so far as 
it is governed by this end, it is among the most important 
of human activities. In so far as it is diverted from it, 
it may be harmless, amusing, or even exhilarating to those 
who carry it on, but it possesses no more social signifi­
cance than the orderly business of ants and bees, the 
strutting of peacocks, or the struggles of carnivorous 
animals over carrion.151
The true political economist realizes that "all rights . . . are 
conditional and derivatice, . . . They are derived from the end 
or purpose of the society in which they exist."1^
Tawney draws on his knowledge of history to say that mankind 
has ordinarily understood that productivity sought for its 
own sake is a vice and must be constrained. However this disci­
plining of productivity is no easy task for society. In a passage 
made memorable by his adept use of history, Tawney skillfully 
enlightens his readers to the problems involved in restraining 
untrammelled and functionless economic productivity.
To do so (determine the quantity of productivity 
by some final social purpose) requires a constant 
effort of will, against which egotistical instincts are 
in rebellion, and because, if that will is to prevail, it 
must be embodied in some social and political organization,
which may itself become so arbitrary, tyrannical and 
corrupt as to thwart the performance of function153 
instead of promoting it. When this process of degenera­
tion has gone far, as in most European countries it had 
by the middle of the eighteenth century, the indispensable 
thing is to break the dead organization up and to clear 
the ground. In the course of doing so, the individual 
is emancipated and his rights are enlarged, but the 
ideal of social purpose is discredited by the discredit 
justly attaching to the obsolete order in which it isembodied.154
Thus in England the functional relations of society were 
displaced by "modem economic relations . . . which replaced the 
conception of purpose by that of mechanism."1 The Industrial 
Revolution would not only profoundly modify the facts of economic 
structure, '*but the minds which appraised them.1,1 ̂  The essence 
of the change was the "disappearance of the idea that social insti 
tutions and economic activities were related to common ends which 
gave them their significance and which served as their criterion." 
Society became viewed as a self-adjusting mechanism in which the 
pursuit of private ends is transmuted by an invisible hand into 
the attainment of the Ultimate End.
If pressed, however, to give an answer to the obvious ques­
tion of what was the final goal of the economic system, the indus­
trialists and conventional economists would give an answer 
reminiscent of the Benthamite formula "the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number." Tawney*s response to this answer is charac­
teristic of his historical approach to social problems. Instead 
of attacking the obvious mathematical impossibility of a double
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maximization in one order (the vagueness of which Tawney alluded 
to) he perceptively noted that, historically speaking,
. . .  to say that the end of social institution is 
happiness, is to say that they have no conmon end at all.
For happiness is individual, and to make happiness the 
object of society is to resolve society itself into the 
ambitions of numberless individuals, each directed towards 
the attainment of some personal purpose.158
Such a doctrine has been historically used to assure "men that 
there are no ends other than their ends, no law other than their 
desires, no limit other than that which they think advisable.
Under the impulse of such ideas men do not become religious or 
wise or artistic; for religion and wisdom and art imply the accep­
tance of l i m i t a t i o n s ."159 jn brief, the Benthamite formula of 
"the greatest happiness for the greatest number" leads to the 
"Acquisitive Society" whose whole tendency "is to promote the 
acquisition of wealth."-^® According to Tawney's historical studies, 
the Benthamite goal had been guilty of obscuring the notion of 
final humane standards or principles by which mankind throughout 
history had moderated the pursuit of economic possessions. Twaney 
claims that
. . .when we condemn slavery, sweating, the exploitation 
of a weak race by a conqueror, even though these things 
are convenient to the greatest number concerned, we do 
so because we recognize . . . there is a law higher than 
the well-being of the majority, and that law is the 
supreme value of every human personality as such.l°l
Such an untraumelled pursuit of maximum individual happiness leads
to what Tawney regards as the nemesis of industrialism. Paradoxi-
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cally, it is not the failure of industrialism which causes the 
general malaise of modem economic society, but its very success, 
its total domination of society as a way of life.
The will to economic power, if it is sufficiently 
single-minded, brings riches. But if it is single-minded 
it destroys the moral restraints which ought to condition 
the pursuit of riches, and therefore also make the pursuitof riches meaningless.162
Like the spirits in Dante's Inferno, they are punished by the at­
tainment of their desires.
Tawney notes that such a frenetic rush to produce without any 
guiding ultimate principle creates a situation where "part of the 
goods which are annually produced, and which are called wealth, is 
strictly speaking, waste . . . (which) should not have been pro­
duced at all."163 those who clamor for increased produc­
tivity as the solution to society’s ills, Tawney responds "Would 
not 'Spend less on private luxuries' be as wise a cry as 'Produce 
more’?" To do so, however, would be "to admit that there is a 
principle superior to the mechanical play of economic forces, . . . 
and thus abandon the view that all riches, however composed, are an 
end, and that all economic activity is equally justifiable."164
Tawney continues by comparing "Prussian militarism" to "English 
industrialism." Both of these ideologies have killed the souls of 
men by allowing a subordinate social system to dominate their 
societies. "When the Press clamors that the one thing needed to 
make this island an Arcadia is productivity, and more productivity,
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and yet more productivity, that is Industrialism. It is the con­
fusion of means with ends."^^
Tawney concludes The Acquisitive Society by declaring that 
what English society needs, therefore, is a purpose, a principle 
of limitation. Such a parinciple of limitation would divide 
"what is worth doing from what is not, and settles the scale upon 
which what is worth doing ought to be done . . . Above all, it 
assigns to economic activity itself its proper place as the servant, 
not the master, of society."1****
This is not the place to review the historical portion of 
Tawney*s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism,*6? but it is appro­
priate to our analysis to review the conclusions which Tawney drew 
from his historical studies. J. D. Chambers has succinctly sum­
marized the importance of Tawney*s findings:
As is well known, Tawney*s main preoccupation was 
with the secularization of traditional Christian values 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries— the greatest 
event, he considered, in the history of Western civiliza­
tion. It was the first step, in Tawney's view, on the 
way to the establishment of an acquisitive society based 
on competition, individualism, and the divine right of 
self-aggrandisement on the assumption that what is good 
for one is, in the long run, good for all.1*"
In the concluding chapter of Religion and the Rise of Capi­
talism Tawney returns to many of the concerns that had troubled 
him in the opening pages of The Acquisitive Society. He quotes 
Berkeley's aphorism 'TYhatever the world thinks, he who has not much 
meditated upon God, the human mind and the sunmum bonum may pos-
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sibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make
160a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman." He continues by noting 
that "the most obvious facts are the most easily forgotten. Both
the existing economic order, and too many of the projects advanced
for reconstructing it, break down through their neglect of the truism 
that, since even quite common men have souls, no increase in 
material wealth will compensate them for arrangements which insult 
their self-respect ahd impair their freedom." Then Tawney sums 
up the result of much of his historical study:
The distinction made by the philosophers of clas­
sical antiquity between liberal and servile occupations,
the medieval insistence that riches exist for man, not
man for riches, Ruskin's famous outburst, 'there is no wealth 
but life,’ . . . are but different attempts to emphasize 
the instrumental character of economic activities by 
reference to an ideal which is held to express the true 
nature of man.170
Once again, as we conclude our review of Tawney's analysis of 
the function of wealth and the economic system, we are led around 
to the question of what is the "true nature of man." Though Tawney 
never defined the nature of man in so many words, late in his life 
Tawney remarked that man, "as known to history, is a religious 
animal." And he considered the modem industrialism and Capitalism 
not as irreligious but as counterreligious with their "idolatry of 
riches and the idolatry of p o w e r . " * I n  his diary he had remarked 
some twenty years earlier, "If it be asked what is your criterion: 
why do you condemn this and approve that? I answer that the stan­
dard which we apply is really a transcendental, religious, or 
172mystical one." The important thing for Tawney was not to define
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precisely the ideal--such an achievement was clearly inpossible in 
any total or definitive sense--but to recognize the need to acknow­
ledge the primary importance of such a standard or principle. As 
he wrote "These (ideals of religion, art, and understanding) are 
not hard to find for those who really seek than, or who seek them 
first. But if they are sought second they are never found at a l l ."*73 
Indubitably, Tawney sought them first. Perhaps this is why another 
eminent British economic historian, T. S. Ashton, was able to write 
of Tawney that "students who had the good fortune to sit at his feet 
rose with the sense of having been in touch not only with scholar­
ship, but with w i s d o m . " *
G. K. Chesterton and the Distributists
Sympathetic with, but independent of, the Hobson and Tawney 
attempt to persuade economic theorists to include a more ultimate 
goal in the analysis of economic production and consumption, was 
the effort by G. K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc and their followers 
to bring about a general reform in the English socio-economic 
structure.
Disturbed by the increasing lack of individual freedom and 
creativity both in the industrial market society of England with 
its cash nexus and in the collective society of Russia with its 
stifling bureaucracy, Chesterton and Belloc searched for a socio­
economic alternative to the feral individualism of capitalism and
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the oppressive centralization of Comunism. The result was Dis­
tributism. Distributism was formally b o m  when Hilaire Belloc 
published The Servile State in 1912. Belloc claimed that capi­
talism was leading western society to a state of servility in 
which the few with economic power based on a monopoly industri­
alism and commercialism would have coercive power over the lives 
of the many. Because, however, of the fact that the many would 
have political power, capitalism as such was not stable and would 
evolve either into a plutocracy, a collective state, or to Dis­
tributism in which the means of production would be widely dis­
tributed among the citizenry. Belloc elaborated further on this 
in his Economics for Helen published in 1924. In order to develop 
both the theory of Distributism and to spread its message G. K. 
Chesterton founded the remarkable weekly newspaper G . K.’s Weekly 
in 1925. Ian Boyd has written that
. . .  if there was a classical period of Distributism, 
it occurred during the years between 1926 and 1936 when 
G. K. Chesterton was at once the president of the Distri- 
butist League and the editor of G. K.’s Weekly which was 
its political organ. During this last decade of his life, 
he and his associates produced a considerable body of 
literature in which they attempted to supply Distributist 
answers to the political and economic questions of the day.* 5
During this decade Chesterton developed five overlapping 
objections to the orthodox economic theorists: First and basic
to the rest of his objections was Chesterton’s claim that conven­
tional economic theorists were only concerned about efficiency and 
not about the fundamental value-system and Final Cause of the
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economic system.
At least people seemed to take a particular 
interest in every kind of theory except that which 
is called theology. One gentleman said that theo­
logical questions did not interest him; quite 
arrogantly for all the world as if it were something 
to be proud of. As a matter of fact, the refusal to 
go to the roots of thought is responsible for a great
deal of failure in the fruits of it.^'6
Second: Such theorists tended to be very political and would
shift their views in order to stay in favor with powerful groups.̂ 7  
Third: Chesterton saw economic theory being used as an
accomodating tool by both the capitalists and the socialists to
enslave the majority of individuals by the few in power.
Fourth: This lack of a moral base and this political out­
look led to frequent internal contradictions and inconsistencies.
In a lecture at Oxford Chesterton declared that he was unwilling 
to enter the arena of "howling and shrieking economists who contra­
dicted each other, if not themselves, at every point."178
Fifth: Economists tended to be too literal and quantity-
minded, or as Chesterton describes them "simple realists" who are 
not able to understand "the idea of an idea." Chesterton illus­
trates this exaggerated literalism in his description of an ad­
dress that he presented before the London School of Economics:
The Editor of this paper recently had occasion 
to give an informal address to a meeting at the London 
School of Economics; which should be the very temple 
of the abstract sciences. But what impressed him most 
in the debate, entertaining and energetic as it was, was 
that the prevailing process of thought seemed to be not 
so much a pedantic or academic detachment as an almost
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childish literalism. Some of the brightest debaters 
seem to be like the schoolboy who cannot even imagine 
a triangle without turning it into a three-cornered 
tart.
Sometimes the conments sounded uncomtionly like 
those sometimes uttered by Sandwich Islanders or other 
savages, when a missionary strives in vain to explain 
the theoretical nature of theology.
It is not difficult to perceive why the study of conventional 
economic theory had little appeal to the mind of Chesterton.
Though Chesterton and his followers were aware of the need 
for efficiency in the economic system, they were adamant in de­
claring that there was much more to political economy than the 
conventional political economist's final goal of the maximization 
of production under certain constraints. As one Distributist
remarked, "Not maximum but sufficient production is the economic
180aim par excellence."
The Ultimate End of the Distributists, on the other hand, is 
somewhat more complex. G. K. Chesterton attempted to define it 
in the following manner:
Distributism, as we understand it, really consists 
of two propositions, one purely economic and the other 
ethical or psychological. But they have only to be 
stated to be recognized as parts of the same spirit, 
operating on the two planes. The first is that any sort 
of economic power, whether in cash or credit or the ma­
terials that make true wealth, had much better be 
distributed rather than left undistributed in the hands 
of individual millionaires. The second is that this 
distribution of mere cash or credit is but a mere symbol, 
or a minor application, of a much more vital principle; 
that what should be distributed is not merely the legal 
power of a man over money, but the divine or mystical
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power of a man over matter. Man is made man, after 
the fact that he prays, by the fact that he ploughs, 
that he builds, that he cuts wood for transport 
or carves it foT ornament; in short, by the fact 
that he has this mystical privilege of mastery over 
the material universe. The one essentially true 
idea of democracy is the desire to make what is 
true of Man true of "a man;" that is, if possible, 
of any man. In a free country, therefore, men 
would become completely men in proportion as they 
have land to plough if they choose, or wood to carve 
as they like. It is as easy to see that this ideal 
is difficult as to see that it is desirable.181
The final goal or Ultimate End for the Distributists was that 
as many individuals as possible should have the economic freedom 
to fulfill those instincts which lie at the core of his or her 
being rather than to possess the greatest possible amount of eco­
nomic goods and services. For this reason Distributists promoted 
that economic society which had as its ideal a wide diffusion of 
the means of production, and one in which the majority of indivi­
duals would be self-employed. For to G. K. Chesterton, "the moral 
of the whole nineteenth century is that it is vain to have political 
equality with economic inequality."182 promotion of such
economic equality was thus dictated by the Ultimate End of man and, 
as such, was a component of ethical justice. Economic theory, in 
turn, became subject to ethics. "To make political economy merely 
a physical or merely a mental science, or again merely a mixed 
mental and physical science, is not much better than making it a
183mere art: it is a part of ethics, nothing more and nothing less," 
is the manner in which a favorite textbook of the Distributists
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described the relationship between ethics and economics.
The economic activities of production and consumption have 
their only rationale to the extent that they contribute to the 
progressive approximation of that quality of life which is ap­
propriate for individually free men who are created in the image 
of their creator and, as such, have certain rather definite and 
unique responsibilities. That which the Distributists would 
maximize was something different than material goods but something 
in the soul of man. One writer to the editor of the successor 
to G. K.*s Weekly illustrated this difference between the economists 
and the Distributists in the following manner:
The reason I have never laboured in the foot­
steps of Ricardo and Mill, Marx and the Fabians is 
that I could never get over my instinct that the first 
step was a false step. Ruskin's mid-nineteenth chal­
lenge has been evaded; it has never been answered.
In other words, . . .  I have never found a definition 
of wealth that seemed to make it much worth while 
going on. A definition of wealth that leaves out of 
account the soul of man seems to me to promise nothing 
but a journey into the illimitable continent of 
darknessT*®^
For the Distributist, increasing production levels or, as it 
is sometimes phrased in conventional economic literature, "optimal" 
growth rates could not be considered as final goals of an economic 
system. What was the effect of the production of commodities on 
the personality of the worker? What was the effect of the con­
sumption of such commodities on the personality of the consumer. 
These were the questions that the Distributists deemed important.
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As regards the first question, the Distributists were quite 
conscious of the relationship between the object produced and 
the producer. "It is thus that man stands alone among the animals. 
He alone can deliberately make things which, because of an intrinsic 
quality, have an independent right to existence. Man alone has the 
power of making t h i n g s . Or, as Chesterton remarked in a 
quotation that we have previously mentioned, "Man is made man . . . 
by the fact that he ploughs, that he builds, that he cuts wood for 
transport or carves it for ornament; in short, by the fact that he 
has this mystical privilege of mastery over the material universe."
Productive activity thus has not only for its ideal a certain 
quantity to be produced but also a certain type of productive ac­
tivity. That type of productivity which enabled an individual to 
be free and creative, to exercise this "mystical privilege of 
mastery over the material universe" was the ideal. That type of 
productivity which enslaved an individual was to be avoided at all 
costs. The whole point of Hilaire Belloc's The Servile State was 
that both Capitalism and Socialism led to enslaved individuals; 
capitalism by leading to the concentration of ownership so that the 
proletariat became wage slaves and collectivism by leading to a 
concentration of power in the hands of a few political leaders.
This concern over the concentration of the means of produc­
tion led the Distributists to the program for which they are best 
known and from which they have obtained their name; the distribution
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of productive property among the citizenry. This ideal of distri­
bution of productive property came to be the distinguishing mark 
of Distributism. The true contrary of the word ’’property" is the 
word "prostitution" proclaimed Chesterton in the preface to 
Outline of Sanity. Though the Distributists were aware that such 
a distribution of productive property could not be carried out 
completely, nor did they actually desire an exact redistribution 
of all productive property, they did, however, plead for a society 
in which ownership of private property would be the norm and one 
in which extensive private ownership of productive property would 
set the tone.
The Distributists were aware that certain industries had such 
benefits from economies of scale and mass production that it was 
technically impossible to abolish them. Eric Gill pointed out 
that the goal of Distributism was not to abolish large-scale 
industries but to minimize the influence of such industries to 
the greatest extent possible:
Electric light, for instance, could not be, but 
for the fact that millions of miles of fine copper 
wire can be turned out by factories. Fountain pens 
and typewriters could not be, but for standardised 
labour. But bread and beer and houses and clothes
without suen h m u j l .
For those industries which had to be massive in size because 
of obvious economies of scale there was seme controversy among the 
Distributists over the best policy of ownership. Some advocated
an d  books could be better
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state ownership while others favored some sort of worker ownership 
through share holding. A majority, however, probably would have 
agreed with Chesterton that "such necessary machines should be 
owned by a small local guild, on principles of profit-sharing."*8  ̂
In order to distinguish between those industries which were 
necessarily of large size and those which could be separated into 
smaller units of production, G. K. Chesterton had in mind the idea 
"of a series of exhaustive examinations of the big combines and the 
big shops, written by somebody who could afford the time and 
trouble to investigate them thoroughly."IBS gut the money and 
talent necessary for such an investigation was not available at 
the time, and apprently this series of examinations of large corpora 
tions was never performed. Earlier, however, Chesterton on his own 
had investigated the economies of scale in retail stores. His con­
clusions was:
Except the illegitimate advantages of being 
able to kill the competition of a small man, and to 
bamboozle the public with display in the shop and in 
printed advertisement, we fail to see that a big 
store possessesfiany advantage, even in terms of cash, 
over a market.
The Distributists also did some actual experiments in the agricul­
tural industry, and concluded that moderate-sized farms were just 
as efficient as the large absentee-owned farming operations.
But even if a certain amount of efficiency in production was 
foregone, all Distributists were at one in claiming that such ef­
ficiency was not their only goal. As Chesterton phrased it, "If
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we can make men happier, . . .  it does not matter if we make 
them less p r o d u c t i v e . I t  was, moreover, his contention that 
there were already too many things being produced. "We use a 
thousand things to stun and stupefy people, when we might use a 
third of those things to awaken and enlighten them."-^ Thus the 
Distributists would violate the first maxim of the standard economics 
textbook and be quite content with being inside the boundary of the 
production possibilities curve. For the Distributists, to have 
as a goal that the economy always be on the boundary of the produc­
tion possibilities curve makes an intermediate end into a final 
end, and thus ultimately is enslaving. Indeed they would claim 
there is something basically irrational about a theory which, having 
no criterion anterior to itself, is its own justification and 
which must, therefore, necessarily end in disaster.
Distributists were also concerned about the quality of goods 
produced as well as the quantity. Distributists felt that the 
responsibility of ownership of productive property would make for 
higher quality goods both directly and indirectly. Directly, 
because each worker would feel more directly responsible for the 
goods produced. Indirectly, because the responsibility of such 
ownership would make for better individuals, and such individuals 
in turn would be capable of producing better quality goods. Among 
the Distributists, Eric Gill especially lamented the loss of 
individually responsible craftsmen and the quality of work performed
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under mass production.
. . .  it is as responsible workmen, that men 
must own; for it is only as owners that they can do 
to things as they should be done by, . . .  In every 
case ownership is necessary for the good of the 
work to be done, and if the work be done well the 
whole consnunity will benefit.!92
If the Distributists were attempting to determine the health 
and prosperity of a nation's economy, it would not be sufficient 
to sum up the money value of the national output as is done in 
sane gross national product (GNP) measurement. They would also 
want to know sanething about the quality of the goods produced, 
and, moreover, they would want some information about the indivi­
dual liberty of those most intimately involved in the production 
process.
Since Distributism did not have maximum production as its
primary goal, it could not have maximum consumption as one of its
goals; nor did it. Even though the Distributists were well aware
of the joys of consumption and certainly were not an ascetic group
(One of the reasons given for the decline of Distributism was that
"distributism got mixed up with a sort of mystique of beer-drinking
193and noisy good-fellowship." ), they distrusted the society in 
which they lived which set such a superior value upon efficient 
mass production and gross consumption of material goods. G. C. 
Heseltine expressed the Distributist viewpoint in the following 
manner:
It may, indeed, be the way of perfection and the
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achievement of an earthly paradise to work for a few 
whose philosophy is wholly material, and to accept 
the substitute foods, the cheap and depraved 
amusements, the mechanized routine life that the system 
gives them . . . But the Distributist is unconvinced.194
The Distributists believed that mass production and its at­
tendant of mass advertising had led to a society in which the 
quality of man's life suffered because man forgot that he was 
more than a mere consumer of material goods.
Though the Distributists were unwilling to dictate to the 
individual precisely what means he should take or what he should 
consume to be hippy because they believed that such decisions 
should be left up to the free choice of the responsible propertied 
individual, the Distributists did feel that one of the marks of 
a responsible individual is precisely a rejection of the "more is 
better" philosophy. They realized that the utilitarian economic 
philosophy which emphasizes maximum production and consumption is 
detrimental to the Distributist way of life. For the Distributist 
system to work would demand a society of individuals who placed 
individual freedom and self-reliance above increased consumption 
of material goods. Thrift in consumption would be a social virtue 
rather than a social vice. G. K. Chesterton saw clearly the re­
lationship between liberty and self-control in consumption. "If 
we are to preserve the old eighteenth century ideal of liberty, 
we must go back to the old eighteenth century ideal of thrift. 
Consumption of goods is thus moderated by a higher end or
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goal rather than being an end in itself. This is perhaps the es­
sential difference between Distributism and modem economic 
theory, G. K. fs Weekly was well aware of this critical distinc­
tion in outlook toward consumption and made every effort to analyze 
this difference, to expose its implicationsf and to abet the 
Distributist position. For instance, one of its writers attempted 
to get to the heart of the distinction and to show the wisdom of 
the Distributist position by calling in Aristotle for support:
But, being a man, one will also need external 
prosperity, for our nature is not self-sufficient for 
the purpose of contemplation, but our body also must 
be healthy and must have food and other attention.
Still, we must not think that the man who is happy 
will need many things and great things, merely because 
he cannot be supremely happy without external goods; 
for self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess, 
and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea.196
Herein lay a crucial dilenma for Distributism and one which 
they never overcame, to wit; they wanted to maximize the indivi­
dual’s liberty, but the majority of individuals apparently of 
their own free will did not want this freedom.197 majority
of people seemed to prefer the security of a fixed income to the 
arduous responsibility of self-employment. G. K. Chesterton 
wrestled with this dilenma and attempted to define what had led 
men apparently of theiT own free will to such an enslaving eco­
nomic decision. In one of his most penetrating essays he wrote:
When I began it (G. K. *s Weekly), I merely thought 
it reasonable that there should be one weekly paper to 
represent a reasonable alternative to conventional 
Capitalism and academic Socialism. But I now realize . . . 
that what we have taken on is something much bigger 
than modem Capitalism or Comnunism combined. I
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realize that we are trying to fight the whole world; 
to turn the tide of the whole time we live in; to 
resist everything that seems irresistible; . . .
For the thing we oppose is something of which 
capitalism and collectivism are only economic by­
products; , .. It is so vast and vague that its 
offensiveness is largely atmospheric; it is perhaps 
easier to defy than to define. But it might be 
approx t spirit
Chesterton then continues in this essay to state that if men 
refuse to recognize and respect the natural boundaries inherent 
in their created beings, if they refuse to respect their creator’s 
transcendence, then they have nothing left to respect but their 
own efforts, which is precisely efficiency in production and con­
sumption. Such a pursuit after efficiency in production is basically 
irrational according to G. K. Chesterton. Since it has no criterion 
anterior to itself, it is its own justification and must perforce 
culminate in social anarchy. It is this refusal to recognize 
these transcendent truths that had led England to such a baneful 
situation that most of her citizens would prefer the security of 
economic slavery to the exhilaration of being self-reliant. They 
were unwilling to follow behind the banner of Distributism which 
declared:
Distributism is the negation of all parasitism, 
for it sees in every man a potential living, thinking, 
acting free man, made in the image of God, conscious 
of the omnipotence of God and yearning to develop 
the God that is in him.l"
which
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But if one does not recognize the transcendence and primal 
authority of a God, how can one yearn to develop the God that is 
in him? It was for this reason that Chesterton believed that his 
role, the role of G. K.*s Weekly, and Distributists everywhere 
was not so much to draw up a detailed program of Distributist
4
policy and how to achieve it (though such programs were drawn up 
and plans devised on how to achieve the Distributist state), but 
by peaceful persuasion of public opinion, a revolution in values 
and ideas, a change of heart in the direction of humility before 
one's God.
Nowadays it is exactly those who realize that 
we have here no abiding city who alone can build 
anything like a city that will abide. It is ex­
actly those who know that man on earth is man in
exile who can alone turn the earth into anything 
like a home.200
This then was G.K. C.'s role; to teach man that earth is not 
his permanent home, that there is more to life than material pro­
duction and consumption. Strangely enough, such an unearthly 
philosophy put such an emphasis on the rights of each individual 
to own a portion of this earth. Yet Chesterton and the Distributists 
were completely consistent in this respect. For they realized that 
if an individual is not to be of the world, he has to have some
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CHAPTER IV
SIGNIFICANCE OF CAUSA MATERIAL IS AND CAUSA FINALIS
To understand and then to improve the reality of commercial 
production, allocation and consumption is the double-barrelled chal­
lenge that we economists place before ourselves. Both understanding 
and improvement of the economic system require a disciplined intel­
lect that can use all the relevant epistemological tools in the 
attempt to penetrate the veils of superficial appearances to the 
essence of the economic system. Just as mere description of what­
ever economic data one thinks relevant is not sufficient for a 
thorough understanding of an economic system so mere extrapolation 
of whatever trends one thinks desirable is not a sufficient base for 
a thorough reform of the system. Both knowledge and reform require 
more than one's unsubstantiated personal intuition and desires; 
they require, above all, a consistency between one’s mind and ob­
jective reality. Such wisdom requires much insight, the ability 
to observe and contemplate as well as to reason and act.
In our western intellectual and moral tradition, the most 
important key both to understanding and reform has been the concept 
of causation. As Aristotle has stated, 'Imen do not think that they 
know a thing till they have grasped the 'why* of it."1 In order 
to grasp the "why" of it, Aristotle next showed that there were
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four essential causes for every rational human act; the causa 
materialis, the causa efficiens, the causa formalis, and the 
causa finalis. An example is the building of a house wherein the 
wood and other materials are the causa materialis, the carpenter's 
labor and the tools are the causa efficiens, the blueprint or plan 
in carpenter's mind is the causa formalis and the desire to have a 
home for shelter and comfort is the causa finalis. To both under­
stand and judge this act of production and consumption in its 
totality, one would have to investigate all four of these causes 
since all four play an essential part in both understanding the 
essence of the action and determining the usefulness of the end 
product. Were the most satisfactory materials used? Were the 
carpenter and his tools efficient? Did he have a good plan or 
blueprint? Was the planned house consistent with the needs of his 
nature? All such questions are relevant in both understanding 
this act of production and in assessing its worth.
The same methodological approach has to be taken when a 
social scientist would investigate the total economic system with 
a view towards understanding and reform. In current methodology, 
however, in economics as well as in other theoretical sciences, 
two of the types of causes advanced by Aristotle have been reduced 
in importance; these are the causa materialis and the causa finalis.  ̂
In its search for understanding and its quest for reform, eco­
nomics has tended to utilize only the causa efficiens and the
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causa formal is. and of these two it has emphasized the causa ef­
ficiens much more than the causa formalis. More accurately, the 
causa formalis is oftentimes submerged by the causa efficiens. As
Phyllis Colvin remarked, “theoretical science tends to meld these
two fundamentals of explanation, concentrating far more on the 
causa efficiens than on the causa formalis."^ "Doing*' becomes its 
own justification. We no longer ask, "Doung what?" Even less do 
we explore "doing what for what?" or analyze the consequences of 
"Doing what for what and with what?"
To attempt to study and to reform the economic system of
reasonable purposive beings and to neglect the causa materialis 
and causa finalis of such a system while merging the causa formalis 
into the causa efficiens would have appeared to Aristotle to shirk 
one's intellectual responsibility and to ensure that one would end 
up with the most dangerous kind of knowledge and reform, i.e., 
half-knowledge and half-reform or, more accurately, quarter- 
knowledge and quarter-reform.
Why have most economists neglected the causa materialis and 
causa formalis and focused their attention on the causa efficiens? 
Is it because they covet the precision and mathematical rigor of 
the physical sciences which have as their object the analysis of 
the quantifiable dimensions of inert (i.e., non-purposive) ob­
jects? For instance, in classical mechanics the only type of 
causation that was necessary for the research scientist to be
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concerned ahout was the materially measurable causa efficiens.
In such a reductionist and mechanistic methodology every immediate 
physical cause (the causa efficiens]) can be viewed as discretely 
distinct from all other immediate physical causes as a single 
nunber is distinct from all other numbers. This arithmomorphic 
assumption, to borrow a term from Georgescu-Roegen,^ allowed the 
classical physicist to make extensive use of mathematics and con­
sequently to construct an imposing exact and precise intellectual 
edifice. Yet the epistemological cost of such a discretely 
ordered methodology is great, even for the physical sciences as 
both Georgescu-Roegen and Colvin have shown. The cost is even 
greater for the economist who deals not with inert objects but a 
social system composed of reasonable and purposive beings. If 
one treats only of the causa efficiencs in an economic system, 
(only the labor and tools of the carpenter) one is forced to 
neglect the treatment of such topics as the adequacy of the ma­
terial resources of the environment or the evaluation of the ulti­
mate end of the system. [Do we have enough wood for the house?
Do we really need a house?). Yet since it is through analysis 
of the adequacy of material resources and the evaluation of the 
ultimate end that we determine what is actually possible and 
important, such an arithmomorphic approach based upon the philos­
ophy of logical positivism "comes perilously close to saying of
Cthe important we have nothing important to say."J
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Is the reason that economists have excluded a complete 
analysis of the causa materialis and causa finalis from their 
methodology because, on the one hand, they believe that tech­
nology will resolve all problems of absolute material shortages and, 
on the other hand, nothing useful can be said about the causa 
finalis beyond stating that the causa finalis of the economic 
system is the fulfillment of the given individual consumer’s 
preferences? Such an assuirption will allow the economists to 
continue to use the arithmomorphic model in which all effective 
wants are viewed as morally neutral. Or, in other words, if a 
consumer purchases an item, that is positive proof that this item 
is a causa finalis in itself. Since in such an approach there are 
as many ultimate goals as there are self-conscious free economic 
agents, the causa finalis of the economic system treated as a 
whole is the most harmonious and greatest possible achievement of 
all these individual goals. Hence the appreciation for the 
Benthamite goal, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," 
as the implicit final goal of the economic system.
Some such causa finalis supports the crucial "revealed 
preference theorem" with its assumption of given tastes. Such a 
utilitarian and positivistic presupposition has widespread credence 
in our age and important implications; not the least of which is 
the result that since any individuals's preferences are an legiti­
mate as any other, not too much can be said about good or bad,
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wasteful o t  necessary production and consumption with the result 
that the science of economics ends up in a moral and ecological 
nihilism. If individual goals did not conflict either with each 
other or with those of future generations, one might not object; 
but if they did (and they do)f then we would be thrown back into 
the problems of justice and ethics, but without the possibility of 
there being any such thing as justice and ethics! As Fred Hirsch 
has noted, 'The problem here is that the pursuit of private and 
essentially individualistic economic goals by enterprisers, con­
sumers, and workers in their market choices . . . must be girded 
at key point by a strict social morality which the system erodes 
rather than sustains."^ Without a moral base, economic power 
itself becomes the final arbiter of crucual decisions and we have 
a full-blown plutocracy. One can understand why this choice of 
the fulfillment of individual preferences as the causa finalis 
of the economic system has popular appeal to those who possess a 
large share of current economic wealth, but less appeal to those 
who do not or who are concerned about the lot of future genera­
tions. Perhaps the historian J. C. Hare was not too far wrong 
when he noticed in the early part of the nineteenth century,
Often indeed the current philosophy is merely 
the reflexion of the reigning vice of an age: as has 
been the case with a great part of that which has as­
sumed the name of philosophy in England during the 
last hundred years. Its chief aim has been to palliate 
and justify, to establish and define that worship of 
Maimon.
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Thus the economic presupposition that the fulfillment of an indivi­
dual's imnediate preferences is the causa finalis of an economic 
system has some societal ramifications which are not inmediately 
apparent. And, whether we like it or not, individual characters 
and mores are to a great extent formed by the socio-economic 
structures in which people live, work, and consume.
Frank Knight has stated that "the individual cannot be a 
datum for the purposes of social policy, because he is formed in 
and by the social process, and the nature of the individual must 
be affected by any social action. Consequently, social policy 
must be judged by the kind of individuals that are produced by 
or under it, and not merely by the type of relations which subsist 
among individuals taken as they stand."® This belief that the 
causa finalis of the individual is the fulfillment of his economic 
desires leads to a consumerism in which man's desires for com­
modities are reinforced rather than checked as in more previous 
societies. The value of an individual comes to depend on the 
amount that he produces and consumes and the individual's identity 
becomes coterminous with his material possessions. "Justifying 
significance . . . now attached to compensation and thence to 
consumption," is the phrase used by the theologian William String- 
fellow to describe the consumption ethic of our modem society.^
The science of economics then continues and completes the circular 
argument by assuming that since demand for consumption constitutes
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the causa finalis of an article, the more conmodities that are 
produced, the better off individuals in our society will neces­
sarily be, which, in turn, leads individuals to identify them­
selves by what they possess, which, in turn, leads economists 
to value things by the consumer’s demand for them, which, in 
turn . . .
Though the conventional economic theorist will plead innocent 
to any charge of normatively forming the tastes and wants of the 
"economic agent" (to use the economist's label for a man, not 
mine),, such a plea is based upon a shallow understanding of the 
consumer. Georgescu-Roegen has remarked about such a stance:
The tastes of an individual being given, his ac­
tions on the market-utility theory teaches us-are 
completely determined. But as some economists (in­
cluding nyself) claim, with this result we have not 
exhausted the consumer problem. More important, per­
haps, is the question of what determines the tastes - 
or better, the wants - of a person.
The economist's lack of any final goal beyond that of immediate
consumer preference is itself a normative judgment and one that
has implications for the very tastes and wants of consumers by
causing consumers to tend to identify their own worth by the
amount of their economic possessions. Ben Seligman has sunmarized
the positivist's methodology in the following manner:
Consider the circle into which the positivist 
would take us: having defined his terms by what his 
propositions may achieve, he takes his premises for 
granted and then asserts that his enterprise is 
indeed "scientific."11
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To escape from this circular argument, one must look beyond 
the circular flow of monetary-valued income and product that 
economists explicitly or implicitly use in describing the economic 
system. Instead of viewing the economy as a closed circular system 
having no contacts with the material universe or with the final goal 
of human nature, one must take a more comprehensive view of the 
economy and its relations with both the material universe and the 
nature of man. "One of the evil results of positivism is that it 
has abolished the desire to engage in open and free speculation 
about the nature of man and the u ni v e r s e . " ^  This is just another 
way of saying that economists should, as Aristotle argued many 
centuries before, incorporate a critical analysis of the material 
and final causes of the economic system into their methodology, if 
one wants to ensure that one*s analysis is congruent with reality. 
Abstract economic "wheels of monetary-valued income and product" 
can roll on indefinitely and expand to an infinite size, but the 
material universe is a limited sphere and the ideal society is 
one which recognizes that a moderate or sufficient amount of eco­
nomic production and consumption is a prerequisite to the good 
society rather than one which places an ever-growing gross national 
product as its goal. When mankind overemphasizes one aspect of 
his society, you can be sure that another aspect will suffer. If 
we overproduce and overconsume, we shall to that extent not only 
have less time to carry on the non-productive and non-consumptive
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work of life hut, more importantly, less ability to enjoy leisure:^ 
to contemplate, to worship, to philosophize, to marvel, to glorify 
God, to wonder, to sacrifice (sacer-facio: to make something holy 
precisely by not consuming it); to love, to give thanks, to medi­
tate, to be amazed, to question, or, in sumnary, to experience to 
the maximum the tensions and joys of one's life. This statement 
implies nothing against production and consumption. Of course 
production and consumption are necessary acts of man. But the 
question is: whether the life of man is exhaustively defined by 
production and consumption; can man develop to the full as a pro­
ducer and consumer. Is human existence coextensive with produc­
tion and consumption? Stated differently, is the causa finalis 
of our existence production and consumption or is it the celebra­
tion of awareness?*4 Even though economists will often give lip- 
service to such non-productive and non-consumptive activities in 
their introductory chapters, the main body of their analysis 
completely ignores such non-productive and non-consumptive uses 
of one's time.
The object of this study has been to discuss how one could 
begin to construct a methodology which would incorporate the 
material and final cause of the economic system into one's analy­
sis. It should be emphasized that the aim is not to replace 
standard economic theory but to add to it. Just as an economic 
theory that neglects a scientific and rigorous analysis of the
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causa materialis and causa finalis tends to terminate in a moral 
nihilism and wastes resources due to the lack of meaningful abso­
lute reference points, so a theory that would neglect a rigorous 
analysis of the causa efficiens and causa formalis would result 
in a waste of resources and inability to reach the perceived 
final goal due to internal and relative inefficiencies.
Since the causa materialis of an economic system is the 
primary natural resources such as metal-bearing ores* energy 
resources and biological nutrients, it is clear that if economic 
theorists want to analyze the causa materialis of the economic 
system, they must be cognizant of the relevant conclusions of 
those scientists who have as their formal subject of analysis the 
biophysical universe. For example, it is imperative that economic 
theorists incorporate within their analysis concepts such as abso­
lute limits, ecological threshholds, and entropic degradation of 
useful matter. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen has shown in The 
Entropy Law and the Economic Process that because of the nature 
of matter, such incorporation rules out reversible mechanistic or 
arithmomorphic models. Such mechanistic and arithmomorphic models 
will lead to grave inconsistencies and insoluble paradoxes. But, 
as shown above in chapter 2, even before Georgescu-Roegen's master­
ful opus, there were economists who realized that the incorporation 
of the limits inherent in the physical universe would expand the 
boundaries of economic theory. The names of Maithus, Jevons in
183
The Coal Question, John Ise, Lewis C, Gray and Frederick Soddy 
jianp into one's mind. Without having to determine the precise 
physical limits of such resources, if one admits of absolute 
scarcity and the consequent need to conserve essential resources 
for future generations, then somehow one must in his analysis 
explicitly provide for the conservation of such resources. Such 
a presupposition will have as one implication that the crucial 
definition of costs are changed. A society's throughput of re­
sources will have to be viewed as a cost to society that has to 
be explicitly minimized rather than maximized. The growth of 
gross national product can no longer be an object of society per 
se. At the very least, more analysis and insight into the com­
ponents of gross national product will be required. Much of 
what now appears to be desirable in our economy will no doubt 
turn out to be undesirable. The immediate goal for an economy 
would be to level out its gross national product at the most ef­
ficient point, using as one's reference points for efficiency the 
biophysical limitations of the universe's natural resources and 
the economic needs of the human nature of the individuals who make 
up the society.^
What are the economic needs of the individuals who compose 
economic society? The fulfillment of such needs is, of course, 
the causa finalis of any society. Just as we had to turn to the 
physicists and biologists for help in resolving the question of
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the dimensions of the causa materialis so we must turn for aid to 
the scholars who study human nature to resolve our difficulties 
at this point since the question of legitimate economic needs 
ultimately depends upon how one answers the perennial question 
first asked by Socrates, what is the nature of man. As E, F. 
Schumacher has pointed out,
Economics is being taught without any awareness of 
the view of human nature that underlies present-day 
economic theory. In fact, many economists are them­
selves unaware of the fact that such a view is implicit 
in their teachings and that nearly all their theories 
would have to change if that view changed.^
If this Socratic question is ignored by economists, it will still
be answered, but by default rather than by design. Such an
avoidance of the question ignores the vast amount of study and
reflection that scholars have performed in their analysis of human
nature. Such an avoidance ignores the potential of the mind of
man to study his own nature and, as such, is patently irrational
and leads to the rational pursuit of an irrational end. As Paul
Hayne has written:
Economists ought to re-examine their thinking on the 
whole subject of value judgments. They enter inevitably 
into scientific work. Their critical examination can 
sometimes contribute at least as much to the development 
of warranted knowledge as can the further refinement of 
data or the logical improvement of formal models. Eco­
nomists will, of course, shy away from such a challenge 
if they continue to maintain that value judgments are 
nothing but statements of subjective preference. But 
this is itself a dogma that flies in the face of the un­
deniable fact that people do hold at least some value 
judgments to be interpersonally valid, that they do offer
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evidence and reasons to support their value judgments, 
and that rational discussion often does lead to consensus 
among people who began by holding Cor supposing that they 
held) conflicting ethical or political positions.*?
Though it is true that the analysis of human nature will
require insights and disciplines of a different nature than that
of the physical scientists,*® such a prerequisite does not make
such knowledge impossible unless one is constrained by the epis-
temology and methodology of the physical sciences. The fault,
in short, lies not in the epistemology of the physical scientist
but with the ’’naive belief that science represents an absolute
and exclusive view of reality."*^
Though it may be admitted that the more one explores the
ultimate material and final causes of the economic Systran the
less precise and less subject to mathematical logic one’s knowledge
can be; this, however, does not mean that such knowledge will be
less valuable or secure. Indeed, the contrary conclusion would
be more correct, for as the noted mathematician and philosopher
of science, Alfred N. Whitehead, has noted, "No science can be
more secure than the unconscious metaphysics which it tacitly
presupposes."20 To refuse to study such presuppositions because
of the incapability of their being subjected to the methodology
used by the physical sciences does not, of course, negate their
existence or real importance. One should not expect a scientific
methodology whose usefulness is limited to analyzing mechanistic
matter and to devising the most efficient manipulations of such
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matter for ends already established, to be capable of dealing with 
the more fundamental question of final causes and ultimate values. 
This avoidance of the issue means that crucial fundamental pre­
suppositions and principles of causation will exist and perform 
their function in a hidden and implicit manner. Historically 
speaking it appears that when economists ignore the question of 
the causa finalis as, by and large, they have for the last century 
or so, economic activity becomes its own justification, which is 
a perversion of the traditional role of ends and means. When 
this happens, when the economic system becomes autonomous of the 
civilization and culture within which it operates, arrogating to 
itself that culture and civilization, instead of serving the ends 
of culture it becomes destructive and cannabilizes the culture.
To take as "given" the material causes and the final causes 
of the economic system and consequently to focus one economic 
analysis solely on the severely limited area of the immediate 
physical cause (capital, labor and land) of economic productivity 
has led to serious distortions in perspective and to harmful per­
versions of values in our society.
With gross national product per capits of more than 
$5,600 and gross national waste of about 11,000 pounds per 
year per capita, it is not hard to contrast us with Nero.
What we have is too much to be appreciated, beyond ade­
quate perception yet within our purchasing power at least 
partially because of the exploitative use of externalities. 
Our consumption is almost totally conditioned by an in­
satiable desire for individual advancement, invidious 
comparisons of the class uimediately above, or a rat­
like attempt at domination and sublimation . . . What 
a Martian would perceive is not only an infinite desire 
for goods but an infinite desire gone mad.**
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What is the final goal which motivates economic productivity 
and camsunption. As mentioned above, when pushed on this ques­
tion, economists have usually resorted to the Benthamite goal of 
"the greatest good for the greatest number." Economists have 
avoided the difficult problem of defining "good" by substituting 
the word "goods," in the sense of commodities. The principle 
thus became "the greatest per capita product for the greatest 
number." More products per capita and more people to enjoy those 
products, lead, in this view, to the greater social good. Our 
conmitment to growth is no doubt based in considerable degree on 
this principle which implies that right action is that which leads 
to more goods for more people.
But there are two problems with "the greatest per capita 
product for the greatest number." First, as others have pointed 
out, the dictum contains one too many "greatests." It is not 
possible to maximize more than one variable. It is clear that 
numbers of people could be increased by lowering per capita product, 
and that per capita product could be increased by lowering numbers, 
since resources taken from one goal can be devoted to the other. 
Second, it makes a big difference whether "greatest number" refers
to those simultaneously alive, or to the greatest number ever to
22live over time.
To resolve the first of these difficulties we must maximize 
one variable only, and treat some chosen level of the other as a
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constraint on the maximization* For one of the "greatests" we 
must substitute ''sufficient." There are two possible substitu­
tions: the greatest per capita product for a sufficient number; or 
a sufficient per capita product for the greatest number. Which 
is the better principle? I suggest that we adopt the latter, and 
that "greatest number" be understood as greatest number over time, 
which takes care of the second problem. The revised principle 
thus becomes, "sufficient per capita product for the greatest 
number over time."
It is hard to find any objection to maximizing the number of 
people who will ever live at a material level sufficient for a 
good life. However, this certainly does not mean maximizing the 
number alive at any one time. On the contrary, it means the 
avoidance of any destruction of the earth’s capacity to support 
life--a destruction that results from overloading the life sup­
port system by having too many people--especially high consuming 
people--alive at once. The opportunity cost of those extra lives 
in the present is fewer people alive in all subsequent time periods, 
and consequently a reduction in total lives ever to be lived at 
the sufficient level. Increasing per capita product beyond the 
sufficient level (extravagant luxury) may also overburden life 
support systems and have the same long-run life reducing effect 
as excess population.
Maximizing number while "satisfying" per capita product does
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not imply that quantity of life is a higher value than quality.
It does assume that beyond some level of sufficiency, further 
increase in per capita goods does not increase quality of life, 
and in fact may well diminish it. But sufficiency is the first 
consideration. To put it more concretely, the basic needs of all 
present people take priority over future numbers, but the ex­
istence of more future people takes priority over the trivial 
wants of the present. The impact of this revised utilitarian 
rule is to maximize life, or what is the same thing, to economize 
the long run capacity of the earth to support life at a suf­
ficient level of individual wealth.^ The sufficient level may 
be thought of as a range of limited inequality rather than a single 
specific per capita income applicable to everyone. Some inequality 
is necessary for fairness.
I do not want to make too much of this modified utilitarian 
principle. It is a bit too arithmomorphic and it certainly offers 
no magic philosopher's stone for making difficult choises easy.
But it does seem superior to the old Benthamite goal in that it 
draws our attention to the concept of sufficiency, and extends out 
time horizon. It forces us to face the causa finalis, the question 
of purpose: Sufficient for what? Needed for what?
In our "advertising age" which prides itself on its two and 
three car families, on its technical prowess, on its gadgetry, 
on its deep velvet creature comfort,^ the concept and notion of
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economic sufficiency does not attract much attention among social 
scientists. We Americans, who during the first hundred years of 
our nation*s history had an ever-expanding land area, and for the 
second hundred years experienced an apparently limitless energy­
techno logy frontier, are not used to the notion of economic limits, 
of sufficiency. We think that included in our manifest destiny 
is the right to an ever-growing plethora of economic goods. We 
are the captains of our fate and that includes our economic fate 
as well as our political fate.
The difficulty in combatting such a view is that it does 
contain a half-truth. Man does yearn rightly for more than he 
possesses. His current economic goods do not satisfy him, nor 
should they. However, it is not more economic goods that will 
satisfy his desires. "Our hearts are restless and only in God 
will they be satisfied," was the Augustinian observation concerning 
this quest. Or as the economist Alexander Gray has stated, "In 
bustling too much, one forgets that the purpose of labour is 
rest, that wealth exists to be consumed, that man's chief end is 
to glorify God and enjoy Him f o r e v e r . M o d e m  man's error is 
not in yearning for more and better things, but in his contrived 
endeavor to ensure that he will remain ignorant of what the good 
life does in fact consist. His rejection of the study of legi­
timate final goals has allowed any goal, no matter how unreason­
able, to be considered a final goal of society.
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Modem society prides itself on its pluralism, 
which means that a large number of things are admissable 
as "good in themselves," as ends rather than as means 
to an end. They are all of equal rank, all to be ac­
corded first priority. If something that requires no 
justification may be called an "absolute," the modem 
world, which claims that everything is relative, does, 
in fact, worship a very large number of "absolutes."
. . . Not only power and wealth are treated as goods 
in themselves--provided they are mine and not someone 
else's— but also knowledge for its own sake, speed of 
movement, size of market, rapidity of change, quantity 
of education, number of hospitals, etc., etc. In truth, 
none of these sacred cows is a genuine end; they are all 
means parading as ends.*6
As a result of this omission of an absolute goal we have 
not been able to determine what is sufficient on a lower level 
of life's hierarchy of values. Whether he likes it or not, modem 
man must make a choice in this matter of absolute goals. He has 
three choices. He can make an act of faith in a transcendental 
reality as traditionally has been the dominant practice in western 
civilization. Though this faith is superrational, it is not how­
ever irrational; at least in part it evolves from a reflection 
upon the reality which emerges from our human experience and 
which calls for a man’s free decision upon the source of reality. 
Faith in a transcendental reality is thus aided by one's trust in 
the reality of the universe. "When he assents to God, man opts 
for an ultimate reason, support, meaning of reality. In belief 
in God assent to reality turns out to be ultimately substantiated 
and consistent: a basic trust anchored in the ultimate depth, in 
the reason of reasons . . .  In this sense it displays a radical
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rationality - which is not the same thing as rationalism."2^
Man can also make an act of faith in the notion of Pro­
gress or, what is the same thing, an act of faith in the inherent 
and unaided perfectibility of man himself. Chauncy Wright, the 
influential early American empiricist, described this faith in 
the following manner:
Progress is a grand idea - Universal Progress 
is a still grander idea. It strikes the keynote of 
modem civilization , . . What the ideas God, the One 
and the All, the Infinite First Cause, were to an 
earlier civilization, such are Progress and Universal 
Progress to the modem world . . . Faith that moral 
perfectibility is possible, not in remote times and 
places, not in the millenium, not in heaven, but in 
the furtherance of a present progress, is a faith which 
to possess in modem times does not make a man suspected 
of folly or fanaticism. He may forget the past, cease 
to be religious in the conventional sense of the word, 
but he is the modem prophet.28
Though this faith in Progress and the perfectibility has 
occasionally been found throughout history, it was not until the 
time of the Enlightenment that it became fashionable. Chauncy 
Wright is probably correct when he wrote in 1865 that "it strikes 
the keynote of modem civilization."2^
The third option for man in this matter of faith is the 
option of the radically agnostic. In other words, one has the 
faith that there is no faith. Ultimately there is no source of, 
support for, or meaning in reality. This option has a wide fol­
lowing in the modem age and seems to be surpassing the faith in 
progress.
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The author of this study opts for the traditional act of 
faith in a transcendent God. Since it is an act of faith, by 
definition I cannot '‘prove" that my choice is the correct one 
just as no person can "disprove" it. I can, however, present 
my reasons for choosing this position. The third option of 
agnosticism is rejected because if followed to its ultimate 
logical conclusion (and, in  opposition to many in my age, I 
like to follow things to their logical conclusion) it can easily 
be shown that it leads to a nihilism and despair which is unac­
ceptable to me. As Will Herberg has written, "The philosophy 
that has become normative for modem man is part of an entire 
spiritual complex which paradoxically combines a practical Pru- 
metheanism with a world-outlook that is nothing short of nihilism."30 
Small wonder that the modem world suffers from a general malaise.
The faith in Progress and the perfectibility of man is re­
jected because it seems to be just a half-way house, a somewhat 
arbitrary stopping-point, between the first act of faith and the 
third. As J. B. Bury has noted, it will in the end fall a victim 
to its own denial of finality.3  ̂ Though one can glorify man for 
a certain length of time as was done in the last half of the 
nineteenth century in western civilization:
Glory to Man in the highest
The Maker and Master of all things.
(Algernon Charles Swinburne, Hymn to Man, 1871)
such a philosophy has no lasting power. Less than a hundred years
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after Swinburne penned this ode to man it has become clear to 
many thoughtful observers that such a faith is incongruous, to 
say the least. As one of the leading theoriticians of the 
British Labor Party writes,
The evolutionary and revolutionary philosohphies 
of progress have both proved false. Judging from the 
facts, there is far more to be said for the Christian 
doctrine of original sin than for Rousseau's fantasy of 
the noble savage, or Marx's vision of the classlesssociety.32
We have found out that if there is one thing that the twentieth 
century knows, it is that the more manipulative knowledge is at­
tained by people who do not have a transcendental reference point, 
"the more that knowledge is used for evil p u r p o s e s . T h u s  we 
perceive that the world-outlook of the faith predicated upon 
Progress and the perfectibility of man, compounded by a positi- 
vistic scientism, leads to a relativism which can find no place 
for absolute values in their vision of reality and, as a result, 
(as Schumacher has noted) we have a plethora of means masquerading 
as final ends. But without a secure foundation, human life and 
all its economic enterprises are deprived of sense and meaning. 
Idolizing man dehumanizes him no less than enslavement. If man 
is looked upon as the center of the universe, then it is not dif­
ficult to look upon his economic role as "maker and master of 
things" as an end in itself, especially when the idea of Progress 
is dethroned. The original error of this positivistic and con­
sequently relativistic faith is not, of course, in taking man
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seriously but in making man the center of the universe. Be­
cause of a too narrow perspective, modem man's socio-economic 
goals are rendered empty of meaning. Relying solely on his 
strength, modem man is bereft of a reference point. This has 
led to a crisis which Will Herberg describes as follows:
We stand at the brink of an abyss with all 
our supports swept away. Science, History, Culture, 
Economic Progress, Socialism - yes, even conventional 
ethics and religion - how vain and powerless they have 
shown themselves to be amid the cataclysms of our 
time . . . The abyss can be crossed in one way and 
in one way only - by the "leap of faith." It is a 
leap beyond experience, beyond science, beyond objec­
tive logic. Experience, science, philosophy can bring 
us to the edge of the precipice and point beyond; 
they cannot help us cross: only the decision of faith 
can do that,34
Contemporary economic and ecological crises are reflections of 
an underlying moral and spiritual crisis of civilization, and 
their resolution depends upon the resolution of that deeper 
crisis. The underlying dileirma is that, somehow, transcendental 
values have come to be a luxury, a functionless decoration, 
superinposed upon values determined by economic efficiency, 
rather than being the measure of the appropriateness of economic 
values. We are thus led straight to agnosticism, the faith that 
there is no faith.
Our task, after having explicitly stated our basic trans­
cendental faith and fundamental values, is next to explore scien­
tifically the economic implications of such a stance. In this 
traditional Greco-Judaeo-Christian thought with its belief in an
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absolute and transcendental creator or First Cause, the primary 
evaluation concerning economic activity is obvious: Economic ac­
tivity has its rationale only to the extent that it contributes 
to the progressive approximation of that quality of life which 
is appropriate for men made in the image of their creator.^5 
This fundamental evaluation does not signify that economic pro­
ductivity and consumption are unimportant; indeed, the opposite 
conclusion would be more true. Greco-Judaeo-Christian thought, 
precisely because of its analytical investigation into the nature 
of man and the final goal of man, is able to buttress its con­
clusions about man's economic activities much more securely than 
that rationalistic and positivistic thought which unquestionably 
accepts that caricature of man, "the economic man" and his fleeting 
desires as the foundation for its analysis. This primary evalua­
tion does, however, signify that economics is a subdicipline in 
the realm of moral philosophy and theology. Economics loses its 
autonomy and the economist must consider ethical implications in 
his analysis. Not to do so would cause one's economic analysis 
to lose all significance. As John Maynard Keynes has testified 
about the analysis of economists, "there are practically no issues 
of policy, as distinct from technique, which do not involve ethical 
considerations. If this is emphasized," he goes on to say, "the 
right of religion to interfere in what is essentially a branch 
of ethics becomes even more obvious."^ Earlier Philip Wicksteed
197
had made the same observation, "If we reflect upon these things 
. . .  we shall understand that the ultimate significance (of our 
economic investigations) is determined by ethical considerations."3^
This does not mean that the analysis of economists loses in 
importance. Once again, on the contrary, it means that economic 
research is elevated in importance and its logical foundation 
supported more securely by finding its realistic niche in the 
hierarchy of disciplines. Not only is economic activity an ob­
vious material prerequisite to man’s approximation to that quality 
of life which befits one made in the image of his creator, but 
according to the Judaeo-Christian heritage it is a spiritual pre­
requisite since it is in service to man that service to God is 
approved. Judaeo-Christians "cannot take God and His will 
seriously without at the same time taking seriously man and his 
well-being."38
One can also support the conclusion that the discipline of 
economics is elevated by subordinating it to a transcendental 
final goal by discussing the Judaeo-Christian theology of labor.
If the Judaeo-Christian ideal is progressively to approximate 
that quality of life which is appropriate for men and women made 
in the image of their creator, is not man’s creative activity 
(and that includes economic activity) an important facet of such 
a society? Though man cannot create ex nihilo, he can create 
new things out of the material resources of the universe. Man,
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alone of all animals, can deliberately make things which, because 
of an intrinsic quality, have a right to existence. G. K. 
Chesterton has defined the Christian view of the noble, though 
secondary, importance of economic productivity in the following 
manner:
Man is made man, after the fact that he prays, by 
the fact that he ploughs, that he builds, that he cuts 
wood for transport or carves it for ornament; in short, 
by the fact that he has this mystical privilege of 
mastery over the material universe.39
It is important to note that G. K. Chesterton implies that prayer 
comes before work in importance, Economic activity, and conse­
quently economic research, has great meaning but only if it accepts 
the challenge of contributing to that quality of life which is 
appropriate for man made in the image of his creator.
Although the study of political economy can dull 
the feeling of the narrow-minded and make them see 
nothing on earth but merchandise, sales and profits, 
for those with a larger perspective the study of politi­
cal economy will always be a source of noble meditation 
on the means of improving the lot of man, and on the 
largesse of the eternal creator of all things.40
This subordination of economics to ethics does not imply that 
theologians should be allowed to dictate particular economic 
politicies based on sacred sanctions. Christian theology, as 
befits its leader, who certainly did not dictate economic policy, 
should only want to be a servant to the other disciplines by 
showing them the highest meaning of life, and should not want to 
take over their unique, arduous and agonizing particular re­
sponsibilities.
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Theology can never be a comprehensive, systematic 
world view, worked out down to the smallest details and 
rendering ultimately superfluous any further reflections 
of sociologists, psychologists, economists, jurists, medi- 
can experts and natural scientists . . .  No science - 
theology no more than any other science - can take as its 
object all aspects of human life and action.
Hans Kung then goes on to say that the legitimate object of theology 
is to attempt to answer "the often tormenting but perhaps never­
theless liberating question about an ultimate w h y . N o  less 
than the economist, when the theologian attempts to overstep the 
boundaries of his discipline he becomes prone to error. Economi­
cally ignorant moral theology is as objectionable as morally 
callous economics. Historically the theologian who attempts to 
perform economic analysis without a proper training has become a 
pawn in the hands of the economically powerful or a naive revolu­
tionary. In his time Marx had more than enough evidence to make 
his succinct statement that "religion is the opium of the people" 
just as Whitehead has more than enough evidence to state now that 
"scientism is the opium of the people." One can readily under­
stand why economists are wary of the moral directives of theo­
logians when one studies some of the political-economic involve­
ments of theologians in the past ages. Unfortunately, this is 
still true of some documents of the modem Church authorities.
But such shenanigans are not part of theology any more than arbi­
trarily defining man to be solely an "economic agent" is part of 
economics.
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The true theologian who studies the absolute Creator and 
man's relationship with this creator realizes, as one of his 
greatest predecessors has stated, that he sees through a glass 
darkly when it comes to man's most important goals and values.
This is what one should expect given the extreme "otherness" 
that separates God and man.
The most important task of philosophy and theology in re­
gard to economics is to set in perspective what should be the 
final goals of economists. In witnessing the intense desire of 
economists to analyze the gross national product, their zeal to 
maximize the utility of every resource and commodity, one can 
easily get the impression that economists regard wealth, and 
the productive activity that results in wealth, as the end to 
which man's existence is subservient. Theologians in their search 
for the ultimate why should have learned by this time that man's 
greatness does not lie in having possession of external goods 
but in utilizing such goods in a manner which recognises that 
their true value lies in being used in a dependent fashion - 
dependence upon God through His law of nature. Such dependence 
leads to the virtue of humility and away from the vice of hubris 
and one cannot help but wonder if economists have acquired this 
virtue of humility and avoided the vice of hubris. This may be 
analagous to what the ecological scientist is trying to tell us 
when he discusses the utter dependence of man upon nature.
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What is that quality of life that is appropriate for men 
made in the image of their creator: What is the role of economics
in contributing to that quality of life? It is clear that such 
a life will find its meaning, its inspiration, its goal in 
reflection upon the source of all things, its Godhead. In Greco- 
Judaeo-Christian civilization this reflection has started with 
exploring all dimensions of creation itself with the hope that by 
analyzing the created one might catch some glimpses of the creator. 
The Judaeo-Christian, furthermore, believes he has been aided in 
this search by divine revelation. And though the Greco-Judaeo- 
Christian scholar studies the material and physical dimensions of 
the universe just as intently as the positivistic scientist, and 
though the Greco-Judaeo-Christian investigates the manifold di­
mensions of man just as thoroughly as the agnostic humanist and 
will find no difficulty in accepting the conclusions of such 
scholars in their appropriate areas of studies, and, indeed, will 
find much that is worthy of admiration and support, the very fact 
that the Greco-Judaeo-Christian perceives this analyzed mind and 
matter as created adds an overlapping dimension that adds a crucial 
meaning to all of the conclusions. Only the Greco-Judaeo-Christian 
can evaluate the absolute worth of all features of this created 
universe from the most insignificant neutron to the most significant 
works of man and even man himself. Without this dimension that 
orders all things we would have perhaps a brilliant analysis of
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certain particular aspects of the universe but we would not have
the slightest idea of the real importance of such analysis.
Because of this fundamental intellectual anchor, the Judaeo-
Christian has the key that can evaluate the worth of economic
goods, as E. F. Schinnacher does in the following passage. He
begins by quoting the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola,
the Spanish founder of the Jesuits.
Man was created to praise, reverence, and serve God 
our Lord, and by this means to save his soul; and 
the other things on the face of the earth were 
created for man's sake, and in order to aid him in
the prosecution of the end for which he was created.
Whence it follows
That man ought to make use of them just so far as they 
help him to attain his end,
And that he ought to withdraw himself from them just 
so far as they hinder him.
The logic of this statement is unshakable; it is in 
fact the kind of logic we invariably try to apply in 
our everyday affairs, whether it be business, or 
science, or engineering, or politics. We first try 
to clarify what we want to achieve; we then study the 
means at our disposal; and we then use those means 
just so far as - in our judgment - they help us to 
attain our objectives, and when it appears that we 
are overdoing things we withdraw from these means 
just so far as they hinder us.
When applied to mankind's presentday economic 
situation, the statement also seems eminently realis­
tic. It implies that where people do not have enough 
means to attain their ends they should have more, and 
where they have more than enough they should "with­
draw" from that which is excessive.42
How much is "enough" and what is "excessive?" The Christian 
views man as composed of a material body and an immaterial com­
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ponent that interpenetrate each other thoroughly. Man has, 
therefore, the material economic needs of any oxidizing machine 
while at the same time he has an interior spirit that will not 
be satisfied with only an ever-increasing accumulation of 
economic goods. Material economic goods, besides being absolutely 
necessary as inputs to keep alive, are the usual prerequisites 
needed to attain that society which is appropriate to persons 
who are in the image of the Creator. Yet, too much accumulation 
of such economic goods can be toxic to this optimal quality of 
life. But as the precise amount of economic goods that is optimal 
for the average man to attain his final goal, it would be unwise 
to attempt to find an exact amount per person. When dealing 
with one's search for the transcendental, one should not expect the 
preciseness that can be obtained in a cost-benefit analysis (which 
is frequently spurious in any case). To attempt to delineate 
precisely and exactly the optimum amount of economic possessions 
for achieving a transcendental sumnum bonum is a contradiction in 
terms. We can only quantifiably measure the inert physical things 
of this world. As we cannot measure qualities of beauty, goodness, 
and attributes of the hunan spirit, much less can we measure the 
achievement of transcendental goals. When we measure something, 
we analyze an item within a closed system and, by definition, the 
transcendental cannot be enclosed. Since we cannot measure the 
goal, it follows that we cannot measure precisely the means to
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achieve the goal. To attempt to make a precise and exact measure­
ment of the optimal amount of economic goods useful in achieving 
a transcendental goal would be a detour from actually achieving 
such a goal and would be a manifestation that one was more inter­
ested in preciseness and mathematical rigor than in pursuing 
one's final transcendental goal. One could end up by placing 
one's faith in numbers and man's ability to logically manipulate 
such numbers rather than in the transcendental creator.
Although we can never determine the precise amount of 
economic goods that are instrunental in achieving the final goal, 
this does not mean that we have to go to the other extreme and 
say that we cannot acquire some significant conclusions about 
the relationship of economic activity and the sunmum bonum of man. 
Even if we could go no further than saying that there was a rela­
tionship between the summum bonum and the quantity of economic 
goods produced and consumed, we would have already gone a long 
way. We would have demonstrated that "a society which, like ours, 
defines the good life as identical with the high standard of 
living is running contrary to a fundamental characteristic of the 
nature of man."^
Assume that we lived in a world in which, because of a more 
abundant and equitable supply of natural resources and fuels, all 
of the earth's inhabitants were able to own all the motorized 
vehicles and electrical gadgets which they apparently desire.
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Would it be a better world if we had no transcendental goals but 
we could go from nowhere to nowhere at 80 miles per hour? Or 
would we only be more anxious about our increased amount of 
possessions? Would it not be true that "more production of 
material goods and services conducive to comfort m y  be detri­
mental to the satisfaction of 'higher,1 noneconomic needs such 
as love, friendship, silence, solitude, contemplation, aesthetic 
and religious experience, community, environment?"^ As my 
neighborhood mechanic remarked to me recently on one of my fre­
quent visits to his shop, "there is no such thing any more as a 
good car. The only trouble is that we cannot survive without 
the bad ones,"
The general criterion to be used in determining what 
are sufficient economic goods would then be that whatever goods 
aid one in achieving his transcendental goal are to be used, and, 
conversely, those goods which detract more than they add in 
achieving this goal are excessive.^ The essential norm is that 
the transcendental goal be sought first. We shall never be able 
to define the notion of sufficiency if there is no transcendental 
sutnnum bonum, because we must face the question: sufficient for 
what? For realization of the surnnum bonum. But we can only 
realize the summum bonum by seeking a hierarchy of intermediate 
ends. Yet we cannot get this hierarchy in the right order without 
some independent perception of the smrroum bonum. This struggle
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to set priorities forces us to clarify our perception of the 
summum bonum. Current conflicts over responsibility of man to 
sub-human creation as well as his own species, needs of future 
as well as the present, and what amount of economic goods are 
sufficient for the ideal quality of life are examples of con­
troversial issues which will aid us in the never-ending task 
of clarifying the notion of the summum bonum. What society 
needs is not so much a precise resolution to all these issues 
but a shift in the hearts of men away from external material 
possessions towards more immaterial goals.
Such a change in goals will have important direct and in­
direct implications for economic theory. All economic activity 
will have to be explicitly scrutinized with a view to its effect 
on achieving the transcendental summum bonum. This will require 
the inclusion of many imponderable and indeterminate variables 
into our analysis.^
In conclusion, as examples of the extended implications of 
a transcendental goal upon economic analysis, it becomes clear 
that problems of scale in economic production are important be­
cause of the impact that the centralization of decision-making has 
on the person of both the few decision-makers who can then 
manipulate the lives of many others and the many powerless who 
became dependent upon the arbitrary decisions of others. Because 
of this excessive economic power in the hands of a few and the
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alienation of decision-making away from those who will be af­
fected by the decisions, for the economist with transcendental 
ideals ’’small is beautiful," or as expressed in Thomistic 
scholastic terminology, the principle of subsidiarity ought to 
be utilized when making decisions concerning the optimal sizes 
of economic enterprises. In conventional economic theory monopolies 
are disliked, not because of their large size and centralization 
of economic power, but because they remove the economic system 
away from the "ideal" economic structure of competition between 
enterprises. A large quantity of competition among economic 
enterprises is looked upon as a desideratum because it theoreti­
cally leads to equality of marginal costs and benefits and con­
sequent "efficient" allocation of material resources. If, how­
ever, natural economies of scale exist, the conventional economist 
will then allow such monoplies to exist but will attenpt either 
through state ownership or regulation to force these monopolies 
to price their product as if they were a competitive firm. The 
economist whose goal is that quality of life which is most ap­
propriate to persons made in the image of their creator will have 
different criteria with which to judge monopolies and large-scale 
enterprises. Large-scale enterprises, whether monopolies or not, 
tend to concentrate economic power and decision-making and thus 
to take away from the average individual any creative expression 
of his unique being in both his productive and his consumptive
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role. As Richard Crossman has written, "We must assume that in­
creased concentration of power, whether in the form of technologi­
cal development or social organisation, will always produce ex­
ploitation, injustice and inequality in a society."4'7
Another related implication of having a transcendental goal 
can be found in the economic theory of labor. Does man's work 
dignify him in the sense that he shares in the creative work of the 
transcendent creator? Is it true that "bodily labor, which even 
after original sin was decreased by Providence for the good of 
man's body and soul, is in many instances changed into an instru­
ment of perversion; for from the factory dead matter goes out 
improved, whereas men are corrupted and degraded?" 48 Do modem 
laboring practices enslave a worker so that he degenerates to a 
lower level of being than that destined for him, to an animal- 
like existence in which he is fettered by his own material and 
sexual desires, or even less to a machine-like existence in which
he has no desires at all except the motivated drive to be effi-
49cient? Though this latter type of attitude may be able to 
masquerade as a Christian work ethic (i.e., the Puritan work 
ethic) because of some superficial similarities, it would not take 
long for a critical observer to tell which is which. Labor theory 
in economics should attempt to construct an economic system which 
encourages to the extent that it is possible a worker may be 
creative, to exercise in a responsible manner that "mystical
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privilege of mastery over the material universe." Those laboring 
practices which are degrading should be minimized to the extent 
that is possible. Maximization in output and economic efficiency 
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